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Abstract
The risk of increasingly devastating natural disasters and the continuous threats of
terrorism drive the nation's demand for swift and effective national emergency planning
and response. Hurricane Katrina struck and devastated parts of the Gulf Region as a
Category 4 hurricane in August 2005. After landfall in New Orleans, opportunities to
maintain sanitation and hygiene quickly disappeared as flood water became
contaminated, evacuees were stranded and forced to sleep next to dead bodies and human
waste, survive without food or water and hope to be rescued. Survivors were convinced
that they were abandoned by the federal government and left to die. Political leaders
including President Bush, the governor ofLouisiana and the mayor ofNew Orleans, have
publicly criticized the federal emergency response. A content analysis will be presented
that analyzes FEMA's actions related to New Orleans from August 26, 2005 to
September 5, 2005. A timeline of FEMA actions and decisions for these dates has been
compiled from three sources: the Brookings Institute, Think Progress, and Fact Check,
which will be compared against the National Response Plan functions that outline
responsibilities and actions for FEMA. Congressional testimony, The White House
report and the Bipartisan Committee report also provide a first hand account of FEMA's
response as well as providing additional information regarding actions taking by FEMA
which are not included in the timelines. New recommendations, based on organizational
theory, have also been developed. It is apparent that FEMA's failure is due to its
organizational structure and systems. Therefore, policy is needed to correct FEMA's
severe shortcomings. Such policy change has also been demanded by the public as well
as local/state government entities.
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction
Organizational theory, as described by Diane Vaughan, involves the idea that,
"formal organizations are designed to produce means-ends oriented social action by
formal structures and processes intended to assure certainty, conformity and goal
attainment"
(1999, p. 273). According to Vaughan, all organizations experience mistake,
misconduct, and disaster which are systematically produced based on an organization's
structure (1999, p. 271). This thesis examines the organizational structure of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and how its organizational structure
contributed to a deficient and uncoordinated response to Hurricane Katrina around the
New Orleans area in 2005.
Based on organizational theory, four research questions were developed that focus on
four areas of FEMA's deficient response to Hurricane Katrina including; centralization
and flexibility, employee competency, information sharing, and business continuity
planning.
1. How will centralization and flexibility affect an organization's ability to
effectively respond and adapt to new and unexpected situations?
2. To what extent will employee skill set and situational awareness affect
organizational operations?
3. How will intra and external information sharing impact communication and
performance?
4. To what extent will a business continuity plan effect an organization's ability to
timely recover from initial failures?
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Using organizational theory, FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans
is analyzed by comparing the research questions against FEMA-mandated actions
outlined by the National Response Plan, a timeline of events that took place, as well as
congressional testimony, the Select Bipartisan Committee report, A Failure ofInitiative,
and the White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina. From this
analysis, recommendations will be made with the focus of increasing FEMA's
preparedness and response to future disasters to prevent such dismal FEMA performance
as seen with the response to Hurricane Katrina.
1.1. Why isKatrina an Issue?
The risk of increasingly devastating natural disasters and the continuous threat of
terrorism drive the nation's demand for swift and effective national emergency response.
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck and devastated parts of Louisiana, Mississippi
and Alabama as a Category 4 hurricane (CNN, 2005) in August 2005. The people who
survived the 175 mph winds and 20 foot surges of water into the city expected federal
relief that was exceedingly slow to arrive. Victims and evacuees waiting four full days
before the federal government began to provide assistance. By all accounts, the federal
response was a complete failure. In absence of federal relief, citizens around the nation
took the initiative to come forth with supplies and equipment, set up donation funds, offer
to take care of displaced pets, and even accept survivors into their homes knowing it
would be an extended stay.
Survivors in the affected areas in the Gulf region lost hope that the federal
government would come to their assistance. Violence and emotions ran high as people
looted for food, water and other essential items for their survival. Media sources
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local emergency efforts (Schneider, 1993). According to Schneider, the federal thought
towards emergency management must be shifted towards proactive approaches, with less
emphasis on civil defense. Schneider states that the federal response in 1989 to
Hurricane Hugo was found by GAO to be inadequate and that the federal response was
not capable of stepping in immediately to pick up the slack of overburdened state
resources (GAO, 1993).
InMay 2005, Congress and the Department ofHomeland Security's inspector general
charged that FEMA had paid $3 1 million in disaster relief without verifying damage
claims beforehand from Hurricane Frances that hit Florida in 2004. FEMA also paid out
nearly $200,000 in unverified expenses for clean-up equipment. Another $9 million in
rental assistance was paid to nearly 5000 residents who did not require such assistance
(Hall, 2005, p. 1). This particular incident was the first grilling session for the then
current FEMA Director, Mike Brown. Media sources have acknowledged that, "Created
in 1979, after criticism of previous disaster-relief efforts, FEMA is no stranger to
controversy"
(Marek, 2005). In fact, South Carolina Democrat Sen. Fritz Hollings
summed up prevalent frustration throughout the United States in 1989 after Hurricane
Hugo struck and devastated his state when he called FEMA, "the sorriest bunch of
bureaucratic jackasses I've ever
known"
(Hall, 2005, p. 2). Marek stated, "Kate Hale, the
former emergency management director of
Miami- Dade County, was so exasperated by
FEMA's response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 that she asked in a tearful press
conference, 'Where the hell is the
cavalry'"
(2005)?
The General Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of Congress, conducted
research regarding FEMA's capability to respond
to catastrophes after the relief efforts
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for Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The GAO concluded that FEMA and the federal response
were inadequate in the following areas: assessing damage and the needs of victims;
providing food, shelter and other essential services, such as medical care, to disaster
victims when the need for resources overburdens state and local faculties; and adequately
preparing for such a disaster even with advanced warnings since the President must issue
a disaster declaration before federal preparedness may commence (GAO, 1993).
The Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) has been accused ofmoving too slowly
and failing its mission of being ready for the future emergencies since September 11,
2001. This reason led to the creation of DHS; to prevent as well as respond to future
large scale emergencies. Four years after September 1
ll
,
DHS has only approved a draft
version of its "national preparedness
goal"
which covers each facet of an emergency
(Washington Post, 2005). Such a document would have proven to be extremely vital
during Hurricane Katrina, had government officials been able to utilize it.
Although DHS was created to prepare for all types of hazards, the Washington Post
has report that,
"
'DHS in reality emphasized terrorism at the expense of other threats',
said several current and former senior department officials and experts who have closely
monitored its creation. This includes the cutting of funding for natural disaster programs
and downgrading the responsibilities and capabilities of the previously well-regarded
FEMA"
(2005).
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and FEMA announced in
April 2002 that both agencies signed an agreement designating NIST to be the research
and technical resource for FEMA. The purpose of such an agreement was to assist the
federal government in minimizing national disaster losses and also bolster homeland
Chapter 1
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security efforts. The agreement states that both agencies will work on projects ofmutual
interest, collaborate to evaluate equipment that is used by first responders (police, fire,
EMS), and the agencies will meet on a semi-annual basis to assess their progress (NIST,
2002). Semi-annual meetings do not create the feeling that the parameters of the
agreement are of high priority. Also, the agreement does not appear to have a focus on
the prevention and response to natural disasters, other than the mention to equipment that
first responders utilize. Such equipment could include clipboards or flashlights, instead
of satellite communications, and mobile command units which may be more effective
and necessary.
In 2004, FEMA ran a simulation in which a Category 3 hurricane, dubbed Hurricane
Pam, hit Louisiana. The 5-day exercise covered various aspects of an emergency such as
how to replenish shelters and hospitals with necessary supplies, establishing a command
structure that would guide the effort of 800 rescuers, establishing 1000 shelters and
creating a transportation plan to safely evacuate survivors. Additional topics that were
discussed included identifying over 784 shelter locations, developing a plan for
identifying more shelter locations, strategies to transport patients between medical
facilities, and coordinating the operations and staffing of temporary schools in temporary
housing locations (Longley, 2005).
A FEMA press release was issued after the conclusion of the Hurricane Pam
simulation exercise on July 23, 2004, and contained the following statement from
Colonel Michael L. Brown, Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, "Hurricane planning in
Louisiana will
continue,"
stated Colonel Brown, "Over the next 60 days, we will polish
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the action plans developed during the Hurricane Pam exercise. We have also determined
where to focus our efforts in the
future"
(Longley,
2005)."
Clearly, such a plan did not
materialize before Hurricane Katrina struck and devastated the Gulf Region over a year
later on August 29, 2005.
1.3. Why is it a Policy Issue?
FEMA's failure regarding Hurricane Katrina is apparently due to its organizational
structure and systems failure. Components of FEMA's organizational structure will
inherently cause FEMA to fail when preparing for and responding to disaster. These
components include:
Centralization
Flexibility
Information sharing
Employee competency
Business continuity planning
Therefore, a policy response is needed to correct each of FEMA's severe
shortcomings. The public and local/state government entities have demanded such a
response. In addition, both the White House Report, The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned (2006), and Select Bipartisan Committee Report, A Failure of
Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation For and Response to Hurricane Katrina (2006), make several
recommendations that would include policy development, change and/or implementation.
In this way, both the analysis of and recommendations for FEMA closely involve policy.
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The National Response Plan (NRP) is the federal government's emergency response
plan and policy that coordinates the federal response to human-made and natural
disasters. Hurricane Katrina was the first time the NRP was utilized since its
implementation in 2004 by President Bush and clearly this new policy failed its first time
being used. The development of new policies or the adjustment of current policies may
be necessary to correct the problems of the NRP which contributed to FEMA's
horrendous disaster response.
Policy also has a strong presence in laws. Accordingly, there are several laws and
federal regulations that are involved in structuring a federal agency such as FEMA. Laws
also mandate FEMA's response duties for disasters including granting FEMA its
authority to prepare and respond to emergency incidents, outline action plans and assign
responsibility for critical response activities.
1.4.Why is it a Science/Technology Issue?
Technology is a large part of disaster planning, management and mitigation.
Technology is necessary for all facets of a disaster, including internal and external
communications, search and rescue operations, federal reporting, information flow
transportation, contract negotiation, etc. The use of technology is critical to the disaster
response. For example, FEMA uses satellite communication equipment, portable
communication hubs, and radios to maintain contact with FEMA employees, federal
agencies and local governments. Heat sensitive equipment assists search and rescue
teams to locate victims. Helicopters equipped with rescue tools are able to pluck
stranded victims from flooded land.
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The purpose of developing equipment for emergency response is to lessen the effort
and time needed to accomplish essential tasks required during a disaster. The overall
purpose of disaster response is to arrive at the recovery stages of a disaster as soon as
possible which can be done more efficiently and effectivelywith the aid of technology.
The federal government has access to various advanced technologies that the general
public may not even be aware of. With such great advances in technology, one would
expect that federal response duties and responsibilities, particularly that ofFEMA, would
be completed in a timely manner with precision and accuracy. Rather, FEMA's response
was primitive as they lacked the proper (or functioning) tools and equipment to
effectively provide relief response. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative, as well as various media reports, described several instances in
which federal equipment, particular FEMA's, was nonfunctional, incompatible with other
agencies'
equipment, not able to be located by FEMA, or not deployed by FEMA and sat
in FEMA storage facilities unused.
1.5. Why does itDemand a Response?
The public, as well as state and local government agencies, have demanded to know
who was responsible for the failed federal response and what measures will be taken to
ensure the federal government will have the capability to plan for and respond to
large-
scale disasters in the future. Accountability and corrective action for future human-made
and natural disasters must be achieved by the federal government in order to limit the loss
of life, property damage and to restore the public's faith that FEMA is an essential
government agency that can sufficiently respond to the needs ofdisaster victims.
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As demonstrated above, over the past 15 years the federal government, specifically
FEMA, has consistently been found to be lax and unprepared in its responses to
numerous man-made and natural disasters. Seemingly, FEMA has been criticized
multiple times for the same types of shortcomings and it appears as though FEMA has
not worked diligently or adequately to correct these shortcomings and improve future
preparedness and response. In recent years, the threat and use of terrorism dramatically
increased, while the threat of natural disasters has also become more dangerous and
costly. Therefore, the need is increasingly higher for a swift and effective federal
response to disaster, which should motivate FEMA to correct identified shortcomings,
failures and criticisms.
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina (2005) indicates that hurricanes are
becoming increasingly more expensive as more property damage is resulting from more
powerful storm as well as more lives are being lost. Figure 1.1 depicts the mounting
costs ofhurricanes each decade since 1900, which identifies a steady increase of cost and
destruction. Figure 1.2 compares the property damage costs, number of
damaged/destroyed homes and lives lost from Katrina to Hurricanes Ivan, Andrew and
Camille, with Katrina being approximately three times are costly as the other hurricanes.
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Figure 1.1 U.S. Natural Disasters that Caused the Most Death and Damage to Property in Each
Decade, 1900-2005, with 2004 Major Hurricanes Added Damage in Third Quarter 2005 Dollars
Deaths
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Figure 1.2: Hurricane Katrina Compared to Hurricanes Ivan, Andrew, and Camille
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In addition, Kerry Emanuel, an atmospheric scientist at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, has concluded that since the mid-1970s, there has been approximately a 50
percent increase in both the duration of these storms as well as their maximum wind
speeds (NSF, 2005, para. 2). This increase in power and destruction is growing due to
the ocean temperatures increase from global warming. Emmanuel has concluded that,
"Hurricanes account for a significant fraction of damage, injury and loss of life from
natural hazards, and are the costliest natural catastrophes in the United States. As the
human population in coastal regions gets denser, the damage and casualties produced by
more intense storms could increase considerably in the
future"
(NSF, 2005, para. 8).
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In fact, Ivor van Heerden, a hurricane expert at Louisiana State University, states he
saw Hurricane Katrina coming. 2001, he and colleagues have been generating computer
models ofhow a major storm could inundate the region in and around New Orleans. And
he and his team sought tenaciously at times desperately to have their warnings heeded
by government officials (Nova, 2004). Van Heerden stated during an interview with
NOVA in October 2004:
There is the potential for extremely high casualties people not only
killed by flying debris, drowning in the soup, but also just imagine, how
do we rescue the survivors? Unlike a river flood, it doesn't come up and go
down. The water stays. And it stays for months and months and months.
How do you rescue all of these people? If there's 200,000 survivors, you
get 20,000 out a day, that's 10 days. So how are they going to hang on?
You know, this is one of the big nightmares: how do you rescue those
survivors?What are they going to need?
I think that there is a real lack of appreciation for the science. I know from
the exercises we've been involved in, certainly with FEMA officials, not
all of them have been very responsive. You know, I think a lot of them are
ex-military folk, and to them we may be geeks.
FEMA can no longer be swept aside and out of the public spotlight until the next
disaster. Corrective action must be implemented now so new policies/procedures,
organizational restructuring, retraining and fund allocation can be in place to lessen
FEMA's burden ofmanaging emergency incidents. FEMA must be accountable for its
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deficient preparation and leadership during disaster preparedness and mitigation for
Hurricane Katrina. If this trend of poor performance and lack of accountability
continues, one may expect liability and litigation against FEMA for its repeated failed
responses, unwillingness to effect change, and ignoring federal recommendations.
1.6. RoadMap
The following road map outlines this thesis.
This thesis begins with an introductory chapter designed to make the reader aware of
the purpose and need for this research. The introductory chapter also discusses a bit of
preliminary background information on Hurricane Katrina to educate the reader of the
scope of the disaster being discussed and analyzed. The introduction also includes
fundamental information regarding FEMA, organizational structure history, and past
criticized disaster responses and actions.
The theory used to explain FEMA's failed response is organizational theory. Various
theories of organizations, their functioning, and organizational failure are introduced in
Chapter 2. Theory operationalization, which provides examples that support this
theoretical framework, are also discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, there are four
organizational problem areas that provide examples and further discussion of
organizational theories, including: centralization and inflexibility, employee inadequacy,
information flow, and lack ofplanning.
The background information and description of organizational theory leads into
Chapter 3, where the research methodology is outlined and discussed. The methodology
includes information regarding why each of the data sources was chosen for inclusion in
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this research as well as the steps and decisions made regarding how the data information
was collected.
Chapter 4 examines the three main sources of data used for the content analysis. A
timeline of actions from August
26th
through September
5th
outlines the events that took
place as reported by various media sources. The National Response plan outlines
responsibilities and essential functions that each of the federal government agencies,
particularly FEMA, are mandated to perform during an emergency. The final section of
Chapter 4 describes what FEMA did correctly during its response to Hurricane Katrina.
While there are not many accomplishments, it must be recognized that FEMA was able to
successfully perform some of its functions and tasks during the relief effort ofHurricane
Katrina.
Chapter 4 leads into the analysis and discussion section which comprises Chapter 5.
The chapter includes the findings, analysis and discussion of the research. Specific
examples of FEMA's response effort are discussed. The Select Bipartisan Committee
report, A Failure of Initiative, and the White House report, The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina, provide examples of FEMA's activities during the relief response as
well as investigative findings presented in each of these federal reports. Congressional
testimony provides an inside look at FEMA's response during Hurricane Katrina and
offers a first hand account of the events and actions that transpired during the relief effort.
Policy recommendations for FEMA will be discussed in Chapter 6. These
recommendations are focused at FEMA and how it may improve its disaster
preparedness, response and effectiveness. These recommendations are based on the
findings and analysis section ofChapter 5. The findings and analysis are developed from
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the evaluation of the research questions which were developed from the organizational
theoretical framework in Chapter 2.
As with all types of research, it must be recognized that there are limitations and
challenges. Chapter 7 discusses the limitations of content analysis research design, the
selected data sources and methodology applied in conducting the research.
Conclusions of the research analysis are discussed in the final section, Chapter 8.
Clearly, FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina was insufficient, uncoordinated and
delayed. Organizational changes must be implemented to correct FEMA's inherent
deficiencies and ensure successful future disaster preparedness and response
performance. The opportunities for further research are acknowledged in Chapter 8, as
this research does not fully answer all possible questions regarding FEMA, its
organizational functions and structure, or its response to Hurricane Katrina.
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2. Chapter 2: Literature Review
In order to understand why the federal response to Hurricane Katrina was inadequate
and to assist in answering the public's demand for accountability, a theoretical
framework must be developed. This type of framework is necessary in order to identify
what areas of the federal response, particularly FEMA's response, failed and
subsequently develop policy recommendations to correct such failures. Various
organizational theories provide viable systems which are applicable to explaining FEMA
preparation activities and its response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans during what
the media has termed the "Week of Crisis". Organizational theories explain how
organizations function, their structure and what components and characterizations of an
organization may cause such problems and failures witnessed in FEMA's response to
Hurricane Katrina. More specifically, organizational theory describes an organization's
behaviors, interactions and dynamics through studies of its structures (including
centralization of power, coordination and formalization), functions and properties
(ISCID, 2006).
Organizational deviance is defined by Diane Vaughan as, "an event, or circumstance,
occurring in and/or produced by a formal organization that deviates from both formal
organizational design goals and normative standards or expectations, either in the fact of
its occurrence or in its consequences and that produces an unanticipated suboptimal
outcome"
(1999, p.283). Essentially, when organizations stray from established protocol
or agency goals there is a high probability that mistake and negative consequences will
result. Further, mistake and disaster are described by Vaughan as, "socially in relation to
the norms of a particular group [such as an
organization]"
(1999). This indicates the
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same action may be viewed differently depending on the structure and norms of the
organization involved. When identifying a failure in an organization, it is also important
to determine who has the authority to define what circumstances constitute failure
(Hughes, 1951). Different organizations will have varying descriptions and
classifications of what is acceptable and categorized as a deviation from the
organization's norms and expectations. Each organization will also have its own
definition ofmistake, deviance and failure.
As described by Vaughan, organizational researchers have accepted that, "A mistake
is systematically produced as a part of the social organization of
work"
(1999, p.283).
Vaughan continues, "A mistake is defined as organizational deviance that stresses the
violation of formal design goals and normative standards and expectations to include acts
of omission or commission by individuals or groups of individuals, acting in their
organizational roles that produce unexpected adverse outcomes with a contained social
cost"
(1999, p.284). Essentially, a mistake is defined as when an error occurs and the
consequences are relatively small (i.e. a procedure wasn't correctly carried out and it was
inconvenient for another worker to correct the action).
Vaughan has categorized misconduct as organizational deviance plus, "acts of
omission or commission by individuals or groups of individuals, acting in their
organizational roles, who violate internal rules, laws, or administrative regulations on
behalfof organization goals. Harm is extensive and social costs are
high"
(1999, p. 288).
Misconduct is seen as intentional deviation of organizational norms and procedures,
similar to sabotage. FEMA employees did not intentionally sabotage their relief efforts
or refuse to provide an adequate or timely response. In reality, FEMA did not have the
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capacity or ability to properly respond to the overwhelming need for relief that Hurricane
Katrina caused. Therefore, misconduct will not be included in this discussion since it
was not a factor in FEMA's response effort.
While organizations strive to function efficiently and effectively, virtually all
organizations have a dark side. This side of an organization has been described as a place
where nonconformity, mistake, misconduct and failure may occur and how activities may
go wrong in organized settings (Vaughan, 1999). Vaughan stated, "Routine
nonconformity, mistakes, misconduct and disaster are not abnormal events, but
systematic products of complex structures and
processes"
(1999).
Regarding organizational theory, the distinction must be made that the theoretical
framework of this thesis is more applicable to the public sector, rather than the private
sector. The main organizational theorist referenced in this thesis, sociologist Diane
Vaughan, has spent several years concentrating on the sociology of public organizational
failures, particularly NASA's Challenger and Columbia disasters. Coupled with
Vaughan'
s evaluation of two shuttle disasters, Scott Snook examined the public
organizational theory practical drift as experienced during a military friendly fire
incident. The remaining majority of organizational theorists cited in this thesis were
identified through Diane Vaughan's works related to public sector organizational theory.
While not all authors may clearly make the distinction between their intent to focus on
private or public sector organizational theories, the focus of this theoretical framework is
solely the public sector.
Public organizational theory invariably differs from private sector organizational
theory. The public sector encompasses that portion of the economy composed of all
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levels of government, and excluding businesses and households (Office of Thrift
Supervision, 2006). Typically, the focus of the public sector includes communal services
for all citizens as well as state or federally controlled services. Also, the actions of the
public sectormay be politically driven.
Conversely, the private sector includes that portion of the economy composed of
businesses and households, and excluding government (Office of Thrift Supervision,
2006). The private sector is generallymore profit driven that the public sector, more able
to quickly provide individual services to citizens and is usually less bureaucratic.
This thesis will determine whether FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina is
essentially due to organizational mistakes and failure. This thesis will also examine if
FEMA was capable of adequately preparing for and responding to Hurricane Katrina.
Specifically, this thesis will analyze FEMA's centralization, flexibility, employee
competency, information sharing and business continuity planning.
2.1. Problem ofCentralization and Inflexibility
The historic transformation of individuals into formal organizations meant that
organizations now interact with other organizations and no longer individual voice to
individual voice. Due to the formalization and rise oforganizations, individuals lost their
voice and subsequently lost a degree of individual power (Coleman, 1974).
Organizations, particularly larger ones, make it rather opportunistic for employees to
hide within the organizational structure and avoid being singled out or held accountable,
which may lead to a lack of accountability, and ease in passing the blame onto others.
Vaughan established that, "Formal organizations are designed to produce means-end
oriented social action by formal structures and processes intended to assure certainty,
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conformity and goal
attainment"
(1999, p. 273). Essentially, organizations will develop a
structure that will assist in maintaining organization rigidity, reliability and success.
Without such formality and process, an organization is liable to fall apart as it has no
backbone. This breakdown does not occur by chance, but rather it is generally a standard
offshoot of the connections between the characteristics (environment, organization and
cognitive practices) of the organization and its system (Vaughan, 1999, p.274). Vaughan
described this as organizational deviance: "A predictable and recurring product of all
socially organized
systems"
(1999, p.274).
High levels of formalization or centralization may result in greater organizational
coordination. While formalization and centralization produce a strong spine for an
organization, they are not without their drawbacks. Organizations may also suffer from
rigidity in which the organization is not flexible enough to adapt to new and changing
situations, policies that are not suited to address all type of situations and cumbersome
procedures may stall routine decisions or rapid-response in crisis situations (Staw et. all,
1981).
Based on this theory, organizations will be unable to adapt to unforeseen situations in
which there is no organizational policy or procedure. Instead, organizations will follow
existing policies and procedures, despite the gravity of an urgent situation they may face.
As a result, the organization will fail at effectively responding to the unplanned situation,
as the organization will not have a pre-established standard for response. Due to
bureaucratic red tape, organizational processes will delay critical response efforts. An
organization will not bypass such time intensive structures processes. This type of theory
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lends itself to an inefficient, inflexible, and bureaucratically complex organization which
will inevitably delay or possibly paralyze disaster response and mitigation.
Also, power may be used by organizations as a central explanatory concept regarding
new and unforeseen situations. When this occurs, the focus of an organization shifts
from adapting to new and uncertain environmental conditions to the organization,
"actively defining, creating and shaping its environment to suit their
needs,"
as described
by Perrow (1986 and 1991). Selznick (1949) further explains this "power
struggle"
may
result in goal displacement and threatened organizational stability. In order for
organizations to survive and not fall victim to Darwinism, they must compete for
resources.
Organizations respond to the work environment they are in (pressure to perform,
competition for resources, etc.) instead of the true work task they are seeking to
complete. When an organization develops intricate and elaborate extensions of their
fundamental policies and procedures, the complexity of the organization itself increases.
These rules function as myths that organizations will adopt them, establish legitimacy for
them, and dedicate resources to them. Institutionalized products, services, techniques,
policies and program myths are tempting to buy into and serve as powerful myths that
many organizations are willing to adopt ceremonially (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The
use of these rules will conflict with the organization's support, legitimacy and efficiency
structure.
Environmental strain (conflicting goals, deadlines, complex procedures, performance
pressures) is tightly associated to failure. The more environmental strain an organization
experiences, the higher the chances are for it to succumb to failure. The chance of failure
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is due to both internal and external pressure and organizational complexity, which make
it more difficult to follow organizational procedure and standards. The organization's
history, or track record, also matters (Turner, 1978) when assessing how an organization
will fare with environmental strains. Have past problems been corrected and new
processes put in place to correct a previous situation? Have cultural beliefs adapted to
the new and changing environmental factors?
2.2. Problem ofLack ofEmployee Competence
As explained by Hughes, "The frequency and probability of workplace errors will
vary based on occupational skill, frequency of skill performance and the role in the
workplace as a social
system"
(1951). In addition, Hughes also stated that the
opportunity for workplace errors to occur is dependent on the, "distribution of risk among
occupational roles and how systems delegate, spread, or concentrate both the risk of
mistakes at work and the losses that result from
them"
(1951). For example, a non-profit
organization that has one grant as its sole funding source which allows its least
experienced employee to be the sole author of the grant application will increase its risk
of error, or not being funded, than an organization who diversifies its sources of funding
and has a committee of experienced staff collaborating to author its grant application.
Organizations that do not adequately distribute risk or plan for losses from mistakes
will have an ineffective response. Few employees are knowledgeable regarding what
tasks must be accomplished if they are regularly not included in such activities.
Employees may attempt to act on their own to coordinate response actions which they
believe to be beneficial to both the organization's struggling response effort. When
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employees drift from the organization's procedure and act on their own without
supervision or approval, then the risk ofmistakes and errors will be high.
When poor performance is observed, organizations respond by tightening rules and
regulations in hopes of an easy resolution to the perceived problem. Increased rigidity, as
noted by Crozier (1964), is a typical response to organizations error or poor performance.
For each subsequent error that occurs, the response is the same and rigidity increases.
This heightened level of rigidity merely perpetuates the death spiral of nonconformity
since there is no method to identify and correct the problem. Thus, an organization's
system of bureaucracy cannot properly correct its own errors because there is no useful
feedback mechanism is in place.
Hierarchy and power have a prominent role is failures. Executive goals and resource
allocation may place employees in a situation where there may be a tendency for
accidents to occur. Executives and administrative employees are generally removed from
the daily functions of an organization and therefore are not well versed in daily tasks and
procedures. As a result, administrators and executives maymake decisions or take action
that is harmful to the rest of the organization due to lack of knowledge of the
organization. Decisions or actions may also result from the executive's own political
agenda or personal gain, despite what may be beneficial for the organization. As a result,
errors which may occur at the top of an organization's hierarchy have an increased
potential to result in organizational accidents since such errors act as a slippery slope and
often compound as theymove down through the hierarchy (Turner, 1978).
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2.3. Problem ofLack ofInformation Sharing
Specialization ofknowledge between organizations or within various disciplines of an
organization can lead to negative consequences (Vaughan, 1999, p. 272). Due to such
barriers as technical vernacular, specialized knowledge, and technology, employees may
be unable to communicate and relate to one another. This may foster frustration and an
unwillingness to engage in dialogue and debate, which is essential for intellectual and
policy development. Similarities in related work products and functions may not be
visible to employees. In addition, Vaughan has indicated, "The sociological basis for
policy implications for organizations may remain
underdeveloped"
(1999).
Organizations may also suffer from what Vaughan (1996) described as "structural
secrecy,"
which describes how, "The division of labor, organizational hierarchy and job
specialization segregate knowledge regarding tasks and
goals."
Vaughan also concluded
that, "Structural secrecy assumes that knowledge will be partial and incomplete, the
potential for actions to go wrong increases when tasks or information crosses internal
boundaries, and segregated knowledge minimizes the ability to detect and halt activities
that deviate from the organization's goals and
tasks"
(1996). An organization that shares
partial or incomplete information may be prone to redundant efforts as no one sector of
the organization is fully cognizant of what the others sections are charged with
completing. Lack of definite information will also breed confusion, uncoordinated and
substandard services, conflicting orders, frustrated staffmembers and rumors which may
be perpetuated by the media to the public.
Secrecy is routinely built into organization structure. Different subsystems in an
organization may speak different languages or use different technologies that make
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communication and information sharing difficult. Organizations may try to resolve this
lack of information flow by implementing strict rules regarding when and with whom
information should be shared. This formal structure usually makes communication even
more complicated and employees may actually learn less (Vaughan, 1997, p. 250).
2.4. Problem ofLack ofBusiness Continuity Planning
Turner and Pidgeon described an additional component of organizational failure:
"Disaster is another type of routine nonconformity which significantly departs from the
normative experience in a particular time and
place"
(1997). Turner and Pigeon further
explained disaster as, "It is a physical, cultural, and emotional event incurring social loss,
often possessing a dramatic quality that damages the fabric of social life. For an accident
to be defined as a disaster, the accident would need to large-scale, unusually costly,
unusually public, unusually expected, or some
combination"
(1997). Vaughan's
definition of disaster specifies it as, "an organizational-technical systems failure that
includes acts of omission or commission by individuals or groups of individuals acting in
their organizational roles, with outcomes that either in the fact of their occurrence or
consequences are unexpected, adverse and of high social impact and cost regardless of
number of lives and amount ofproperty
lost"
(1999, p. 293).
Organizations that lack plans to manage organizational failure will fall apart during
the course of their disaster response. Organizational performance will steadily decrease
as the organization struggles to continue the response effort. Increased employee
confusion, frustration and miscommunication will occur. Other departments of an
organization will be affected by the failing department by experiencing increased
mistakes or even disasters. For example, a department's nonfunctioning piece of
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communications equipment may dramatically affect the ability of all internal departments
and external agencies to communicate with that department. Without a recovery plan to
begin an alternate method of communication within this department, the organization will
begin to fail as it no longer can share critical information and therefore can no longer
provide an effective response effort.
Complexity is, according to Perrow, "a core concept in disaster
studies"
(1984).
Systems and components (departments, equipment, etc) are all interconnected which
creates system complexity. Perrow concluded, "Accidents are the result of these complex
systems. The outcome of different types of interaction of system parts and the types of
coupling can dictate the seriousness of the accident [mistake or
disaster]"
(1984).
Complex interactions, by definition, are components which can interact with one or more
other components either by structural design or not (Perrow, 1999, p. 77-78). Since
failure can be expected at some point within all systems, the recovery plan is critical.
Organizations should be able to prevent a failure from spreading to all of its components
(Perrow, 1999, p. 95).
Snook (1996) has described "practical
drift"
as, "an incremental uncoupling of
practice from written procedures designed to handle the worse-case condition when
subunits are tightly
coupled."
More specifically, Snook stated that, "Practical drift is the
slow steady uncoupling of local practice from written procedure. It is this structural
tendency for subunits to drift away from globally synchronized rule-based logics of
action toward locally determined task-based procedures that places complex
organizations at
risk"
(Longstaff, 2003). When employees stop, for one reason or
another, adhering to the policies and procedures
of the organization, they are placing the
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organization at risk for accidents. The longer these employees are allowed to operate on
their own and not maintain compliance with company policy, the higher the risk of an
accident occurring. Laws are ambiguous by nature and therefore policies associated with
those laws are also ambiguous. In that context, it can be very dangerous for employees to
act on their own accord and not adhere to organizational procedures.
This gap between the procedure and what actually happens can dramatically cripple
an effective emergency response. Therefore, it is imperative that employees have written
procedures that they use on a regular basis. When an emergency situation arises, the
necessary procedures will be engrained in the
employees'
thought processes. This can be
compared to law enforcement training. Police officers are thoroughly and consistently
trained for managing worst-case situations. Several officers have emerged successfully
from a horrific situation and stated that they stopped panicking and let their training take
over. This example helps to explain Lanir's notion that: "both intelligent technology and
intelligent people have a limited ability to manage and work through unforeseeable
situations, known as 'the reasonable choice of
disaster' "
(1989).
There are various organizational theories that provide explanations and insight as to
how organizational are structured, how they function and also how they make mistakes,
fail and create disasters. This framework is also the basis from which research questions
will be developed and then tested against FEMA's preparation and response to Hurricane
Katrina as well as mandated actions outlined in the National Response Plan.
2.5. Research Questions
While organizational theory provides a broad explanation of how organizations are
structured and how they function, this theoretical framework raises many direct questions
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regarding FEMA's structure, decision making practices and operations. From the above
theory, four research questions have been developed which will be tested against the
actions and decisions that took place during FEMA's preparation for and response to
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans between August 26, 2005 and September 5, 2005.
1. How will centralization and flexibility affect an organization's ability to
effectively respond and adapt to new and unexpected situations?
2. To what extent will an employee's skill set and situational awareness affect
organizational operations?
3. How will internal and external information sharing impact communication and
performance?
4. To what extent will a business continuity plan effect an organization's ability to
timely recover from initial failures?
These research questions were developed based on their relevance to FEMA's actions
during the response to Hurricane Katrina. The compatibility of the above questions to be
tested against what actually took place as reported by the media and federal reports, as
well as what should have happened as outlined by the National Response Plan was an
important factor when developing the research questions. The data will either support or
dissent from the research questions outlined above. The outcome of this analysis will
drive the development of recommendations that are presented in Chapter 6. The purpose
of developing recommendations is to enhance FEMA's future disaster preparation and
response capabilities.
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3. Chapter 3: Methodology
This study will use content analysis to examine FEMA's actions in New Orleans,
Louisiana from August 26, 2005 to September 5, 2005 in order to illustrate how FEMA's
failed response was due to its organizational structure. For this thesis, a qualitative
content analysis is employed, which includes collecting and organizing information into a
standardized format which allows for inferences to be drawn regarding the characteristics
and meanings ofwritten and recorded material (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2007). The
theoretical framework of this research focuses on organizational theory, including
organizational failure related to an organization's structure, employee competence,
information sharing and pre-planning capability. Research questions developed from the
organizational theoretical framework will be tested against three data sources:
The timeline of events (comprised of media and federal report data) depicts
what occurred regarding FEMA preparation and response activities
The National Response Plan, which outlines activities FEMA is mandated to
perform and
Congressional testimony, which gives a first hand report from key federal
officials and emergency management personnel of how FEMA prepared for
and responded to Hurricane Katrina as well as how and where FEMA failed.
The findings from this content analysis will be developed into recommendations
focused at enhancing FEMA's capacity to properly and reasonably prepare and respond
to future disaster situations.
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3.1. Timeline
A timeline ofFEMA actions and decisions for the period ofAugust 26, 2005 through
September 5, 2005 was constructed using three sources. The first source is the Brookings
Institute, a private non-profit organization that performs independent research for policy
debate (http://www.brookings.edu/index/about.htm). The timeline authored by
Brookings was selected because of the reputation the Institute has for performing high
quality research while remaining impartial on the issues it investigates. The second
source selected, Think Progress, is part of the American Progress Action Fund that
wishes to advance progressive ideas (http://www.thinkprogress.org/about). The final
source of timeline information was Fact Check, which has categorized itself as a non
profit, non-partisan "consumer
advocate"
to increase public knowledge bymonitoring the
factual accuracy of what is said by major US politicians
(http://www.factcheck.org/miscreports70.html). Because organizations may skew facts
based on their political leanings, these three sources were chosen not only for their
credible reputations within the policy community, but also because they do not subscribe
to the same political leanings. Brookings and Think Progress are both considered to be
liberal groups, while Fact Check maintains that they are non-partisan.
This timeline is important for various reasons. There are several conflicting entries in
the timeline which support the notion that Hurricane Katrina brought on confusion, chaos
and panic that was passed onto the media from the local, state and federal officials. A
timeline depicts what information the public was provided from the media sources during
the federal government's response to Katrina. The White House Report and Select
Bipartisan Committee Report provide additional information regarding actions taking by
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FEMA which are not included in the timelines. The federal reports, A Failure of
Initiative and The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina are the result of investigations
initiated by the White House and Congress to evaluate the federal response to Katrina.
Therefore, the reports will have additional information that may not have been revealed
to or reported by the media in the time period being examined.
As previously mentioned, only the time period ofAugust
26th
through September
5'
will be considered for this timeline. August
26th
through August
28th
took place before
Katrina made landfall, while August
29th
through September
5th
has been deemed by
various media outlets as The Week of Crisis, with Katrina making landfall on August
29th. This particular week has been the main focus of the media, the public, government
officials and emergency management agencies that have critiqued and severely criticized
the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. During the response to Hurricane Katrina,
New Orleans was frequently in the media spotlight due to its population and city size
compared to other areas affected by Hurricane Katrina in the GulfRegion. New Orleans
also gained media attention during this Week ofCrisis due to reports of violence, looting
and inhumane conditions. For this evaluation, only events occurring in New Orleans will
be considered. This is due to the fact that New Orleans became a consistent focus of the
media, and therefore ample information regarding the federal response will be available
for analysis.
The timeline does not include any information regarding September 5, 2005 since
there was no data available from the three sources related to FEMA's activities or
fundamental information on Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, the last day included in the
timeline is September 4, 2005.
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3.2. National Response Plan
The timeline will be compared against the National Response Plan (NRP). As Tom
Ridge explained the purpose of the NRP in an introductory letter at the beginning of the
plan, "to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified
all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident
management"
(NRP> 2004,
p.i). Tom Ridge (NRP, 2004, p.i) also states that:
The NRP incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident
management disciplines to include fire, rescue, emergency management,
law enforcement, public works and emergency medical services. The
NRP is built on the templates of the National Incident Management
System (NEVIS), which provides a consistent doctrinal framework for
incident management at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the cause,
size, or complexity of the incident.
The NRP is of particular interest since it was implemented in 2004 and subsequently
used for the first time during Hurricane Katrina. The NRP outlines several areas of
disaster management and critical functions that must be facilitated in relation to each area
of response. The NRP identifies a coordinating, or lead agency to ensure the completion
of the mandated duties and responsibilities. There are three areas of responsibility and
action within the NRP (termed Emergency Support Functions) that will be examined. In
these areas, FEMA is the coordinating agency tasked with fulfilling the mission and tasks
associated with each (Emergency Management, Mass Care and Urban Search and
Rescue). These three areas of responsibility and duty should have taken place and been
completed within the time period being examined. The NRP serves as a checklist against
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the timeline to compare what FEMA actually did versus what the NRP charged FEMA
with facilitating.
3.3. Congressional Testimony
Congressional testimony provides a first-hand account related to FEMA's
preparations and response actions regarding Hurricane Katrina. Congressional testimony
provides primary information that support points and arguments made by the federal
reports and the media timeline. Congressional testimony provides a definitive
explanation of what actually occurred during the time period being examined. Only
congressional testimony regarding FEMA's actions in or related to New Orleans between
August
26th
and September
5th
will be included in order to uphold a means of uniformity
with the timeline and federal reports also being analyzed. Such testimony was collected
by visiting the US Senate's website where keyword searches related to FEMA and
Katrina were conducted. For US House testimony, the A Failure ofInitiative report was
utilized for its appendices in which House testimony used in the Select Bipartisan
Committee's report was documented and available to the public. This was done because
keyword searches for testimony on the US House's website, www.house.gov, was
unsuccessful in yielding results related to Hurricane Katrina and FEMA's response.
Keyword searches were conducted on the US Senate's website, www.senate.gov.
Each testimony was examined for information relating to the parameters of the research
design. Each of the following testimonies were examined for relevancy to Hurricane
Katrina and FEMA's preparation and response based on the time period outlined above:
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1. Donald Smithburg before the Senate Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and
Public Health Preparedness on July 14, 2006
2. Bruce Baughman before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee onMarch 8, 2006.
3. Senator Joe Lieberman before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee on December 8, 2005.
4. Craig Nemitz before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
5. William Lokey before the House Select Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on December 14, 2005.
6. Philip Parr before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee on December 8, 2005.
7. Mayor Ray Nagin before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on
December 14, 2005.
8. Colonel Jeff Smith before the House Select Committee to Investigate the
Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina on December 14, 2005.
9. William Lokey before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee on January 30, 2006.
10. DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff before the House Special Committee on
Katrina on October 19, 2005.
11. Gary LaGrange before the Senate Committee on Finance on September 28,
2005.
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12. Johnny Bradberry before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on
January 3 1,2006.
13. Bill Carwile before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on December 8, 2005.
14. Susan Collins before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on December 8, 2005.
15. Congressman Bennie Thompson before the Senate Committee on Small
Business and Entrepreneurship on November 8, 2005.
16. Michael Brown testified before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on
September 27, 2005.
17. Marty Bahamonde before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee on October 20, 2005.
18. Gregory Rothwell before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on
November 2, 2005.
19. Congressman Mike Ross before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs on April 21, 2006.
20. Kenneth Horak before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on April 20, 2006.
21. Tina Burnette before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information and International Security on April 10, 2006.
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22. Tom Hazelwood before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
23. David Maurstad before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs on October 18, 2005.
24. Thomas Gimble before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, and International Security Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on April 10, 2006.
25. Robert David Paulson before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs on October 6, 2005.
26. Governor Haley Barbour before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on
March 7, 2006.
27. J. Robert Hunter before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs on February 2, 2006.
28. Craig Nemitz before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
29. Donald Powell before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on January 17, 2006.
30. Bruce Baughman before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs onMarch 8, 2006.
3 1 . Donald Smithburg before the Senate Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and
Public Health Preparedness on July 14, 2006.
32. Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco before the Senate Appropriations
Committee onMarch 7, 2006.
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33. Rev. Doc. C. Welton Gaddy before the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
34. Almetra Franklin before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
35. Paul Sarbanes before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs on October 18, 2005.
36. Major Todd Hawks before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
37. Jean Cefalu, RN, before the Senate Committee on Aging Members on May
18,2006.
38. Roberto Beinfait before the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial
Management, Government Information and International Security on July 28,
2006.
39. David Pressly before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs on February 2, 2006.
40. Mary Lynn Wilkerson before the Senate Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship on September 22, 2005.
41. Richard Skinner before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on February 13, 2006.
42. Tanya Harris before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
43. Senator BarbaraMikulski before the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions onMarch 8, 2006.
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44. Wayne Fairley before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions on January 24, 2006.
45. Scott Cowen before the Senate Subcommittee on Education and Early
Childhood Development on July 14, 2006.
46. Mayor Brent Warr before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on January 17, 2006.
47. Hector Barreto before the Senate Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship on November 8, 2005.
48. Donald Kettl before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on June 8, 2006.
49. Michael O'Hanlon before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology and Homeland Security on October 26, 2005.
50. David Garratt before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on April 27, 2006.
51. Major General Ronald Johnson before the Senate Committee on Small
Business and Entrepreneurship on November 8, 2005.
52. Jim Bunning before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs on October 18, 2005.
53. Dan Hanfling before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions onMarch 16, 2006.
54. Steve Ellis before the Senate Democratic Policy Hearing Committee on May
19, 2006.
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55. Jayne Wright before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions onMarch 7, 2006.
56. Captain Timothy Bayard before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs on January 30, 2006.
57. Jason Jackson before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on November 16, 2005.
58. Wayne Thomas before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security on October 26, 2005.
59. R. David Paulison before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs onMay 24, 2006.
60. William Woods of the Government Accountability Office before the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on April 10,
2006.
61. Alberto Ashwood before the House Committee on Transportation,
Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings
and EmergencyManagement on October 6, 2005.
62. Paul McHale before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities and House
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology on November 9, 2005.
63. David Johnson before the House Committee on Science on October 7, 2005.
64. Lieutenant Governor Mitchell Landrieu before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure on October 18, 2005.
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65. Norman Rabkin before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce on September 28, 2006.
Each of the three sources of data (NRP, timeline and congressional testimony) will be
compared separately to the research questions which have been developed from
organizational theory. From these three comparison analyses, findings and
recommendations will be generated that are aimed at enhancing future FEMA actions
related to disaster management and response. The development of recommendations will
be designed to prevent a repeat of the grossly inadequate performance of FEMA's
response to Hurricane Katrina.
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4. Chapter 4: Findings
FEMA's relief effort for Hurricane Katrina has been criticized by the American
public, officials in the emergency management community, as well as federal officials,
and political figures. In order to analyze each of the research questions as they relate to
FEMA and its response to Hurricane Katrina, it is essential to identify what FEMA
actually did, or did not, do before conclusions can be drawn about FEMA's relief effort.
The findings of this analysis will impact the types of recommendations that will be
developed in order to improve FEMA's future disaster preparedness and response
abilities. There are two main data sources that assist in unearthing what FEMA actions
took place.
The first data source is a timeline of events that occurred. Key events and actions
regarding FEMA have been underlined for emphasis. Underlined items in the timeline
signify major errors and actions that occurred for which FEMA is responsible. The
underlined text will assist the reader in identifying some of the more important decisions,
actions and impacts of FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, which will also be
incorporated into the upcoming findings and recommendations chapters.
The second data source is the National Response Plan (NRP), which serves as a
checklist in order to understand the activities and decisions FEMA is charged with
coordinating tasks related to emergency management, mass care, and search and rescue
functions. The NRP is the federal plan used for planning for and responding to any type
of disaster. This type of checklist assists in discerning if the actions identified in the
timeline were in compliance with the tasks and responsibilities outlined in the NRP, lax
or insufficient from what the NRP outlines, or all together nonexistent.
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While FEMA clearly had several deficiencies in its response, the final section of this
chapter identifies tasks that FEMA successfully completed as identified
through
comparing the timeline with the NRP outline. Positive and successful FEMA
actions
were also recognized and included from each of the federal reports. It is worth noting
that there were tasks and functions that FEMA was able to successfully complete. While
FEMA's overall response effort to Hurricane Katrina has been deemed a failure, FEMA
was able to successfully manage a few portions of the response effort. The
positive
actions were grouped into five categories; individual initiative, pre-staging and
deployment of resources, information flow, general response and pre-landfall
warnings/advisories.
4. 1. WhatActuallyHappened:
The timeline below is a compiled list taken directly from three sources: Brookings
Institute, Fact Check and Think Progress, which provides a breakdown ofFEMA actions
in New Orleans for each day during the time period of August 26, 2005 through
September 4, 2005. There were no data for September 5, 2005 that provided information
related to FEMA or fundamental information on Hurricane Katrina. Therefore,
September
5th
is not included in this timeline.
Also, various points on the timeline will conflict with each other. For example, the
same action may be listed on the timeline twice
under two separate days, even though in
reality the action only
occurred on one of the days. This exemplifies the fact that the
flow of information was not clear and resulted in confusion and contradictory media
reports. In addition, some of the points on the timeline
are not directly related to FEMA,
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but they provide important background information regarding Hurricane Katrina and a
baseline to understanding the federal response.
Friday August 26th, 2005
9am - White House declares impending disaster area and orders FEMA and DHS
to prepare. 10,000 National Guard troops are dispatched along Gulf Coast (arrival
time unclear) (Brookings)
The storm heads into the Gulf of Mexico and by 10:30 am is reported to be
"rapidly
strengthening."
(Fact Check)
11 pm - Governor Kathleen Blanco declares a state of emergency for Louisiana
(Brookings, Fact Check and Think Progress)
Center of
Katrina'
s landfall is expected to be in Gulfport and New Orleans
(Brookings)
Saturday August
27th
5am Katrina is upgraded to a Category 3 Hurricane with 115mph winds.
Hurricane warning is issued for Louisiana's SE coast and for the northern Gulf
Coast (Brookings, Fact Check and Think Progress)
Gov. Blanco requests that Bush declare a federal state of emergency in Louisiana
"I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that
effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and affected local
governments, and that supplementary federal assistance is necessary to save lives,
protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a
disaster."
(Think Progress and Fact Check)
A federal emergency is declared by Bush. DHS and FEMA are given full
authority to respond to Katrina. "Specifically, FEMA is authorized to identify,
mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to
alleviate the impacts of the
emergency."
Bush does so, authorizing the
Department of Homeland Security and FEMA "to coordinate all disaster relief
efforts. and freeing up federal money for the state. (Think Progress and Fact
Check)
Afternoon - National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfield calls New Orleans
Mayor Nagin to advise him regarding the need for a mandatory evacuation.
(Brookings and Fact Check)
5 pm - Nagin declares a State of Emergency in New Orleans and establishes a
voluntary evacuation order. Residents in low-lying areas are encouraged to
evacuate. (Brookings)
6 pm - Weather Service Prediction: 45% chance that a Category 4 or 5 storm will
hit New Orleans directly. (Brookings)
Sunday August
28th
2am - Katrina is upgraded to a Category 4 Hurricane with winds at 145mph
(Think Progress and Fact Check)
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7am - Katrina is upgraded to a Category 5 Hurricane with 160mph winds. NOAA
predicts "coastal storm surge flooding of 15 to 20 feet above normal tide
levels."
(Brookings, Fact Check and Think Progress)
Morning - Louisiana newspaper indicates that forecasters fear the levees will not
endure the hurricane "Forecasters Fear Levees Won't Hold Katrina": "Forecasters
feared Sunday afternoon that storm driven waters will lap over the New Orleans
levees when monster Hurricane Katrina pushes past the Crescent City
tomorrow."
(Think Progress)
Early - DHS Secretary Chertoff and FEMA Director Brown are given electronic
briefings by the National Hurricane Center regarding the possibility of a levee
break. (Brookings)
8am - Superdome opens up and allows people inside. (Brookings)
Morning
- Mayor Nagin issues the first mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.
Ten shelters are set up for those unable to leave (Nagin referred to them as
"refuges of last
resort"
rather than shelters). Evacuation orders are posted all
along the coast. President Bush suggests mandatory evacuation after the decision
was already made, but before it was reported to the public. "We're facing the
storm most of us have
feared,"
said Nagin. "This is going to be an unprecedented
event."
The evacuation call comes only 20 hours before Katrina would make
landfall - less than half the time that researchers had determined was necessary to
evacuate the city. (Brookings, Think Progress and Fact Check)
9:30 am - Nagin announces that Regional Transit Authority (RTA) buses will
pick up people in 12 locations throughout the city to take them to places of refuge,
including the Superdome. The New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan calls for buses to evacuate citizens out of the city (this
component was not in effect). (Brookings)
10am - NOAA raises their estimate of storm surge flooding to 18 to 22 feet above
normal tide levels. The levee protecting New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain is
only 17.5 feet tall, but other levees and floodwalls designed to protect against
storm-driven waters from the Gulf ofMexico vary in height, and are even much
lower. (Fact Check)
Afternoon - Bush, Brown, Chertoff are warned of the levee failure by the
National Hurricane Center Director. Dr. Max Mayfield, director of the National
Hurricane Center: "We were briefing them way before landfall. ... It's not like
this was a surprise. We had in the advisories that the levee could be
topped."
(Think Progress)
3pm Superdome has 10,000 people inside with 150 National Guardsmen
stationed there (approximately two-thirds are unarmed). (Brookings)
4 pm - National Weather Service issues a special hurricane warning: In the event
of a category 4 or 5 hit, "Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks,
perhaps longer. ... At least one-halfofwell-constructed homes will have roof and
wall failure. All gabled roofs will fail, leaving those homes severely damaged or
destroyed. . . . Power outages will last for weeks. . . . Water shortages will make
human suffering incredible bymodern
standards."
(Think Progress)
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National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfield participates in a video
conference call to the President, who is at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. (Fact
Check)
Approximately 30,000 evacuees gather at the Superdome with about 36 hours
worth of food. (Think Progress)
Louisiana National Guard requests 700 buses from FEMA for evacuations.
FEMA sends only 100 buses. (Think Progress)
7 pm - National Weather Service predicts the levees may be
"overtopped"
due to
storm surge. (Brookings)
8:30 pm - An empty Amtrak train leaves New Orleans, with room for several
hundred potential evacuees. "We offered the city the opportunity to take evacuees
out of harm's way...The city
declined,"
said Amtrak spokesman Cliff Black. The
train left New Orleans with no passengers on board. (Fact Check)
Late night - Reports are made ofwater toppling over the levees: "Waves crashed
atop the exercise path on the Lake Pontchartrain levee in Kenner earlyMonday as
Katrina churned
closer."
(Think Progress)
FEMA sends water, food and supplies to Georgia and Texas in preparation.
(Brookings)
MondayAugust
29th
6:10am - Katrina makes landfall as a Category 4 Hurricane with 145mph winds
with sustained winds ofnearly 145 mph and predicted coastal storm surge ofup to
28 feet. The National Hurricane Center warns that "some levees in the greater
New Orleans area could be
overtopped."
The Center states a weather buoy located
about 50 miles east of the mouth of the Mississippi river had reported wave
heights of at least 47 feet. (Think Progress, Fact Check and Brookings)
7:30am - The Bush Administration is notified of a levee breach. The
administration finds out that a levee in New Orleans was breached. On this day,
28 "government agencies, from local Louisiana parishes to the White House,
[reported that] that New Orleans
levees"
were breached. (Think Progress)
9am Lower 9th Ward Levee reportedly breached. Floodwaters are 6-8 feet high
in this area. (Brookings)
Morning - Brown warns Bush about the potential devastation that Katrina may
bring. In a briefing, Brown warned Bush, "This is, to put it mildly, the big one. I
think."
He also voiced concerns that the government may not have the capacity to
"respond to a catastrophe within a
catastrophe"
and that the Superdome was ill-
equipped to be a refuge of last resort. (Think Progress)
Late morning - a levee is breeched: "A large section of the vital 17th Street Canal
levee, where it connects to the brand new 'hurricane proof Old Hammond
Highway Bridge, gave way late Monday morning in Bucktown after Katrina's
fiercest winds were well
north."
A full day will pass before state or federal
officials fully realize what is happening. (Think Progress, Fact Check and
Brookings)
11am - Brown finally requests that DHS dispatches 1000 DHS rescue employees
to the region and gives them 2 days to arrive on scene and requests 2000 more
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within the next 7 days. "Brown's memo to Chertoff described Katrina as 'this
near catastrophic
event'
but otherwise lacked any urgent language. He proposes
sending the workers first for training in Georgia or Florida, then to the disaster
area "when conditions are
safe."
Among the duties of the workers. Brown
proposes, is to "convey a positive image of disaster operations to government
officials, community organizations and the general
public."
The memo politely
ended with, 'Thank you for your consideration in helping us to meet our
responsibilities.' "
(Think Progress, Fact Check and Brookings)
11am - Brown arrives in Baton Rouge at the State Office of Emergency
Preparedness. (Brookings)
Afternoon - FEMA issues a statement asking first responders to only come to the
city if there was proper coordination between state and local officials (Brookings).
1:45pm President Bush declares Emergency Disaster for Louisiana and
Mississippi and frees up federal funds. (Brookings)
The Superdome sustains damage (with 10,000 people inside). Refineries suffer
damage and eight refineries closed. Airports also close. (Brookings)
Coast Guard rescues 1200 from flood and the National Guard is called in.
(Brookings)
2 pm - CDT - City Hall confirms
17th
Street levee breach. About 20% of the city
is flooded. (Brookings)
FEMA employee Marty Bahamonde listens to reports of the levee breach at the
17th
Street Canal and provides regular updates to FEMA Headquarters.
Bahamonde conducts a flyover of the area with the assistance of a Coast Guard
helicopter. From Bahamonde 's bird's eye view, there was no doubt there was a
breach and he is also able to observe that the city is 80% flooded. Bahamonde
then calls Brown at 7 pm and relays his spot report. Brown did not ask
Bahamonde any questions. Brown contacts the White House with this
information. The White House discounted this FEMA eyewitness account. A
Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p. 142).
8pm - Gov. Blanco requests (for a second time) assistance from Bush. "Mr.
President, we need your help. We need everything you've
got."
Bush later assures
her "help is on the way". (Think Progress and Fact Check)
Late night - Bush ends the night without acting on Gov. Blanco's requests.
(Think Progress)
Tuesday August 30
Earlymorning
- The first reports of looting are made.
Midday
- Chertoff indicates he finally becomes aware that the levee has failed.
"It was on Tuesday that the levee-may have been overnight Monday to Tuesday-
that the levee started to break. And it was midday Tuesday that I became aware of
the fact that there was no possibility of plugging the gap and that essentially the
lake was going to start to drain into the
city."
Later reports note that the Bush
administration learned of the levee breach on Aug. 29. (Think Progress)
Mass looting is reported and security shortages cited. "The looting is out of
control. The French Quarter has been
attacked,"
Councilwoman Jackie Clarkson
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said. "We're using exhausted, scarce police to control looting when they should
be used for search and rescue while we still have people on
rooftops."
(Think
Progress)
U.S.S. Bataan sits off-shore unused. "The USS Bataan. a 844-foot ship designed
to dispatch Marines in amphibious assaults, has helicopters, doctors, hospital
beds, food and water. It also can make its own water, up to 100,000 gallons a day.
And it just happened to be in the Gulf of Mexico when Katrina came roaring
ashore. The Bataan rode out the storm and then followed it toward shore, awaiting
relief orders. Helicopter pilots flying from its deck were some of the first to begin
plucking strandedNew Orleans residents. But now the Bataan's hospital facilities,
including six operating rooms and beds for 600 patients, are
empty."
(Think
Progress)
4:30 pm Officials call for anyone with boats to help with rescue mission.
(Brookings)
6:30 pm - Mayor Nagin issues urgent bulletin that waters will continue to rise 12-
15 feet in some places. He reports that pumps will soon fail. (Brookings)
8:10 pm - Reports suggest looting is widespread. (Brookings)
10:15 pm - Gov. Blanco orders an evacuation of the Superdome. She sets no
timetable. (Brookings)
An estimated 50,000-100,000 remain in New Orleans on roofs, in the Superdome,
and in the convention center. (Brookings)
FEMA stops volunteer firefighters with hurricane expertise due to the insecurity
of the city and asks them to wait for National Guardsmen to secure city first.
(Brookings)
FEMA activates the National Response Plan to fully mobilize federal
government's resources. (Brookings)
Second levee in New Orleans breaks. Water covers 80% of the city (20 feet high
in some places). (Brookings)
Wednesday August
31st
1:45 am - FEMA requests ambulances that do not exist. "Almost 18 hours later.
[FEMA] canceled the request for the ambulances because it turned out, as one
FEMA employee put it, 'the DOT doesn't do
ambulances.'"
(Think Progress)
HHS Secretary declares federal health emergency throughout the Gulf Coast and
sends in medical supplies/workers. (Brookings) "After a natural disaster, short
and long-term medical problems can occur. Diseases like cholera, typhoid,
hepatitis and mosquito-borne illnesses tend to break out under these
conditions."
(Think Progress)
Buses begin arriving to evacuate the Superdome. 25,000 people are in the
Superdome with another 52,000 people in Red Cross shelters. (Brookings)
1 1:20 am - FEMA staff warns Brown that there have been fatalities in the
Superdome. Three hours later. Brown's press secretary wrote to colleagues
complaining that Brown needed more time scheduled to eat at a restaurant: "He
needs much more that (sic) 20 or 30 minutes. We now have traffic to encounter to
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go to and from a location of his choise (sic), followed by wait service from the
restaurant staff, eating, etc. Thank
vou."
(Think Progress)
Tens of thousands are trapped in the Superdome and conditions deteriorate. "A 2-
year-old girl slept in a pool ofurine. Crack vials littered a restroom. Blood stained
the walls next to vending machines smashed by teenagers. "We pee on the floor.
We are like
animals,"
said Taffany Smith, 25, as she cradled her 3-week-old son,
Terry. By Wednesday, it had degenerated into horror. At least two people,
including a child, have been raped. At least three people have died, including one
man who jumped 50 feet to his death, saying he had nothing left to live for. There
is no sanitation. The stench is overwhelming. (Think Progress)
12:30 pm Refugees begin arriving in Houston at the Astrodome. (Brookings)
Water level stops rising in New Orleans. (Brookings)
Looting grows exponentially and intensifies in New Orleans. Mayor Nagin orders
most of the police to abandon search and rescue missions for survivors and focus
on packs of looters who are becoming increasingly violent. (Brookings and Fact
Check)
The London Avenue canal is breached. (Brookings)
Military transport planes take the seriously ill and injured to Houston. (Brookings)
FEMA deploys 39 medical teams and 1700 trailer trucks. (Brookings)
Jefferson Parish Emergency Director states that food and water supplies are gone
"Director Walter Maestri: FEMA and national agencies not delivering the help
nearly as fast as it is
needed."
(Think Progress)
80,000 are believed to be stranded in New Orleans. Former Mayor Sidney
Barthelemy "estimated 80,000 were trapped in the flooded city and urged
President Bush to send more
troops."
(Think Progress)
3,000 people are stranded at the Convention Center without food or water. "With
3,000 or more evacuees stranded at the Convention Center and with no
apparent contingency plan or authority to deal with them collecting a body was
no one's priority. ... Some had been at the Convention Center since Tuesday
morning but had received no food, water or
instructions."
(Think Progress)
8pm - Brown indicates he is surprised by the size of the storm. "I must say, this
storm is much much bigger than anyone
expected."
(Think Progress)
Thursday September
1st
There is still no command or control established in New Orleans. Terry Ebbert.
New Orleans Homeland Security Director: "This is a national emergency. This is
a national disgrace. FEMA has been here three days, vet there is no command and
control. We can send massive amounts of aid to tsunami victims, but we can't bail
out the city ofNew
Orleans."
(Think Progress)
2pm - Nagin issues "desperate
SOS"
to the federal government. "This is a
desperate SOS. Right now we are out of resources at the convention center and
don't anticipate enough buses. We need buses. Currently the convention center is
unsanitary and unsafe and we're running out of
supplies."
Storm victims were
raped and beaten, fights and fires broke out, corpses lay out in the open and
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rescue helicopters and law enforcement officers were shot at as a flooded-out
New Orleans descended into anarchy Thursday. (Think Progress and Brookings)
2pm - Brown claims that he has not previously heard of reports of violence. "I've
had no reports of unrest, if the connotation of the word unrest means that people
are beginning to riot, or you know, they're banging on walls and screaming and
hollering or burning tires or whatever. I've had no reports of
that."
(Think
Progress)
8pm - CDT- Brown learns of evacuees in Convention Center. "We learned about
that (Thursday), so I have directed that we have all available resources to get that
convention center to make sure that they have the food and water and medical
care that they
need."
o Speaking from Baton Rouge in a live interview with CNN's Paula Zahn,
he says:
Brown: And so, this ~ this catastrophic disaster continues to grow.
I will tell you this, though. Every person in that Convention
Center, we just learned about that today. And so, I have directed
that we have all available resources to get to that Convention
Center to make certain that they have the food and water, the
medical care that they need...
Q: Sir, you aren't telling me...
Brown: ... and that we take care of those bodies that are there. . . .
Q: Sir, you aren't just telling me you just learned that the folks at
the Convention Center didn't have food and water until today, are
you? You had no idea they were completely cut off?
Brown: Paula, the federal government did not even know about the
Convention Center people until today.
(Brookings, Think Progress and Fact Check)
Military increases National Guard deployment to 30,000. Violence, carjacking,
looting continues. Military helicopters are shot at while evacuating residents.
FEMA water rescue operations suspended because of gunfire. (Brookings and
Fact Check)
The first buses arrive at the Superdome to take evacuees to the Astrodome in
Houston, 355 miles away. (Fact Check)
Superdome and Convention Center now housing up to 45,000 refugees.
(Brookings)
Friday September
2nd
Government agencies demand that DHS pay attention to worker-safety. "By
Friday, experts and officials from NIH, the Department of Labor and the
Environmental Protection Agency began to make frantic calls to the Department
of Homeland Security and members of Congress, demanding that the worker-
safety portion of the national response
plan be
activated."
(Think Progress)
10:35am - Bush, arriving in Alabama to tour the disaster area, says of the FEMA
Director at a live news conference: "Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job. The
FEMA director is working 24
-- (applause) - they're working 24 hours a day.
Again, my attitude is, if it's not going exactly right, we're going to make it go
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exactly right. If there's problems, we're going to address the
problems."
(Think
Progress and Fact Check)
Afternoon - FEMA's Deputy Director Patrick Rhode is
"impressed"
with the
government's response. "I am actually very impressed with the mobilization of
man and machine to help our friends in this unfortunate area....I think it's one of
the most impressive search-and-rescue operations this country has ever conducted
domestically."
(Think Progress)
Saturday September 3rd
8:05 pm - FEMA finalizes bus request. FEMA ended up modifying the number
of buses it thought it needed to get the job done, until it settled on a final request
of 1,335 buses at 8:05 p.m. on Sept. 3. The buses, though, trickled into New
Orleans, with only a dozen or so arriving the first day. (Think Progress)
Sunday September
4th
Superdome is fully evacuated (except stragglers). (Brookings)
Carnival Cruise offers cruise ships for 7000 victims. (Brookings)
This timeline depicts a lack of information flow between federal agencies and within
FEMA itself. There are also various instances in which FEMA's attempts to provide
reliefwere not without delay. The relief that was provided was often insufficient and less
than what was requested. In some instances, it seemed as though requests for reliefwere
ignored all together.
The timeline data definitively shows that FEMA made several errors in providing
relief to Hurricane Katrina victims in New Orleans. For example, FEMA did not activate
the NRP until Tuesday, August 30th. In addition, the USS Bataan with its medical
resources and rescue equipment went used as it sat off-shore. FEMA requests
ambulances from the Department of Transportation (DOT). FEMA took almost a full
day to realize that the DOT does not provide ambulance services. The full scope of
Hurricane Katrina was not realized until more than 48 hours after landfall. Director
Brown did not contain urgent language when requesting relief assistance from DHS and
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gave relief workers a 2 day deadline to arrive in New Orleans. Such lax directives
indicate that Brown had not grasped the gravity of the situation in New Orleans.
While the timeline is a breakdown of the actions that took place during FEMA's
preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina, the following section outlines what
tasks and responsibilities FEMA is responsible for coordinating and completing as
outlined by the NRP. More specifically, FEMA is the coordinating agency responsible
for facilitating the following Emergency Support Functions; Emergency Management,
Mass Care and Urban Search and Rescue. Both sections regarding what should have
happened and what actually happened concerning FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina
can be compared individually to the research questions.
4.2. What ShouldHave Happened
The purpose of the NRP is, "to establish a comprehensive all-hazards approach to
enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic
incidents"
(NRP, 2004 p.2).
The NRP continues to state (FEMA.gov, 2006):
The plan incorporates best practices and procedures from incident
management disciplines homeland security, emergency management,
law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health, responder and
recovery worker health and safety, emergency
medical services, and the
private sector and integrates them into a unified structure. It forms the
basis of how the federal government coordinates with state, local, and
tribal governments and the private sector during incidents.
The NRP was used for the first time in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina as a
handbook for required actions to be taken by federal agencies including FEMA. The
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NRP specifically outlines disaster management responsibilities and activities that FEMA
must engage in during the preparedness and mitigation phases of a national incident.
Therefore, the NRP is essential to this content analysis since it provides a checklist of
actions that FEMA should have completed to be compared against the activities that
actually occurred.
4.2.1. Introduction to the NRP
In the NRP preface, a letter authored by Tom Ridge (NRP, 2004, p.i) explains:
In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the President
directed the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) to align
federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified
all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.
The NRP incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident
management disciplines to include fire, rescue, emergency management,
law enforcement, public works and emergency medical services. The
NRP is built on the templates of the National Incident Management
System (NIMS), which provides a consistent doctrinal framework for
incident management at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the cause,
size, or complexity of the incident.
Tom Ridge indicated that the NRP, "is in place to be a concerted national effort to
prevent terrorist attacks with the US; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major
disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks,
major disasters and other emergencies that occur. It is the core operational plan for
national incident
management"
(NRP, 2004, p.l).
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All of the sections that follow below regarding the description and layout of the NRP
come directly from the NRP itself.
4.2.2. Organization of the NRP
The NRP is organized into several sections, all of which address the responsibilities
and duties assigned to FEMA in various aspects of an emergency response. These
sections include the base plan, appendixes, emergency support function annexes, support
annexes and incident annexes. However, for this evaluation, only parts of the base plan,
appendices and emergency support function annexes will be discussed. The base plan
describes the structures and the processes that comprise the national approach to domestic
incident management designed to integrate the efforts and resources of federal, state,
local, tribal, private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. Components of the base
plan include planning, assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations,
incident management actions and plan maintenance instructions.
The Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes detail the missions, policies,
structures and responsibilities of federal agencies for coordinating resource and
programmatic support to states, tribes and other federal agencies or other jurisdictions
and entities during Incidents ofNational Significance (NRP, 2004, p.xi). Please note that
not all Incidents ofNational Significance result in the activation of ESFs. Each ESF is
composed ofprimary and support agencies. The NRP identifies primary agencies on the
basis of authorities, resources and capabilities (2004, p. 1 1). FEMA is the primary agency
for the ESFs examined further in this document.
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4.2.3. Essential Staffing ofGroups and Centers
With regard to federal departments and agencies, as required by HSPD-5, federal
departments and agencies will designate representatives to staff the HSOC (Homeland
Security Operations Center), NRCC (National Response Coordination Center), and IIMG
(Interagency Incident Management Group). Federal agencies will also carry out
responsibilities assigned to them in the Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes of
the NRP and establish connectivity with and report incidents to the HSOC. Federal
agencies must also modify existing interagency incident management and emergency
response plans and protocols within 120 days of the issuance of this plan. This includes
incorporating the following; procedures for transitioning from localized incidents to
Incidents ofNational Significance; and accelerated resource activation, mobilization and
deployment requirements outlined in the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP, 2004,
p.x). Modifications to existing federal interagency plans must be completed and reported
to DHS within 120 days of the publication of the NRP (NRP, 2004, p.ix).
The HSOC, IIMG, and NRCC are critical committees and groups that must be staffed
and activated in times of disaster preparation and response. Group and center functions
include disseminating weather warnings to the federal government, passing critical
information through the federal government to the White House and making essential
decisions with regards to disaster mitigation and response. Each ESF will designate who
is in charge of activating and ensuring adequate staffing for each of these groups and
centers.
The Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) is a federal headquarters-level
multi-agency coordination entity that
facilitates strategic federal domestic incident
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management for Incidents ofNational Significance. The Secretary ofHomeland Security
activates the IIMG based on the nature, severity, magnitude and complexity of the threat
or incident. Its responsibilities include: providing decision making support for threat or
incident-related prevention, preparedness, response and recovery efforts, and provides
strategic coordination and recommendations for the application of federal resources in
cooperation with existing agency and interagency resource management and
private-
sector entities (NRP, 2004, p. 22). FEMA is included in core group staffing for this
organization.
The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) is the primary national hub for
domestic incident management operational coordination and situational awareness. It
facilitates homeland security information sharing and operational coordination with other
federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental emergency operations centers (EOCs).
Federal departments and agencies are required to report information relating to actual or
potential Incidents ofNational Significance to the HSOC (NRP, 2004, p.24). The HSOC
was activated when reports of the impending danger that Hurricane Katrina posed before
it made landfall. FEMA is among one of the HSOC representatives and is mandated to
send representatives to staff this center. Due to FEMA's direct link to the HSOC, FEMA
was alerted to the weather warnings and preparation was being initiated in order to
respond to Katrina, despite FEMA claims that it was not aware of the above information.
The NRCC is a multi-agency center that provides overall federal response
coordination for Incidents ofNational Significance and emergency management program
implementation. Its functions include monitoring potential or developing Incidents of
National Significance and supports the efforts of regional and field components,
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coordinating and sustaining federal response, and monitoring the preparedness of
national-level emergency response teams and resources. The Departments ofHomeland
Security, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate ofDHS, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (DHS/EPR/FEMA) maintains the NRCC as a
functional component of the HSOC in support of incident management operations (NRP,
2004, p.25). Again, FEMA has a direct link to this group as well. In fact, FEMA is in
charge of assisting with the facilitation of this center. This center would have monitored
Katrina'
s progress, including weather related warnings that would indicate an
approximate size and scope ofKatrina's path and estimated damage. The NRCC, with
FEMA's guidance, was charged with preparing accordingly. This NRCC would have
been a major information clearinghouse to assist FEMA in preparing rescue worker,
relief supplies and the appropriate number of employees to ensure a swift and effective
response.
The Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) is a standing facility operated
by DHS/EPR/FEMA that is activated to coordinate regional response efforts, establish
federal priorities and implement local federal program support until a JFO (Joint Field
Office) is established in the field and/or a federal official appointed to lead the field
response effort can assume their NRP coordination responsibilities. The
DHS/EPR/FEMA Director activates the RRCC based on the level of response required.
The RRCC is led by an RRCC Director and includes DHS/EPR/FEMA staff and regional
ESF representatives (NRP, 2004, p.27). While it is not immediately known if the RRCC
was activated or not, it clearly should have been launched based on the warnings that
were disseminated to the public regarding Katrina's predicted path and extent of
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destruction. As mentioned above, the activation of such a center was left up to FEMA to
accomplish. The RRCC would have given FEMA advance notice to provide a fast and
efficient relief response by establishing initial regional federal programs of relief and
response until a more concerted federal response was able to arrive and assume
situational control. Such advanced notice would have made a dramatic difference in the
response efforts made in the wake ofHurricane Katrina to rescue and provide assistance
to victims.
The Federal Coordinating Officer, or FCO, (Secretary Chertoff), in coordination with
the HSOC, facilitates distribution of warning, alerts and bulletins to the emergency
management community (NRP, 2004, p.48). While Chertoff is the main figure charged
with dissemination of warnings and alert bulletins, he is not alone. FEMA is part of the
HSOC which assists DHS Secretary Chertoff in such distributions. This gave FEMA an
opportunity to alert the federal government on the predicted dangers ofHurricane Katrina
well ahead of time. FEMA's involvement in the HSOC warning dissemination provided
FEMA with ample warning to adequately review plans and prepare resources for a timely
and successful response to Hurricane Katrina.
4.2.4. Incidents ofNational Significance
This plan distinguishes between incidents that require DHS coordination, termed
Incidents ofNational Significance, and the majority of incidents occurring each year that
are handled by responsible jurisdictions or agencies through other established authorities
and existing plans (NRP, 2004, p.3). A majority of incidents that occur daily nationwide
are generally handled by local authorities, such as flooding, power outages, naturally
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occurring incidents (windstorms, drought), and the like. Only large-scale incidents
receive national attention or federal government response.
It is critical to understand both the definition of an Incident ofNational Significance and
that Hurricane Katrina met this definition. Based on the criteria established in HSPD-5,
Incidents ofNational Significance are those high-impact events that require a coordinated
and effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal,
private-sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage and
provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities (NRP,
2004, p.3). FEMA does not have the authority to tell other federal agencies what to do or
sufficient budget or staff to manage large emergencies without external assistance (The
Heritage Foundation, 2005).
As the principal federal official for domestic incident management, the Secretary of
Homeland Security declares Incidents ofNational Significance and provides coordination
for federal operations and/or resources, establishes reporting requirements and conducts
ongoing communications with federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and
nongovernmental organizations to maintain situational awareness, analyze threats, assess
national implications of threat and operational response activities, and coordinate threat
or incident response activities (NRP, 2004, p.4).
The NRP bases the definition of Incidents of National Significance on situations
related to the following four criteria set forth in HSPD-5: A federal department or agency
acting under its own authority has requested assistance
from the Secretary of Homeland
Security; the resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal
assistance has been requested by the appropriate state and local authorities; the Secretary
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ofDHS has been directed to assume responsibility for managing a domestic incident by
the President, and finally more than one federal department or agency has become
substantially involved in responding to an incident (NRP, 2004).
4.2.5. Requests for DHS assistance
Federal support to states is provided through the following procedure.
DHS/EPR/FEMA processes a Governor's request for Presidential disaster or emergency
declarations under the direction provided in the Stafford Act (NRP, 2004, p.52).
Concurrent with a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency and official
appointment of an FCO, DHS/EPR/FEMA designates the types of assistance to be made
available and the counties eligible to receive such assistance. In large-scale or
catastrophic events, the declaration process can be expedited. Typically, the Governor
must create a report to the President which is reviewed by DHS/FEMA/EPR which must
indicate that the state is overwhelmed and must specifically call on the federal
government for assistance (NRP, 2004). However, during major incidents, this report
may be sent to the federal government after the federal assistance has been initiated in
order to prevent relief assistance from being delayed. As mentioned above, FEMA is
charged with correctly identifying which types of federal resources are needed and what
areas are eligible to receive such assistance. Clearly there was some sort of disconnect
with this stage of the response, as FEMA sent too little too late in terms of relief and
reliefworkers.
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4.2.6. Pre-declaration Authorities
DHS can use limited pre-declaration authorities to move initial response resources
closer to a potentially affected area (food, water, emergency generators, etc.) before an
incident strikes (NRP, 2004, p.5). In accordance with HSPD-5, federal departments and
agencies are expected to provide their full and prompt cooperation, available resources
and support, as appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities for protecting
national security (NRP, 2004, p.7). This passage clearly shows that FEMA had the
capability and opportunity to preplan for this national incident, strategically stage relief
workers, emergency rescue teams, assemble and transport relief supplies including food,
water, and medical equipment, and expect the full cooperation of other federal agencies.
Government preparation seemed to be entirely lacking as it took relief supplies four days
(September 2nd) to reach victims after Katrina stuck. Clearly, FEMA failed to provide its
full and prompt cooperation. The incompetence that consumed FEMA can be visibly
demonstrated on Wednesday August 31st, when FEMA ordered the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to send its ambulances to respond and assist with victims.
However, it took FEMA a full 18 hours after it placed this request for assistance to
realize that the DOT does not even own ambulances (Think Progress).
4.2.7. Emergency Support Functions (ESF)
A federal agency designated as an ESF primary agency serves as a federal executive
agency under the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to accomplish the ESF mission.
Responsibilities include: orchestrating federal support within their functional area,
providing staff for operations
functions at fixed and field facilities, notifying/requesting
assistance from support agencies, managing mission assignments, coordinating with
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state/support agencies, and working with appropriate private-sector organizations to
maximize available resources. Additional duties consist of executing contracts, procuring
goods and services as needed, planning for short-term and long-term incident
management and recovery operations, and maintaining trained personnel to support
interagency emergency response and support teams (NRP, 2004, p.101). A primary
agency is identified to assist the FCO in managing each ESF as well as overseeing the
completion of the outlined tasks, mission and goals of the ESF.
Each ESF corresponds to a particular aspect of an emergency response, including
transportation, communication, mass care, energy, etc.(Refer to Appendix 2). Three out
of the five ESFs that FEMA is the coordinating or primary agency for including: public
works and engineering; emergencymanagement; mass care, housing and human services;
urban search and rescue; long-term community recovery and mitigation; and external
affairs. Emergencymanagement, urban search and rescue, along with mass care, housing
and human services were chosen to be evaluated. These three particular ESFs were
chosen because they most closely target the critical functions that must be performed
both in preparation for Katrina's landfall and in the first week after Katrina made
landfall. These functions were also frequently in the New Orleans media spotlight and
therefore more information regarding these ESFs will be available for analysis.
For each of the ESFs below, a summary table has been developed which outlines the
ESF's purpose, the actions that will take place within each ESF, and the actions of the
agency that heads each ESF. For this thesis,
each ESF discussed below is headed by
DHS/EPR/FEMA. The information for the three summaries was taken from the National
Response Plan.
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4.2.7.1. ESF #5 - EmergencyManagement
ESF #5 EmergencyManagement
Purpose ESF Actions - Headquarters, Regional
and Field Primary Agency Responsibilities
Provides core DHS/EPR/FEMA activates the ESF by Activates and convenes federal
management and increasing staffing and the operational emergency assets to prevent and
administrative functions tempo at the NRCC and RRCC respond to an Incident ofNational
that support the Significance
operations of the NRCC, Maintains constant communications with
RRCC and JFO the affected state emergency operations Coordinates with local, regional,
center (EOC) and facilitates periodic state law enforcement agencies
Supporting overall video teleconferences with all and emergency management
activities of the federal appropriate parties to coordinate the joint organizations
government for domestic local, state and federal operations
incidentmanagement Coordinates federal planning
Provides situational reports and other activities including immediate,
information to the NRCC short-term, and long-range
planning
DHS/EPR/FEMA activates the ESFs
required to handle the threat or incident Coordinates the use of remote
sensing and reconnaissance
DHS/EPR/FEMA establishes and operations, activation and
deploys special teams under operational deployment of assessment
control ofheadquarters personnel or teams and
Geographic Information System
Staff develops the initial Incident Action
support
Plan outlining federal operations
priorities and coordinates with other
Coordinates overall staffing of
ESFs to implement the plan federal emergency management
activities at the NRCC, RRCC and
Staff develops the schedule for staffing
JFO levels
and operating the NRCC while it is
activated
DHS/EPR/FEMA staffs and operates the
RRCC
Initiates actions to identify, staff and
operate the JFO
DHS/EPR/FEMA regions establish
communications with the affected
state(s) to coordinate initial requests for
federal assistance
Helps maintain situational awareness of
the threat or incident, in coordination
with the HSOC
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This particular ESF is seemingly the nerve center of the emergency preparedness and
planning that occurs at the federal level. Emergency preparedness is a critical stage in
overall emergency management. Poor pre-planning and communication preparations will
inevitably lead to an inadequate emergency response.
4.2.7.1.1. Purpose
Both the ESF coordinator and primary agency of ESF #5 is DHS/EPR/FEMA. The
purpose of this ESF is to be responsible for supporting overall activities of the federal
government for domestic incident management. ESF #5 provides the core management
and administrative functions in support of NRCC, RRCC and Joint Field Office (JFO)
operations (NRP, 2004, p. 139). It also facilitates the information flow in the pre-incident
prevention phase in order to place assets on alert or to pre-position resources for a
hastened response. In the post-incident response phase, this ESF is charged with support
and planning functions.
4.2.7.1.2. Scope
ESF #5 activities include those functions that are critical to support and facilitate
multi-agency planning and coordination for operations involving potential and actual
Incidents of National Significance. This includes alert and notification, deployment and
staffing ofDepartment ofHomeland Security (DHS) emergency response teams, incident
action planning, coordination of operations, logistics and material, direction and control,
information management, facilitation of requests for federal assistance, resource
acquisition and management (to include allocation and tracking), worker safety and
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health, facilities management, financial management, and other support as required
(NRP, 2004, p. 139).
Essentially, FEMA is required to preposition its assets to facilitate a timely and
effective response to a domestic incident. Furthermore, FEMA is in charge of federal
coordination and planning of all critical support functions and bringing multiple agencies
together for a unified incident response once an incident has occurred. This scope is
overwhelming in terms of items that do not seem to have been completed prior to Katrina
making landfall in Louisiana. One can assume that if FEMA adequately followed
through and performed these necessary tasks that the federal government would have
been more prepared and responded more quickly to the victims ofKatrina.
4.2.7.1.3. Policies
ESF #5 is responsible for establishing the federal support infrastructure in the affected
state or region in anticipation of requirements for prevention, response, and recovery
federal assistance. ESF #5 staff identifies and resolves resource allocation issues
identified at the JFO, the RRCC, and/or the NRCC. Those issues that cannot be resolved
at the NRCC level are referred to the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG)
(NRP, 2004, p. 140).
ESF #5 staff provides the informational link between the NRCC and the Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC) headquarters. ESF #5 also serves as the centralized
conduit for federal situation reports to the HSOC from the various other ESFs. ESF #5
maintains an on-call workforce of trained and skilled reserve employees to provide surge
capability to perform essential emergency
management functions on short notice and for
varied duration. (NRP, 2004, p. 140).
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4.2.7.1.4. Actions
Actions taken under ESF #5 occur at different sectors of the federal government. In
DHS Headquarters, when there is a credible threat, DHS may take several actions,
including but not limited to, activating the IIMG, deploying a Principal Federal Official
(PFO) and supporting staff to the threat area, as well as pre-positioning strategic assets.
The HSOC monitors the threat situation and notifies the NRCC and other DHS
component operations centers accordingly. The Principal Federal Official (PFO) group,
when deployed pre-incident, reports back to the HSOC and IIMG. These PFO situation
reports are pushed from the HSOC to the NRCC, for situational awareness and for
determination of the need to activate ESF #5 and other ESFs (NRP, 2004, p. 141).
At the DHS/EPR/FEMA Headquarters level, when an incident occurs or has the
potential to occur, DHS/EPR/FEMA activates ESF #5 by increasing the staffing and
operational tempo at the NRCC and RRCC, as required. Actions include alerts,
notifications, and situation reporting in coordination with the HSOC headquarters
element. Once activated, ESF #5 is operational at the NRCC on a 24-hour basis. ESF #5
maintains constant communications with the affected state emergency operations center
and facilitates periodic video teleconferences with all appropriate parties to coordinate
the joint local, state, and federal operations (NRP, 2004, p. 141). ESF #5 provides
situation reports and other information as required to the NRCC, a functional component
of the HSOC, in accordance with HSOC standard operating procedures and protocols.
DHS/EPR/FEMA activates the ESFs required to handle the threat or incident at hand,
issues initial activation mission assignments, and establishes reporting and
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communications protocols with the activated agencies and the Federal Coordinating
Officer (FCO) (NRP, 2004, p. 142).
DHS/EPR/FEMA establishes and deploys special teams under the operational control
of headquarters, including the National Emergency Response Team, Mobile Emergency
Response Support, Nuclear Incident Response Team, Mobile Air Transportable
Telecommunications System, National Disaster Medical System, and FIRST in
coordination with ESF #8. ESF #5 staff develops the initial Incident Action Plan
outlining federal operations priorities and coordinates with the other ESFs to implement
the plan. ESF #5 staff develops the schedule for staffing and operating the NRCC from
activation to stand-down (NRP, 2004, p. 142).
At the regional and field level, when an incident occurs or has the potential to occur,
appropriate DHS/EPR/FEMA regions activate and increase the operational tempo ofESF
#5 as described in the NRP (2004). This includes alert, notification, and situation-
reporting to regional and field components. This also includes staffing and operating the
RRCC on a 24-hour basis. ESF #5 staff makes the initial contact with the affected
state(s) and reviews capabilities and shortfalls as a means of determining initial response
requirements for federal support. ESF #5 staff also develops and issues the appropriate
operational orders to the required ESFs, issues initial activation mission assignments or
reimbursement agreements, and establishes reporting and communications protocols with
the activated agencies (NRP, 2004, p. 142).
4.2.7.1.5. Responsibilities
As the primary agency, DHS/EPR/FEMA responsibilities include: activating and
convening federal emergency assets and
capabilities to prevent and respond to an
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Incident ofNational Significance, and coordinating with state, regional, local, and tribal
law enforcement agencies and emergency management organizations. DHS/EPR/FEMA
will also coordinate federal planning activities including immediate, short-term, and
long-
range planning. Additionally, the response planning and operations implementation
priorities of the federal government are developed, tracked, and implemented through
ESF #5 (NRP, 2004, p. 143).
ESF #5 also coordinates the use of remote sensing and reconnaissance operations,
activation and deployment of assessment personnel or teams, and Geographic
Information System (GIS) support as needed for incident management. It is also
responsible for coordinating overall staffing of federal emergency management activities
at the NRCC, RRCC, and JFO levels, including which ESFs are activated, the size and
composition of the organizational structure, the level of staffing at the above facilities, as
well as the key personnel required to staff the Section Chief and other command staff
positions (NRP, 2004, p. 143).
In essence, this particular ESF is charged with overseeing and coordinating resource
allocation and tasking response activities. This is a major component of the criticisms
that the federal government has received for its response to Hurricane Katrina. FEMA
has been criticized for providing an uncoordinated and chaotic response effort as well as
not having nearly the amount of resources and supplies that were needed.
DHS/EPR/FEMA also decides what areas need which type of emergency response
and determines who and what type of equipment/supplies to deploy to the areas in need.
FEMA failed to successfully complete this task by not providing adequate relief
resources. FEMA was reported to have turned away empty Amtrak trains to evacuate
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victims, not have rescue boats staged and waiting to facilitate water rescues, and not
having an organized or timely response to provide relief to victims stranded on rooftops
or patches of land and roadway throughout New Orleans. Clearly, this ESF makes
FEMA and the collaborative federal groups FEMA staffs (NRCC, HSOC, and IMG) the
central nervous system of federal response planning and mitigation for any incident.
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4.2.7.2. ESF #6 - Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
ESF #6 - Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
Purpose ESF Actions -
Headquarters, Regional Primary Agency
and Field Responsibilities
Supports local, regional and state Assesses the situation, Activates appropriate
governments'
efforts to address the non validates resource requests support agencies
medical mass care needs of individuals and and anticipates response
families impacted by Incidents ofNational needs Coordinates logistical and
Significance financial activities
Coordinates resource supporting ESF #6
Mass Care involves the coordination of requests with federal associated priorities and
non-medical mass care services to include departments and agencies activation
sheltering ofvictims, organizing feeding and the NRCC
operations, providing emergency first aid at Plans and supports regular
designated sites, collecting and providing Validates resource requests meetings with the primary
information on victims to familymembers, from the regional ESF #6 and support agencies related
and coordinating bulk distribution of to preparedness, response
emergency relief items. Provides technical assistance
to the NRCC and affected
and recovery activities
state Ensures primary and support
agencies are informed and
Determines the adequacy of involved in all meeting
response and recovery related to ESF #6 activities
activities
Assists and coordinates the
Manages the process for release of information for
requests for federal notification of relatives
assistance
Assists in the provision of
Provides reports to the medical supplies and
national ESF #6 response services
structure and JFO
Provides available
Initiates actions to identify, resources, including cots,
staff and operate the JFO MREs, logistical support
and communications, as
DHS/EPR/FEMA regions appropriate
establish communications
with the affected state(s) to
coordinate initial requests
for federal assistance
Helps maintain situational
awareness of the threat or
incident, in coordination
with the HSOC.
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4.2.7.2.1. Purpose
The ESF Coordinator of this particular ESF is DHS/EPR/FEMA with the primary
agency including DHS/EPR/FEMA and the American Red Cross. The purpose of ESF
#6 is to provide support to state, regional, local, and tribal government and
nongovernmental organization (NGO) efforts to address the non-medical mass care,
housing, and human services needs of individuals and/or families impacted by Incidents
ofNational Significance (NRP, 2004, p. 145).
4.2.7.2.2. Scope
The scope of ESF #6 is quite large. It promotes the delivery of services and the
implementation of programs to assist individuals, households and families impacted by
potential or actual Incidents of National Significance. ESF #6 includes three primary
functions: mass care, housing, and human services (NRP, 2004, p. 145). Although this
section involves three major functions, only the mass care aspect will be evaluated. Mass
care is part of an immediate response to an incident and undoubtedly did/should have
occurred within the first week after Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. The media
seemed to focus on the issue ofmass care and repeatedly broadcasted images of stranded
evacuees on rooftops, highways and bridges all waiting for reliefworkers to arrive with
food, ice and water. The other aspects of housing and human services are hopefully
initiated within the first week after an incident but may continue for several months after
an incident occurs.
Chapter 4 -74-
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Van Patten
4.2.7.2.3. Policies
Included in ESF #6 policy is the underlying principle that ESF #6 support may vary
depending on an assessment of incident impact(s), the magnitude and type of event, and
the stage of the response and recovery efforts. Also, supporting mass care activities and
providing services will be done without regard to economic status, race, religion, ethnic
or religious affiliation (NRP, 2004, p. 146).
4.2.7.2.4. Concept ofOperations
ESF #6 Concept of Operations involves initial federal response activities focused on
meeting urgent mass care needs of victims. Recovery efforts are initiated concurrently
with initial response activities. Close coordination is required among those federal
agencies responsible for response operations and recovery activities, and other
nongovernmental organizations providing assistance (NRP, 2004, p. 146).
Mass care involves the coordination of unified federal assistance to provide non
medical mass care services to include sheltering of victims, organizing feeding
operations, providing emergency first aid at designated sites, collecting and providing
information on victims to family members, and coordinating bulk distribution of
emergency relief items in affected areas (NRP, 2004, p. 146).
Emergency shelter includes the use of pre-identified shelter sites in existing
structures, the creation of temporary facilities or the temporary construction of shelters,
and use of similar facilities outside the incident area, should evacuation be necessary
(NRP, 2004, p. 146).
Feeding is provided to victims through a combination of fixed sites, mobile feeding
units, and bulk distribution of food. Feeding operations are based on sound nutritional
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standards to include meeting requirements of victims with special dietary needs to the
fullest extent possible. Emergency first aid, consisting of basic first aid and referral to
appropriate medical personnel and facilities, is provided at mass care facilities as well as
at designated sites (NRP, 2004, p. 146). Bulk distributions provide for emergency relief
items to meet urgent needs and are distributed through sites established within the
affected area. These sites are may also be used to coordinate mass care food, water, and
ice requirements, and distribution systems coordinated with federal, state, local, and tribal
governmental entities and NGOs (NRP, 2004, p. 147).
4.2.7.2.5. Actions
Initial action taken on at the headquarters level includes: assessment of the situation,
validation of resource requests from the regional ESF #6, forecasting response needs,
providing technical assistance to the regional ESF #6 and NRCC, and coordinating ESF
#6 resource requests with federal departments, agencies and the NRCC (NRP, 2004, p.
148).
Initial actions at the regional level include: providing technical assistance to support
incident priorities, establishing communications with the national ESF #6 response
structure, assessing the incident situation and determining the adequacy of response and
recovery activities. Additional tasks include; providing technical assistance to the state
designated mass care agency, managing the process for requests for federal assistance,
providing reports to the
national ESF #6 response structure and JFO, and anticipating
future requirements (NRP, 2004, p. 148).
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4.2.7.2.6. Responsibilities
Responsibilities of DHS/EPR/FEMA as the ESF #6 coordinating agency: activates
appropriate support agencies, coordinates logistical and fiscal activities supporting ESF
#6 associated priorities and activation, designates DHS/EPR/FEMA Recovery Division
staff with specific ESF coordination responsibilities to ensure information and
coordination support to the primary and support agencies, as appropriate, plans and
supports regular meetings with the primary and support agencies related to preparedness,
response, and recovery activities, and ensures primary and support agencies are informed
and involved in all meetings related to ESF #6 activities (NRP, 2004, p. 148).
The primary agencies, DHS/EPR/FEMA, will provide leadership in coordinating and
integrating overall federal efforts associated with mass care, housing, and human services
(NRP, 2004, p. 149).
DHS/EPR/FEMA, as the primary agency for recovery activities pursuant to a
presidentially declared disaster or emergency, has a number of responsibilities.
DHS/EPR/FEMA assists and coordinates the release of information for notification of
relatives; assists in establishing priorities and coordinating the transition of mass care
operations with recovery activities based on incident information and the availability of
resources that can be appropriately applied; provides available resources such as cots,
blankets, meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), additional initial response resources, and logistical
support, including communications, as appropriate and assists in the provision ofmedical
supplies and services (NRP, 2004, p. 149).
This ESF was also frequently in the media spotlight as a large amount of attention
was focused on the delay of mass care being delivered to Hurricane Katrina victims.
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Katrina victims did not receive relief supplies (food, water, ice, basic medical care) until
a full four days after Katrina stuck Louisiana. Media images of helpless victims, corpses
and stranded pets were center stage across various types of media outlets. Nationwide,
citizens could not understand why the federal government was so delayed in providing
mass care and relief supplies. After seeing the horrific condition ofNew Orleans and
the
images of suffering and despair on the news, some Americans left their home states and
traveled to Louisiana to assist victims themselves. Many news reports quote victims as
stating they believed they were not going to survive this chaotic and terrifying situation
and that the federal government left them there to die.
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4.2.7.3. ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue
Purpose
Rapidly deploys parts
of the US&R System
to provide specialized
life-saving assistance
to local and state
authorities during an
Incident ofNational
Significance
US&R activities
include locating,
extricating, and
providing on-site
medical treatment to
victims trapped in
collapsed structures
ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue
ESF Actions Headquarters, Regional
and Field
The NRCC serves as the single point of
contact for responding task forces for
situation information and response status
during the initial stages of an incident
Upon notification of an Incident ofNational
Significance, the NRCC notifies
DHS/EPR/FEMA of the potential need to
activate task force, and cooperative
agreements
The NRCC develops recommendations on
the type and quantity of resources to be
alerted or activated
The NRCC issues Activation Orders for task
forces
The NRCC issues Alert Orders placing
additional task forces in a heightened state
of readiness
The NRCC collects assessment information
from special teams, DHS/EPR/FEMA
officials and local/state government officials
for situational reports and for decision
making regarding the need for US&R
resources
DHS/EPR/FEMA officials from the affected
region designate an initial point of contact
for the ESF
The regional ESF representative provides
overall management and coordination of all
deployed US&R resources
Primary Agency Responsibilities
Serves as the primary agency for
the ESF, provides planning
guidance and coordination
assistance, funds special
equipment, and evaluates task
force operational readiness
Coordinates logistical support for
US&R assets during field
operations
Provides status reports on US&R
operations throughout the affected
area
4.2.7.3.1. Purpose
The ESF Coordinator and primary agency of this ESF is DHS/EPR/FEMA. The
purpose of ESF #9 is to rapidly deploy components of the National Urban Search &
Rescue (US&R) Response System to provide specialized life-saving assistance to state,
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local, and tribal authorities during an Incident ofNational Significance. US&R activities
include locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in
collapsed structures (NRP, 2004, p. 173).
4.2.7.3.2. Scope
The National US&R Response System integrates US&R task forces, Joint
Management Teams (JMTs), and technical specialists. JMTs provide coordination and
logistical support to US&R task forces during emergency operations. They also conduct
needs assessments and provide technical advice and assistance to state, local, and tribal
government emergency managers. The JMTs are comprised of personnel from US&R
task forces; federal, state, local, and tribal government emergency response
organizations; and private-sector organizations (NRP, 2004, p. 173).
4.2.7.3.3. Policies
The National US&R Response System assists and augments state and local US&R
capabilities. Upon activation by the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) under the
National Response Plan (NRP), US&R task forces are considered federal assets under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and other applicable
authorities (NRP, 2004, p. 173).
4.2.7.3.4. Concept ofOperations
Department of Homeland Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal
Emergency Management Agency (DHS/EPR/FEMA) may activate the National US&R
Response System for any actual or potential Incident of National Significance likely to
result in collapsed structures that may overwhelm existing state and local US&R
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resources. Activation is dependent upon the nature and magnitude of the event, the
suddenness of incident onset, and the pre-existence of US&R resources in the affected
area (NRP, 2004, p. 174).
4.2.7.3.5. Actions
There are various initial actions that must be completed by headquarters and regional
sectors of this ESF. From the aspect of Headquarters, the NRCC serves as the single
point of contact for responding task forces and JMT members for situation information
and response status ofUS&R resources during the initial stages of the incident. NRCC
staff in ESF #9 establishes and maintains a chronological log of US&R events and
information obtained from the field. Upon notification of an Incident of National
Significance with potential or actual structural collapse, the US&R Response System
staff immediately notifies the ESF #9 NRCC staff, support contractors, and the
DHS/EPR/FEMA Military Support Liaison Officer of a potential need for US&R
response. The NRCC staff also notifies DHS/EPR/FEMA of the potential need to
activate task force, JMT, and cooperative agreements (NRP, 2004, p. 175).
Upon establishing the need for US&R assets, the NRCC: develops recommendations
regarding the type and quantity of resources
to be alerted or activated; issues activation
orders for task forces and JMT members; and issues alert orders placing additional task
forces in a heightened state of readiness.
Initial actions from regional sects are just as critical as the actions completed by
headquarters. DHS/EPR/FEMA officials from the affected region designate an initial
point of contact for ESF #9 activities. The NRCC notifies the DHS/EPR/FEMA
Regional Office responsible for the affected area. Copies of all advisories and alert and
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activation orders issued by the NRCC are transmitted to the regional US&R point of
contact for the affected region, as well as for those regions whose resident task forces
have been alerted or activated. Initial recommendations on US&R resources to be alerted
or activated are coordinated with the regional US&R point of contact. Regional US&R
points of contact with alerted or activated task forces maintain contact with the
sponsoring states and task forces (NRP, 2004, p. 175).
While US&R task forces and JMTs are activated at the national level, the regional
ESF #9 contact provides information related to the need for US&R resources. Regional
officials process state requests for federal US&R assistance. The regional ESF #9
representative coordinates the preparation for the arrival of task forces and JMT members
and ensures the JMT is fully incorporated into the region's ERT structure. The regional
ESF #9 representative also provides overall management and coordination of all
deployed US&R resources through the JMT. The ESF #9 representative coordinates all
US&R activities with the functional groups of the ERT. The ESF #9 representative keeps
the ESF #9 leader in the NRCC informed of all US&R field activities (NRP, 2004, p.
175).
4.2.7.3.6. Responsibilities
The responsibilities of DHS/EPR/FEMA as the primary agency of this ESF are
critical. DHS/EPR/FEMA develops national US&R policy, provides planning guidance
and coordination assistance, standardizes task force procedures, evaluates task force
operational readiness, funds special equipment and training requirements within available
appropriations, and reimburses task force costs
incurred as a result of deployment under
the NRP, as appropriate. DHS/EPR/FEMA also serves as headquarters-level ESF #9
Chapter 4
-82-
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Van Patten
coordinator. DHS/EPR/FEMA establishes, maintains, and manages the National US&R
Response System. This includes pre-incident activities such as training, equipment
procurement, and evaluation of operational readiness. Additionally, DHS/EPR/FEMA
dispatches one or more JMTs to the affected area(s), manages US&R task force
deployment to, employment in, and redeployment from the affected area, coordinates
logistical support for US&R assets during field operations, develops policies and
procedures for the effective use and coordination of US&R assets and provides status
reports on US&R operations throughout the affected area (NRP, 2004, p. 177).
FEMA, as both coordinator and primary agency for this particular ESF is charged
with deploying the Urban Search and Rescue Team (US&R) to an incident. FEMA
assists with all aspects of maintaining the US&R system including financial resources,
equipment and training needs, and ensuring adequate staffing. If there are not adequate
US&R teams or such teams do not have the proper training or equipment
- the blame will
fall back on DHS/EPR/FEMA (NRP, 2004, p. 177). The US&R System is vital to any
incident nationwide where there may be victims who are trapped or injured and need to
be evacuated or rescued from a location. The number one goal in any incident response
and mitigation is to preserve and safeguard life. Therefore, there is no acceptable excuse
for the US&R Team to not be properly equipped, funded or trained. After all, this is the
team that is called in when local and state government emergency response teams are
overwhelmed. The national US&R team can be categorized as the last line of defense
against an incident. There is no alternative entity to activate if the US&R fails and
therefore, it is critical they are properly trained, equipped and ready to provide an
effective response.
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The overall NRP outlines numerous critical tasks in which FEMA is the coordinating
federal agency in charge of ensuring successful task completion. For this research
design, this NRP account ofwhat should have happened is used as a checklist to compare
against the timeline and congressional testimony for the purpose of identifying where
FEMA made mistakes and failed. Analyzing this data against the four research questions
will assist in determining how and why FEMA made mistakes and failed with several
responsibilities and functions. Once it is understood why FEMA failed,
recommendations can be developed to correct FEMA's organizational operation and also
improve future disaster planning and response.
4.3. FEMA Successes
Although the overall FEMA's disaster preparedness and response to Hurricane
Katrina was a failure, there are certain responsibilities that FEMA successfully fulfilled.
There are also situations in which FEMA employees made individual decisions that were
ultimately beneficial for FEMA's overall preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina.
While the positive contributions from FEMA do not outweigh the dramatic
organizational paralysis and poor performance, they are worth noting. In most instances,
FEMA made an attempt to prepare and respond according to the needs of the affected
areas in New Orleans as well as FEMA's bureaucratic procedure for accommodating
such requests. Generally speaking, FEMA's response was on a much smaller scale than
what was truly needed. As a result, FEMA was not able to accommodate the essential
needs and fell apart organizationally trying to do so.
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Pre-staging and Deployment ofResources
Resources were pre-staged to various locations adjacent to areas that were predicted
by the NationalWeather Service to be the most severely effected. Although FEMA went
to great lengths to pre-deploy resources and FEMA personnel, there were not nearly
enough to meet the needs of Katrina victims. FEMA also did not calculate the
transportation needs that would be required to bring resources and personnel into
devastated and flooded cities.
The Select Bipartisan Committee report describes several instances in which FEMA
successfully prepared for Hurricane Katrina through pre-staging and resource deployment
activities. FEMA positioned an unprecedented number of resources in affected areas
prior to Katrina's landfall (A Failure of Initiative, 2006, p.59). FEMA's efforts far
exceeded any previous operation in the agency's history. Louisiana expressed its
satisfaction with the supplies and that former FEMA Director Brown directed that
commodities be "jammed
up"
the supply chain (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p. 131). On
August 28, 2005, in Louisiana alone a total of 36 trucks ofwater (containing 18,000 liters
per truck) and fifteen trucks of MREs (21,888 per truck) were pre-staged at Camp
Beauregard. Nine US&R task forces and Rapid Needs Assessment Teams also were
deployed to Louisiana on the Saturday before landfall (A Failure of Initiative, 2006,
p.59).
The White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, indicated that
state and local governments supported by the federal government and FEMA had carried
out unprecedented preparations in comparison to those made for previous
"average"
hurricanes (2006, p.31). Pre-deployed assets were placed throughout the region to
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encircle the forecasted impact area. On Sunday, August 28th, FEMA opened a federal
logistics mobilization center at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The report
indicates that FEMA pre-staged over 400 truckloads of ice, more than 500 truckloads of
water and nearly 200 truckloads of food at logistics centers in Alabama, Louisiana,
Georgia, Texas and South Carolina (2006, p. 31). This was the beginning of the pre-
staging efforts that increased to the largest pre-positioning of federal assets in history by
the time Hurricane Katrinamade its second landfall on August 29th.
Within twenty-four hours of the storm, surface operations (boats) were conducted out
of Zephyr Field (a local professional baseball stadium). According the Coast Guard, a
unified command for surface operations was established at Zephyr Field with the Coast
Guard, FEMA, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (A Failure of
Initiative, 2006, p.215).
FEMA's Mobile Emergency Response Support detachments were pre-positioned in
Louisiana to provide emergency satellite communications capability. FEMA partially
anticipated the communications infrastructure would be needed in the Gulf coast and pre-
positioned with each of the three
states'
EOCs a Mobile Emergency Response Support
detachment (MERS) detachment which is designed to provide, "rapid multimedia
communications, information processing, logistics, and operational support to federal,
state and local agencies during catastrophic emergencies and disasters (A Failure of
Initiative, 2006, p.
164)."
FEMA also deployed a MERS to the state Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, Mississippi to provide satellite communications
systems for its operations in the Gulf Coast region (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p. 165).
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Due to efforts by FEMA and the National Guard, the Cloverleaf was completely
cleared by Saturday, September 3rd, where 6000 to 7000 people had been stranded (A
Failure ofInitiative, 2006).
FEMA also conducted their first video teleconference, a call held each day at noon
from August
25l
until well after landfall, which helped to synchronize response efforts
between federal, state and local governments (The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina, 2006, p.23). The report also indicates that Bush regularly received briefings and
held numerous conversations with many federal, state and local leaders who unanimously
stated that FEMA was providing excellent assistance and they had "no concerns at this
time"
(2006).
The morning of August
27l
,
FEMA headquarters commenced Level 1 operations
requiring full staffing on a round-the-clock, seven-days-a-week basis. This is FEMA's
highest alert. FEMA's regional headquarters for Regions IV (Atlanta) and VI (Denton,
Texas) went to Level 1 activation as well (The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,
2006, p.27). At this point, all fifteen National Response Plan Emergency Support
Functions had been activated. Region IV had staged at Camp Beauregard 540,000 liters
of water, 680,000 pounds of ice, 15,120 tarps and 328,320 MRE's with more
commodities pre-staged elsewhere in the region (The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina, 2006, p.27). FEMA's Logistics Representative stated that one hundred and two
trailers with water and MREs were staged at the FEMA Logistic Center in Ft. Worth,
Texas (The Federal Response to HurricaneKatrina, 2006, p.27).
On August 30th, Governor Blanco announced her desire to begin evacuating the
Superdome (Brookings). FEMA personnel at the Superdome requested that FEMA
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headquarters provide buses to transport evacuees from the stadium. The report states that
within an hour of receiving the call, FEMA tasked the DOT to assemble a bus fleet of
over 1100 vehicles (2006). Significant numbers of federally-contracted buses began to
arrive at the Superdome on the evening of August 31st. By September 4th, both the
Superdome and the Convention Center had been evacuated (Brookings).
4.3.1. Warnings and Advisories Prior to Landfall
FEMA disseminated warnings and information advising the Gulf region ofKatrina's
predicted path of destruction and strength. FEMA's Hurricane Liaison Team was
activated and deployed to the National Hurricane Center on August
24th
in anticipation of
Katrina making landfall to work with the National Hurricane Center in monitoring
weather forecasts and ensuring advisories were made. The Hurricane Liaison Team
(HLT) is made up of FEMA, the National Weather Service, and state and local
emergency management officials (A Failure of Initiative, 2006, p.59). The HLT is
charged with assisting in the coordination of advisories with federal, state and local
emergency management agencies, providing forecast updates and technical advice, and
closely coordinating with FEMA Headquarters (A Failure of Initiative, 2006, p. 164).
Federal officials, including FEMA, also informed Blanco and Nagin about the threat to
New Orleans (NRP, 2004).
Brigadier General David L. Johnson testified before the House Committee on Science
in 2005:
The FEMA/NWS Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), established in 1996,
coordinates communications between NOAA and the emergency
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management community at the federal and state levels. Membership
consists of FEMA Hurricane Program Managers and Disaster Assistance
employees as well as National Weather Service meteorologists and
hydrologists. The Hurricane Liaison Team is activated by FEMA, at the
request of the director of the National Hurricane Center, or his or her
designee. The HLT is activated a few days in advance of any potential
U.S. hurricane landfall. Once activated, FEMA hosts the daily HLT audio
or video conference calls. FEMA invites state and local emergency
managers in the potential impact area to participate in these calls.
Additionally, FEMA disseminated pre-landfall warnings to state and local
governments as well as the White House. FEMA listened to the forecast predications and
warnings originated by the National Weather Service and made notifications to Mayor
Nagin, the White House and President Bush. While these notifications are few in
number, FEMA contacted the key players who would have the power to authorize action,
cut bureaucratic red tape and demand priority response to Katrina victims.
Katrina's growing intensity led NHC (National Hurricane Center) Director Mayfield
to make personal calls on Saturday night to state and local officials in the region to
emphasize the threat Katrina posed (A Failure of Initiative, 2006, p. 164). FEMA
DirectorMichael Brown shared Mayfield's concerns during the daily teleconference with
the state EOCs and FEMA Regional staffon Sunday, August
28th
(A Failure ofInitiative,
2006, p. 164).
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On Monday, August 29th, Brown warned Bush about the potential devastation that
Katrina may bring. In a briefing, Brown stated, "This is, to put it mildly, the big one,
I
think"
(Think Progress). He also voiced concerns that the government may not have the
capacity to "respond to a catastrophe within a
catastrophe"
and that the Superdome was
ill-equipped to be a refuge of last resort (Think Progress).
4.3.2. Individual Initiative
Despite the rigid procedures of the federal government, there were various FEMA
employees that took their own initiative to effect change and bring about a hastened and
much needed response. Policies and procedures cannot be a substitute for common
sense. Policies and procedures also cannot foresee every possible challenge that may
arise during an emergency situation. FEMA employees eventually
broke away from
agency procedures and policies and
began pushing resources and services to
local and
state governments even though requests for assistance for those items had never been
made. Various FEMA officials took it upon themselves to cut the red tape and deliver
essential items without processing or approval delay. They also thought on
their own and
outside of the organizational structure to create evacuation plans
on an ad-hoc basis and
gather much needed intelligence for federal decision making. The
downfall to the
individual initiative was that the federal hierarchywould halt or ignore their efforts.
FEMA officials also took planning into their own hands at
times when it appeared
that federal plans were lacking and action was essential. On Tuesday
August 30th, FEMA
official Phil Parr and other FEMA officials
sheltered in the Superdome, who were
apparently unaware of
the evacuation planning at the EOC, began their own plans to
evacuate the Superdome as they observed the rising waters
around the building and
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realized that people would not be able to walk out of the dome and return home. They
devised a plan where virtually all evacuees in the Superdome could be airlifted by nine
helicopters in about thirty hours. They communicated their plan to the FEMA Regional
Response Center in Denton, Texas and received initial approval. The next day
Pan-
learned that the JTF Katrina Lt. General Honore halted and threw out their plan as he
arrived in Louisiana to lead the JTF Katrina (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p. 121).
Individual initiative also applied to distribution of resources by FEMA. The federal
response evolved into a push system over several days after Katrina made landfall. The
Select Bipartisan Committee indicated, "Federal response officials in the field eventually
made the difficult decisions to bypass established procedures and provide assistance
without
waiting,"
for appropriate requests from the states or for clear direction from
Washington (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p. 132). This push system initially occurred in
an uncoordinated fashion (A Failure of Initiative, 2006, p. 132) and became widespread
by the end of the first week.
In Louisiana, FEMA response personnel tried on a number of occasions to push
commodities and assets into the field (A Failure of Initiative, 2006, p. 139). In cases
where there was a need for life-saving and life-sustaining commodities but no clear state
distribution system set up, FEMA acted proactively to provide assistance (A Failure of
Initiative, 2006, p. 139).
When FEMA gained access to several helicopters, FEMA began ferrying food and
water to people stranded on high ground even though there was no formal request by the
state to perform this function. FEMA also contracted with over 100 ambulances to
transport hospital evacuees (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p. 139). This mission was not
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requested by the state, but FEMA responded proactively because the situation demanded
this immediate attention.
On Monday, August 29th, FEMA employee Marty Bahamonde listened to reports of
the levee breach at the
17th
Street Canal and regularly updated FEMA Headquarters. He
received assistance from a Coast Guard helicopter to do a flyover of the area (A Failure
ofInitiative, 2006, p. 142). From Bahamonde's bird's eye view, there was no doubt there
was a breach and he was also able to observe that the city was 80% flooded. He then
called Brown at 7pm and told him of his spot report. The White House discounted this
FEMA eyewitness account that ultimately proved to be accurate (A Failure ofInitiative,
2006, p. 142).
4.3.3. Flow of Information
At times, the flow of information with FEMA was successful. In particular, FEMA
strived to maintain daily teleconference calls with the White House and other key
officials in an effort to provide situational awareness and status updates and to facilitate
consistent communications within the federal government. However, FEMA's successful
attempts at facilitating information flow are quickly shadowed by the overwhelming
information and reports of how poorly FEMA managed information and communication
logistically and bureaucratically. Even within FEMA there were conflicting accounts of
information as well as a severe lack of overall communication. While FEMA did pre-
deploy communications equipment, these setups were outdated, frequently broken down,
and were not compatible with other federal organizations.
At the beginning of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, communication
between FEMA and the Department ofDefense (DOD) was strained. Requests were not
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filled by FEMA if the DOD did not exactly follow FEMA's rigid procedure for
requesting assistance from the federal government. However, as time went on, FEMA
and DOD worked out Requests for Assistance and communications, resulting in
improved information sharing (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p.204).
4.3.4. General Response
It should be noted FEMA used existing resources, procedures, and staff to organize
and conduct a massive civil logistics operation beyond any this country has seen before
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p.322). FEMA was able to pre-position an unprecedented
amount ofwater, ice and MREs before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Several FEMA
employees took individual initiative to provide information to the White House,
coordinate evacuate plans in the Superdome, take charge of medical operations at field
facilities, as well as strategically place resources and equipment.
4.4. Summary
FEMA is the primary agency for several functions and responsibilities under the
National Response Plan. When the NRP is activated, it is expected that FEMA will
adequately staff and fulfill responsibilities of the NRCC, IIMG and HSOC. Under the
EmergencyManagement ESF, FEMA will adequately prepare for the impending disaster
and maintain constant communication with the effected areas. FEMA will also deploy
special teams units, resources and equipment that will be necessary in the disaster
response effort. With regards to the Mass Care ESF, it is ordered that FEMA will
provide logistical support, necessary resources (including; cots, blankets, MREs, etc.) and
the critical coordination to facilitate mass care. Under the Search and Rescue ESF of the
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National Response Plan, FEMA is mandated to evaluate team readiness to respond to
disasters, provide coordination guidance, provide funding for equipment and standardize
the search and rescue process to ensure uniformity and efficiency. FEMA clearlywas not
able to successfully complete each of these expectations due to lack of preparation and
planning for such a large scale disaster. While FEMA may have attempted to complete
such responsibilities and expectations, FEMA's response was paralyzed and
uncoordinated in various aspects of the response effort and was not able to recover and
continue to forge ahead with its reliefplans as outlined by the NRP.
The few positive actions and responses FEMA do not outweigh the overall
organizational failure and inoperability that resulted in an ineffective and shoddy disaster
response. Organizationally, FEMA's response effort fell apart because it was unable to
accommodate unplanned circumstances due to lack of structure for such occurrences, and
the rather small, untrained and inexperienced agency staff was not capable of properly
planning for a disaster of this magnitude despite weather predictions and warnings and
subsequently responding to overwhelming quantities of requests for assistance. FEMA
also did not have a plan to respond to Katrina, but rather responded in an ad hoc "here
and
now"
fashion which lacked strategy, efficiency, coordination, or interagency
cooperation (A Failure ofInitiative, 2005).
Although FEMA's overall preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina was
ineffective, uncoordinated and generally poor, FEMA's successes cannot be ignored.
FEMA was able to accomplish certain emergency preparedness and mitigation tasks and
at times accomplished them rather well. Individual initiative, thought, and brevity on the
part of some FEMA staff members must also be recognized. Without their individual
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efforts and accomplishments, FEMA's response and reputation may both have been
worse off.
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5. Chapter 5: Analysis and Discussion
The findings from the analysis of the research questions will be the basis for the
development of policy recommendations aimed at improving FEMA's ability to
adequately prepare for and respond to future disaster needs. This research comparison is
a compilation of FEMA's performance, decisions and activities throughout the
preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina. In order to develop the findings, the
National Response Plan's outline ofFEMA responsibilities and tasks will be compared to
the media timeline, congressional testimony and the two federal reports. Each of the four
research questions will be examined in order to determine if the data presented regarding
FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina supports each research question.
Congressional testimony will be a large component of this comparison, as it is the
sole primary data source which provides a first hand account ofwhat occurred and what
did not regarding FEMA's response effort. Congressional testimony was provided by
FEMA officials, state emergencymanagement workers, Senators, Congressmen and other
federal officials. There may be additional congressional testimonies or portions of
testimonies that were not released to the public due to the presence of classified
information. Therefore, the congressional testimony accessed on both the US House and
US Senate's websites are only what was released for public consumption. The possibility
of omitted testimony, which may provide additional information critical to this research,
but not available to the public does exist.
A research question is deemed supported when the data sources identified above
provide multiple distinct and clear instances that exemplify the posed organizational
inadequacy outlined in each research question. The data examples must clearly state
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what occurred and/or the impact of the action being described. If a research question is
adequately substantiated by FEMA's actions or lack of action, then policy
recommendations will be made relating to the research question in Chapter 6.
Conversely, if a research question is not supported by evidence of FEMA's relief
response to Hurricane Katrina, then policy recommendations will not be made related to
that research question.
Through congressional testimony, the White House and Select Bipartisan Committee
reports, it is expected that each of the four research questions will be clearly supported
with examples of the extent of each organizational issue outlined in each respective
research question. FEMA was closely followed by the media during its preplanning and
response to Hurricane Katrina and conveyed a large amount of information to the public
concerning FEMA's response activities. Regarding the federal reports, the federal
government has the authority to demand records and documents. Therefore, the federal
reports contain information that the public may not have been able to access and will
assist to definitively show FEMA's successes and failures.
It becomes apparent through this plethora ofdocumentation that FEMA suffered from
several types of organizational failures outlined in the theoretical framework. FEMA was
not prepared to face such a dramatic disaster due to lack of funding, training, staffing, and
even disaster focus. Organizational centralization and bureaucratic red tape were also
factors in FEMA's inadequate preparation and delayed response. These series of failures
on account ofFEMA attributed to a second disaster of failed federal response.
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5.1. Analysis
1. How will centralization and flexibility affect an organization's ability to
effectively respond and adapt to new and unexpected situations?
The federal government is a victim of bureaucratic red tape, which typically involves
complicated policies and procedures that greatly extend the amount of time needed to
complete tasks and are generally not adaptable to unexpected situations. Clearly, the
federal government does not adopt a one-size-does-fits-all approach and FEMA is no
exception. FEMA's systems were overburdened and ill prepared for Hurricane Katrina.
As a result, many of FEMA's systems became paralyzed from its inability to handle
unexpected situations, large amounts of requests for assistance, and multi-agency
coordination. It is apparent that FEMA steadily declined to a level of inoperability as the
days after Katrina made landfall marched on. Various media reports depicted FEMA
employees arriving to an affected location without any supplies in hand, but promising to
return with aid and then never doing so. FEMA was broken down by failure and was
unable to recover.
Donald Smithburg, Executive Vice President, LSU System CEO, Health Care
Services Division testified before the Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health
Preparedness Committee on July 14, 2006:
To give you one concrete example, despite the designated role of our
hospitals to receive evacuated patients, we received far fewer than we had
capacity for. I personally worked at the state Office of Emergency
Preparedness headquarters to help move both the patients and the staff
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from Charity and University to other LSU hospitals that were prepared to
accept them, but this approach - theplanned approach - was overruled by
FEMA. Instead, patients from Charity and University Hospital were taken
to the New Orleans airport, ultimately put on military transports and
scattered across the country. Only medical records, but no staff,
accompanied them. To our knowledge, no record was kept ofwho was on
what plane, where they came from or where they were taken. Immediately
after the evacuation, it was as if our patients had disappeared, and when
the calls from families came asking about those in our care, we could not
tell them where they were. Staff spent literally weeks calling hospitals
across the country asking if any of our patients had been transferred there.
Despite these efforts and those of the Louisiana Hospital Association, we
never did find out where all our patients were taken.
As the evidence shows, it is apparent that Hurricane Katrina did not fit the federal
government's, particularly FEMA's, rubric for disaster preparedness and response needs.
Hurricane Katrina has been deemed one of the most devastating natural disasters in US
history. Various media sources appeared to repeatedly report that FEMA was
"overwhelmed". FEMA's current policies and procedures are not conducive to a swift
and coordinated disaster response, especially for a large scale disaster. For example,
FEMA procurement tracking processes have not yet been automated. This made the job
of tracking shipments inaccurate and labor intensive to locate relief supplies that were in
route. Also, initially FEMA did not provide relief resources to New Orleans unless a
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request for resources was received and approved, even if it was known that there was the
need for such resources. Rather, FEMA would not initiate fulfilling requests for services
unless the state or local government (which not all were able to do) made a formal
request by following FEMA's rigid request procedure.
FEMA was incredibly ineffective with regards to requests for assistance. Requests
took time to be processed and approved by FEMA before action took place. Some
requests were claimed to have never been received. FEMA could have pre-positioned
mobile communications in New Orleans but did not do so because it believed that it
should first be asked to do so by local authorities (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p. 163).
On December 8
,
Senator Joseph Lieberman testified before the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, "Under these kinds of catastrophic
conditions, FEMA should not have seen its role as a butler waiting in the wings to assist
when
called."
Ivor van Heerden, hurricane expert at Louisiana State University, stated during an
interview with NOVA in 2005:
The other important thing about the Pam exercise is that a lot of local
officials came away from it understanding that FEMA, the Federal
EmergencyManagement Agency, had to act within 48 hours that FEMA
would arrive with all the troops, all the food, all the water, and all the
rescuers that we needed.
The second thing is, we could have had military transport aircraft flying
into the New Orleans Airport it was serviceable early on Tuesday
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[August 30] bringing food and water, the necessary amphibious vehicles
if needed. There was a promise that in 48 hours, FEMA would start
delivering all those things.
According to Bruce Baughman, Alabama's Director of Emergency Management,
during his March 8, 2006 testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee:
Unfortunately, the Administration, Congress, and all of us have stood by
and watched as FEMA has become a shell of its former self. We are at the
same point as the nation was after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, questioning
organizational structures, leadership, the roles of federal, state, and local
government, and even citizen preparedness.
David Paulison, FEMA Director, acknowledged the government is often slow to
revamp itself, comparing the recommendations made after Hurricane Andrew in 1992 to
Katrina more than a decade later. "You could have taken
'Andrew'
out and put
'Katrina'
in,"
Paulison said in a brief interview (Jordan, 2006).
Craig Nemitz, Disaster Services Manager of America's Second Harvest testified
before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the United States
Senate on March 7, 2006 and stated, "The DHS oversight of FEMA adds a layer to the
communications channels but fortunatelymy office knew who to call at the right time for
the right
answers."
William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer, testified on December
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14, 2005 before the House Select Committee To Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina that:
The FCO indicated that after FEMA came under DHS that his authority to
make decisions in the field has been curtailed and many of his actions are
now subject to review at FEMA headquarters and in many cases DHS.
This slows the recovery process greatly.
Senator Lieberman testified on December 8, 2005 during opening statements before
the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that, "Yet, as we
will hear from one of our witnesses today, Mr. Parr, who led the FEMA emergency
response team sent to the Superdome, the team didn't depart Baton Rouge for New
Orleans until noon Tuesday
- almost a full day after the hurricane had
passed."
Philip
Parr, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, testified before Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee on December 8, 2005 to which he stated:
On Saturday August
27'
,
I was informed that I would be the Emergency
Response Team Advance Element team leader for the state of Texas. My
team was composed of personnel from FEMA, Region 1 (New England),
and we were instructed to rendezvous in the Region 6, Regional Response
Coordination Center in Denton, TX. Sunday August 28th. Soon it became
clear that Texas was not in the path of Hurricane Katrina and that
members ofmy team and I would be assigned as the lead element in New
Orleans, La.
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I flew into Louisiana, immediately following the hurricane passing
Monday the
29l
of August with a contingent of my team, and Tuesday
morning on the
30l
we helicoptered into the Superdome. Our mission was
three fold: (1) form a unified command with the State (as represented by
the Louisiana National Guard), and the City ofNew Orleans; (2) maintain
visibility of commodities ordered; and (3) build out a base from which
FEMA teams could be formed to locate and assist in the hardest hit
Parishes.
The Honorable James Oberstar stated at a press conference onMay 9, 2006 on
the Introduction of the Restoring Emergency Services to Protect Our Nation from
Disasters ("RESPOND") Act:
Moving FEMA into the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) was the
wrong thing to do. It trapped the agency
- an agency that needs to be
nimble and be able to marshal resources quickly
- in a bureaucratic
morass. During its time in DHS, FEMA has been partially dismantled, has
been bled of necessary resources, has been unable to fill key management
positions on a permanent basis, has been unable to make timely decisions
to deal with emergencies, and has been forced to focus on terrorism at the
expense ofnatural disasters.
I, along with many others, feared that including FEMA in the new
Department would undermine its effectiveness by diverting resources
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away from its traditional mission of preparing for and responding to
natural disasters, thereby leaving the federal government unprepared to
respond to a disaster like Hurricane Katrina.
Mayor Ray Nagin testified before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on December 14, 2005
and described the inadequate federal response to New Orleans.
Every day, requests were sent to the State and Federal authorities for
emergency assistance needed to save lives and restore order. We
requested search and rescue assistance, busses for evacuation, assistance
in patching the levees, food, water, medical supplies, police and fire
equipment and pumps to drain water. We were in most desperate need for
assistance.
OnWednesday, the situation in the Superdome was tenuous at best and no
food or water had arrived at the Convention Center. Little help had
arrived as the day turned to night and you could feel the heaviness of the
aftermath. Imagine the nights - pitch black, no power, intense heat and
people crying for help.
On Thursday, conditions continued to deteriorate. I received word from
the National Guard and New Orleans police that the suffering in the
Superdome and Convention Center were becoming inhumane. There was
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increasing pressure to leave the buildings and incidents of violence were
escalating. As the day passed, I sent out more urgent pleas for help.
Finally, on Friday afternoon we began to see passengers loading into
busses. Late Friday night, I watched the last bus leave the Convention
Center. Saturday, the final bus left the Superdome. Many people had
been there for 7 full days.
According to the Select Bipartisan Committee, there were several severe performance
issues with FEMA. The Committee report stated that FEMA, "is a dysfunctional system
in DHS that simply waits for requests for aid that state and local officials may be unable
or unwilling to
convey"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2006). "The blinding lack of situational
awareness and disjointed decision making needlessly compounded and prolonged
Katrina's
horror"
(A Failure of Initiative, 2006). One of the Select Bipartisan
Committee's findings included that, "FEMAmanagement lacked situational awareness of
existing requirements and resources in the supply chain. An overwhelmed logistics
system made it challenging to get supplies, equipment and personnel where and when
needed"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2006). In fact, FEMA was overwhelmed and unable to
coordinate all aspects ofproviding relief to Katrina victims. On Thursday, September 3rd,
FEMA requested that the DOD take over the logistics distribution function of
coordinating relief to be provided to victims.
The formal Mission Assignment was begun
by DOD on September 3rd, which involved the planning and execution for procurement,
transportation and distribution of ice, food, water, fuel and medical supplies in
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participation of the Katrina disaster relief effort in Louisiana and Mississippi (A Failure
ofInitiative, 2006).
FEMA's lack of real-time asset-tracking system left federal managers in the dark
regarding the status of resources one they were shipped. Some post-landfall requests
took weeks before any shipments arrived to local officials. Parish officials were
universally critical of FEMA for providing relief commodities late. There were also
misunderstandings of what constituted an official request for assistance (verbal requests
during conference calls versus written requests as FEMA requires, etc.)
FEMA's database systems are also not linked inter or intra agency which resulted in
delays in requests reaching FEMA and also the requests being fulfilled. State officials
complained about FEMA's non-automated process that made tracking status difficult.
They also complained about weaknesses in tracking the transportation and estimating
arrival of FEMA-contracted commodities. FEMA officials have acknowledged these
weaknesses. One unnamed employee interviewed was worried about holes in the
tracking system, noting: "White House is asking, 'where are the water
trucks?'
I didn't
know. ... We don't have confidence that the trucks have checked in, arrived at the
destination. We have to rely on third parties to tell us they have
arrived"
(Jordan, 2006).
FEMA also failed in other areas of planning and response. FEMA logistics and
contracting systems did not facilitate a unified, proportional, or prolonged coordination of
commodities. According to A Failure of Initiative, in some cases FEMA had contracts
and in other cases FEMA had to, "start buying off the street to meet the
demand"
(2006,
p.330). FEMA, DOD and Kenyon International Emergency Services, a mortuary
services contractor, were in discussions for recovery services and it was unclear who was
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in charge of the recovery effort. Kenyon stated that it was not given the foundation it
needed from FEMA to meet its objectives and ended up pulling out of the contract (A
Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p.330).
Katrina overwhelmed FEMA management and overloaded its logistics system.
Response and reliefpersonnel had little access into available federal assets and resources.
The process for requesting assistance could not sustain the volume of requests, and the
technology supporting that process proved inadequate. Due to degrading
communications, many highly publicized requests for food and water may not have ever
reached FEMA. According to Wells, requests for easily obtainable commodities were
inappropriate because the state should not rely on FEMA for basic items that are
otherwise easily obtainable, like writing tablets (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p.324).
The Select Bipartisan Committee indicated in its report that, "The failure of initiative
was also a failure of
agility"
(2004). Response plans at all levels of government,
including the federal government, lacked flexibility and adaptability to successfully
manage Katrina's strength and destruction.
Colonel Jeff Smith, of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, testified before the House Select Committee to Investigate the
Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina on December 14, 2005 and stated:
Two huge issues emerged with FEMA in resourcing: Not only were
resources slow in coming, but there is no tracking system in place. FEMA
could not advise with a degree of certainty when a particular resource
would arrive. Once something is ordered FEMA has no way to determine
the arrival date. When FEMA provided an arrival date, yet did not deliver,
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huge problems were created. The most notable example is the failure to
deliver buses, as promised, to evacuate the City ofNew Orleans.
Generators are a key element in emergency response. FEMA's method to
supply generators is totally absurd. There are many documented cases
where it took three and four days to get generators in place and operating,
when there were generators on hand at a staging area.
The Louisiana EOC stated that FEMA should have been more sympathetic and
provided more assistance when it was clear Louisiana was overwhelmed by the size of
Katrina's devastation. There are several instances of state and local officials making
requests to FEMA that were never processed because they did not follow the formal
request process. In these cases, no immediate action was taken because FEMA assumed
the state would follow up the verbal requests with official written requests.
According to Assistant Secretary of Defense of Homeland Defense, Paul McHale,
during the response to Hurricane Katrina, the federal military remained under FEMA's
control (A Failure of Initiative, 2006, p.204). In fact, the DOD grew frustrated with
FEMA's inefficiency regarding appraising situations prioritizing need. The DOD
operated under FEMA and therefore could act only when FEMA gave it direction to do
so. Since the DOD had more advanced equipment and expertise than FEMA, DOD
began appraising the incident more quickly than FEMA could, and began drafting their
own work plans and requests for assistance. The DOD would then send these documents
to FEMA who in turn sent them right back to DOD for action.
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Former FEMA Director Michael Brown testified that too little was pre-positioned too
late in various affected locations in the Gulf Region: "It was the largest natural disaster
ever to strike the United States - 92,000 square miles. Logistics were falling
apart"
(A
Failure of Initiative, 2005). When FEMA did arrive, representatives sometimes were
empty-handed (A Failure ofInitiative, 2006, p.320). Senator Pryor stated, "When FEMA
finally did show up, everybodywas angry because that is all they had was aWeb site and
a flier. They didn't have any real resources that they could
give"
(A Failure ofInitiative,
2006, p.320).
William Lokey, FEMA Baton Rouge Federal Coordinating Officer testified on
January 30, 2006 before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee that the federal government and particularly FEMA, were overwhelmed:
Were we overwhelmed? The simple answer is, yes. But what needs to be
understood is that at any disaster the initial response always feels
overwhelmed. I must draw on my experience as a local responder to give
you an example on a small scale of what I mean, and then a larger one.
The police officer who pulls up to a two car accident with severe injuries
while he operates alone waiting for help is overwhelmed.
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina also documented the inflexibility and
bureaucracy ofFEMA which contributed to its failed and often paralyzed response.
FEMA's pre-positioned supplies were inadequate to meet demands throughout the
region after landfall. As Katrina made landfall, Brown provided public assurances that
FEMA was prepared to act to meet the logistical challenge. As it turns out, FEMA
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personnel were quick to discover that the quantity of resources requested
post-landfall
stripped their logistical capabilities. FEMA was not able to buy resources quickly
enough to keep up with needs of the affected areas and the requests for assistance.
FEMA's contracts with private companies were incapable of supplying the quantities
needed. As a result, shortages plagued the Gulf Region (The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina, 2006, p.44-45).
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff testified on October 19, 2005 in front of the House
Special Committee on Katrina that:
By all measures, Hurricane Katrina was the largest natural disaster that
FEMA has ever been called upon to support. Although FEMA
pre-
positioned significant numbers of personnel, assets and resources before
the hurricane made landfall, we now know its capabilities were simply
overwhelmed by the magnitude of this storm.
William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer, testified on December 14,
2005 before
the House Select Committee To Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina that:
Despite all of our efforts and despite the fact that we pre-positioned more
commodities and staged more rescue and
medical teams than ever in our
history, as a result of the catastrophic size and
scope ofKatrina, our initial
response was overwhelmed.
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Ineffective communications between FEMA and other federal agencies prevented
available federal resources from being effectively used for response operations. There
was no efficient mechanism for proficiently integrating and deploying these resources
that were at times repeatedly offered by the USDA, HUD, VA, and DOI. FEMA did not
know how to manage these requests because there was no procedure available regarding
this type of circumstance.
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina states that FEMA turned to DOD for
major assistance with logistical problems. FEMA could neither efficiently accept nor
manage the deluge of charitable donations. Even other countries had a hard time getting
through to a contact person in FEMA. A flight of relief supplies from Switzerland was
cancelled because FEMA only wanted a portion of the cargo and Switzerland could not
unload and repackage the supplies.
FEMA officials lacked situational awareness and were oblivious to their own
resource capabilities. FEMA had deployed two Mobile Emergency Response Support
(MERS) detachments to the Gulf and quickly moved them to the affected areas in
Louisiana. MERS consists of vehicles equipped with phone and data lines, satellite
communications, generated power, mobile communication, etc. These two units were not
adequate to manage Katrina's magnitude. Key officials in Washington, DC and in the
field were not aware that there were additional MERS available.
On Saturday, August 27th, FEMA issued a statement in the afternoon asking first
responders to only come to the city if there was
proper coordination between state and
local officials (Brookings). On Tuesday, August 30th, FEMA stopped volunteer
firefighters with hurricane expertise due to the insecurity of the city. They were asked to
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wait for National Guardsmen to first secure city (Brookings). This clearly demonstrates
how bureaucracy can greatly delay and also halt critical assistance and resources merely
because
Five full days passed after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans before
FEMA was able to secure transportation to evacuate New Orleans. On Saturday evening,
September
3rd
FEMA finalized a bus request. "FEMA ended up modifying the number of
buses it thought it needed to get the job done, until it settled on a final request of 1,335
buses at 8:05 p.m. on September 3rd. The buses, though, trickled into New Orleans, with
only a dozen or so arriving the first
day"
(Think Progress). Essentially, the evacuation
effort was delayed because FEMA did not have the knowledge or skill to determine how
many buses it needed to evacuate New Orleans. Instead ofmaking an initial bus request
and following up with an additional request (if needed), FEMA delayed evacuations by
waiting until they had a more definitive idea ofhow many buses should be requested.
2. To what extent will an employee's skill set and situational awareness affect
organizational operations?
The Homeland Security Act was signed into law by President Bush in November of
2002 (NRP, 2004). This act directs FEMA to, "protect the Nation from all hazards by
leading and supporting the Nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency
management
program"
(The Heritage Foundation, 2005).
In March 2003, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed control of
twenty-two federal agencies, including FEMA, in an effort to better coordinate national
security, emergency preparedness, response and
civil defense (FEMA.gov, 2006). The
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Department ofHomeland Security is charged with degrading virtually all aspects of the
Federal EmergencyManagement Agency when it came under DHS in 2003. Reportedly,
FEMA's operating budget for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, after FEMA was absorbed by
DHS, was cut by $80 million and $90 million respectively (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004,
p.156).
In addition, FEMA did not have any succession planning. Top officials, senior
workers and specialists were victims of "FEMA brain
drain,"
meaning that these FEMA
employees were moved to other sectors of DHS to fill staffing needs and left FEMA
without the knowledgeable, skilled and seasoned workers it once had (A Failure of
Initiative, 2004, p. 152). According to DHS Secretary Chertoff, "Currently, FEMA has a
very capable and well respected Acting Director in David Paulison. But FEMA must
work to replenish its ranks at the senior level with experienced staff (October 19, 2005
testimony before the House Special Committee on Katrina).
DHS Secretary, Michael Chertoff, testified before the House Special Committee on
Katrina on October 19, 2005:
Hurricane Katrina was the first large-scale test for the new National
Response Plan that Congress as well as other federal, state, and local
partners worked with our Department to create and implement over the
past few years. And it was by any measure an extraordinary test. The
one-
two combination of a catastrophic hurricane and massive flood
overwhelmed the normal disaster relief system.
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As seen with the Hurricane Pam exercise, funding for training was also cut. In 2004,
FEMA encouraged a mock Hurricane disaster to bring together multiple federal agencies
for training, named Hurricane Pam, out of realization that the Gulf Region was a
vulnerable location for a large-scale hurricane (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004). A
follow-
up exercise was planned for 2005, but it never materialized due to insufficient funding (A
Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.82). With funding cut for training, employees are unsure of
their roles and responsibilities in the face of a disaster, do not know how to collaborate
(meaning communicate with, meet with, or divide responsibilities) with other responding
agencies (i.e. first responders, local/state emergency officials, federal agencies or other
sectors within FEMA) for an effective, managed and unified response.
Colonel Jeff Smith, of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, testified before the House Select Committee to Investigate the
Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina on December 14, 2005 and stated:
In addressing the shortcomings in the Federal response, I share the views
of many other emergency managers and other[s] that many of the
shortcomings are directly a result of FEMA being brought under the
umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is my
understanding that the Department ofHomeland Security is made up some
180,000 employees of which FEMA is barely over 2,000. Critics of the
current federal structure have been validated by the response ofDHS and
FEMA to Katrina. It is apparent that DHS does not understand the full
spectrum of emergency management. DHS hindered FEMA's ability to
plan and coordinate. It appears that DHS has literally stripped FEMA of
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its assets: just recently the Preparedness Division of FEMA was taken
away from FEMA and moved into DHS.
While natural disasters such as Katrina cannot be prevented, there can be
preparation. The desperately needed ability to prepare has been stripped
from FEMA. When you read about the role of the new preparedness
division that is now in DHS, it is clear that the emphasis is terrorism and
preventing terrorism. This is not the same as "preparing". Only one short
reference is made to natural disasters.
DHS publicizes that it is "all
hazards"
but the grant guidelines reflect an
entirely different picture. Unless the training exercise has something to do
with weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"), it is very difficult to get
funding.
FEMA is the only federal agency that is able to properly prepare and respond to
disasters given the necessary tools, including funding and staffing. Baughman stated
during his March 8, 2006 testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs:
No federal agency is more qualified structurally and statutorily than
FEMA to help our nation respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA
has the direct relationships with state and local governments because of
the grant programs and the disaster relief programs authorized through the
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Stafford Act. FEMA is the only federal agency authorized under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (42 U.S.C.
5121 et seq.) to carry out duties on behalfof the President.
FEMA is vastly understaffed at both the headquarters and regional offices.
Currently, 4 of the 10 regional offices are led by Acting-Directors. The
constant strain of placing civil service employees in an acting capacity
takes away from the work-load in the office, since decisions have to be
made about what tasks to put aside because of staffing shortages. I would
estimate that, regional offices are staffed to about 70 percent of the level
that they were three years ago.
Gary LaGrange, President and CEO of Port of New Orleans, testified before the
Senate Committee on Finance on September 28, 2005 in which he stated, "However, it is
difficult to keep the FEMA person focused on one crisis. FEMA employees are often
moved around to address the newest crisis and that often that delays recovery of older
problems."
Albert Ashwood, Vice-President, National Emergency Management Association and
Director, Oklahoma Department of Emergency Management testified before the House
Committee on Transportation, Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings and Emergency Management in 2005, "More and more, FEMA is
forced to rely on state and local governments to support their own activities because
FEMA just does not have the volume ofnecessary personnel and institutional knowledge
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within the agency anymore (2005). Senator Joseph Lieberman also indicated in his
testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
(2005):
As we will hear today, FEMA deployed too few people to respond to
Katrina and deployed them too slowly. Many of those it did deploy
apparently failed to appreciate what the breaking of the levees meant, even
when they belatedly learned of the breaks - a failure that had disastrous
consequences for the people ofNew Orleans.
Several media reports also indicate since FEMA's inclusion into DHS in 2003, the
focus of FEMA was no longer disaster preparedness and response. Rather, FEMA was
forced to focus on terrorism, as is DHS's main focus (A Failure of Initiative, 2004).
According to A Failure of Initiative, FEMA's trained response teams were reduced to
merely names on a roster and by no means coordinated or well trained (2004, p. 158).
As mentioned in A Failure ofInitiative, FEMA personnel were meeting officials from
other agencies for the first time ever during the response to Hurricane Katrina (2004,
p. 152). An effective, swift and coordinated interagency federal response cannot be
expected if members of the involved organizations do not have any experience training
together.
All of these factors contribute to FEMA's severely lacking response to Katrina.
There are several examples given by both of the federal government's reports and the
timeline which demonstrate a clear lack of training, familiarization, knowledgeable
personnel, situation awareness, and practice.
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The Select Bipartisan Committee determined that FEMA's disastrous response was a
result of organizational and societal failures of initiative (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.
359). There were several examples of failure including, "tardy and ineffective execution
of the NRP, an under-trained and under-staffed FEMA, and a perplexing inability of
FEMA to learn from Hurricane Pam and other
exercises"
(A Failure of Initiative, 2006,
p. 132). Additional failures include, "a complete breakdown in communications that not
only paralyzed command and control, but made situational awareness murky at best, and
an overwhelmed FEMA logistics and contracting system that could not support the
effective provision of urgently needed
supplies"
(A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 359).
Some of these mistakes resulted in failure since these errors resulted in extensive harm
and social costs including substantial loss of life, grave human suffering and significant
property damage.
The Select Bipartisan Committee stated that the medical operation at the New Orleans
Airport was chaotic due to lack of planning, preparedness and resources (A Failure of
Initiative, 2004, p.287). FEMA officials did not conduct an adequate assessment of the
situation before deploying DMATs. Upon arrival, many teams were confused about
where to place assets and how to integrate into the existing operation. Many DMATs
arrived before their cache of supplies, limiting their ability to do their work. Medical
personnel reported doing the best they could with limited resources by, "black tagging the
sickest people and culling them away from the masses
so they could die in a separate
area"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.287). DMAT units TX-1 and TX-4 were the first to
arrive. Their equipment had not been updated, so they couldn't link together other
critical equipment, such as ventilators (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.287). In addition,
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the two FEMA employees sent to operate these DMAT units were unfamiliar with the
controls and functions of the units and ultimately were not able to successfullyman them.
Technology cannot be an effective instrument in disaster planning, mitigation or response
if the equipment operators lack the necessary knowledge and skill set to properly set up
and manage technological tools and equipment.
Katrina overwhelmed several areas of FEMA's response, particularly staffing. "The
response to Katrina required large numbers of qualified personnel at a time when
FEMA's professional ranks had
declined"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.157). FEMA
response officials in Louisiana testified that FEMA's, "inability to field sufficient
numbers of qualified personnel had a major impact on federal response
operations"
(Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 157). A lack of trained, professional personnel at both the
state and federal level greatly hindered the response. FEMA was significantly
shorthanded regarding available trained staff to send into the field. Wells stated that,
"We did not have the people. We did not have the expertise. We did not have the
operational training folks that we needed to do our
mission"
(A Failure of Initiative,
2004, p. 157).
In A Failure of Initiative, Scott Wells, Deputy FCO for Louisiana stated that, "A
ninety person FEMA regional office is woefully
inadequate to perform its two primary
disaster functions: operating a regional response coordination center and deploying
people to staff emergency response teams in the
field"
(2004, p. 157). Further, Wells
indicated that, "FEMA response officials in both Mississippi and Louisiana testified that
the department's inability to field sufficient numbers of qualified personnel had a major
impact on federal response
operations"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004). According to A
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Failure of Initiative, "Ultimately, FEMA officials turned to federal agencies like the US
Forest Service and city firefighters from across the country to staff FEMA positions in
the
Louisiana"
(2004). FEMA had fifty-five acquisition slots, and procurement officials
think it should have had a minimum ofone-hundred-seventy-two. Further, only thirty-six
of the fifty-five slots were actually occupied (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 157).
A Failure ofInitiative found that FEMA and DHS lacked both an adequately trained
and experienced staff capable of planning for and managing the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina. According to A Failure of Initiative, Brown's memo, "identified
budget cuts and organizational changes he believed were harming FEMA's ability to
perform its statutory responsibility of leading the federal government's response to all
disasters, including terrorist attacks. FEMA's operational budget baseline had been
permanently reduced by 14.8% since joining DHS in
2003"
(2004). Brown also stated
that, "FEMA lost $80 million in fiscal year 2003 and $90 million in fiscal year 2004 from
its operation budget. These budget reductions were preventing FEMA officials from
maintaining adequate levels of training and ready staff, according to
Brown"
(A Failure
ofInitiative, 2004, p.
155- 156).
As Brown described, recent organizational changes [the transfer of several FEMA
preparedness programs to ODP in Secretary Tom Ridge's reorganization plan of
September 2003] have divided what was intended to be one, all-hazards preparedness
mission into two artificially separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural
disasters. Brown also said FEMA no longer managed numerous functions that were
essential to meeting its statutory
responsibilities and therefore did not have the tools to
successfully accomplish its mission (A
Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 155).
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The emergency management community has complained since 2003 that FEMA was
being systematically dismantled, stripped of authority and resources and suffering from
low morale, in part because of the Department's focus on terrorism. A Failure of
Initiative described the decline in preparedness has been seen as a result of, "the
separation of the preparedness function from FEMA, the drain of long-term professional
staff along with their institutional knowledge and expertise and the diminished readiness
ofFEMA's national emergency response
teams"
(2004, p.158). The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina claims that at least two factors account for FEMA's loss of seasoned
veterans. First, the report indicated that, "Like other government agencies, many of
FEMA's long-term professionals are reaching retirement
age"
(2004, p. 157). Secondly,
"Job satisfaction was second to last in 2005, according to Partnership for Public
Service"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 157).
In a June 30, 2004 memo, FEMA's top disaster response operators, the cadre of
Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs), warned then FEMA Director Brown that the
national emergency response teams were unprepared because no funding was available
for training exercises or equipment. "It appears no actions were taken to address the
problems,"
identified the memo (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 158).
The diminished readiness of the national emergency response teams has been
attributed to a lack of funding for training exercises and equipment. Numerous officials
and operators, from state and FEMA directors to local emergencymanagers told the same
story: ifmembers of state and federal emergency response teams are meeting one another
for the first time at the operations center, then you should not expect a well-coordinated
response (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 158).
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The lack of adequate staff and insufficient training are directly attributable to limited
funding for FEMA operations. The funding for training exercises is and has been
deficient. This is evident in the lack of coordination of FEMA staff. According to Bill
Carwile (FCO in Mississippi), training funding for national emergency response teams
dried up in 2003 (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 193). Teams sent to the Gulf never had
an opportunity to train together (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 193). This contributed to
delays and inefficiency in federal response.
Senator Joe Lieberman described the training and funding issues as, "A FEMA
disaster waiting to happen because we weren't giving FEMA the resources to get ready
for
this."
(A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 193). The FCO in Mississippi, Bill Carwile
testified before the Senate on December 8, 2005 that, "By 2004, the readiness ofFEMA's
emergency response teams had plummeted
dramatically."
Funding for the teams dried up
after 2002 (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 158). They lost their dedicated
communications equipment. Teams were split up into ever smaller units. Team training
and exercises ceased (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 158).
One FEMA official, Deputy FCO Scott Wells, also said there was no clear unity of
command at the Superdome (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 185). He said he arrived
there on Wednesday, August 31 and when he tried to contact the leadership at the
location to coordinate FEMA activities, he found, "nobody in charge, and no unified
command"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004). For example, Wells stated that there was no
organization or structure to collect requests, prioritize them and pass them on to the next
appropriate echelon (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, 186).
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According to The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, DMATs are supposed to
set up self-supporting field hospitals and provide medical care within the first seventy-
two hours after a disaster before the arrival of other federal assets (A Failure ofInitiative,
2004, p.298). Jack Beall, NDMS Chief, said most of the FEMA NDMS officials
deployed during Katrina and giving orders to DMATs were unseasoned, unfamiliar with
how to operate the communications equipment (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.298). The
inexperience ofFEMA employees contributed to the delayed response.
The Select Bipartisan Committee determined that the effects of lack of command had
various consequences on the overall response effort including: delayed and duplicative
efforts to plan for and carry out post landfall evacuations at the Superdome,
uncoordinated search and rescue efforts that resulted in residents being left for days
without food and water and confusion over deliveries of commodities because some
officials diverted trucks and supplies without coordination with others (A Failure of
Initiative, 2004, p. 183).
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina cites two additional poignant instances
not previously mentioned by the Select Bipartisan Committee, which exemplify the lack
of FEMA staff training and ability, FEMA coordination and poor performance. First,
FEMA teams were deployed to assess damage to the regions did not focus on critical
infrastructure and did not have the expertise necessary to evaluate protection and
restoration needs (The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 2004, p.61). Lastly,
since March 2003, DHS has spread FEMA's planning and coordination capabilities and
responsibilities among DHS's other offices and
bureaus. DHS also did not maintain the
personnel and resources ofFEMA's regional offices (The Federal Response to Hurricane
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Katrina, 2004, p.53). Additionally, many FEMA programs that were operated out of the
FEMA regions have moved to DHS headquarters in DC (The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina, 2004, p.53). Therefore, there were no local relationships which are
critical to an integrated and effective response.
On Monday morning, August 29th, Brown finally requests that DHS dispatch 1000
DHS rescue employees to the region and allows them 2 days to arrive on scene and 2000
more within the next 7 days. "Brown's memo to Chertoff described Katrina as 'this near
catastrophic
event'
but otherwise lacked any urgent language. He proposes sending the
workers first for training in Georgia or Florida, then to the disaster area "when conditions
are
safe."
Among the duties of the workers, Brown proposes, is to "convey a positive
image of disaster operations to government officials, community organizations and the
general
public."
The memo politely ended with, 'Thank you for your consideration in
helping us to meet our
responsibilities.'"
(Think Progress, Fact Check and Brookings)
Early Wednesday morning, August 31, FEMA requests ambulances that do not exist
"Almost 18 hours later, [FEMA] canceled the request for the ambulances because it
turned out, as one FEMA employee put it, 'the DOT doesn't do
ambulances'"
(Think
Progress). This clearly demonstrates a severe lack of familiarity of resources, poor
situational awareness and the absence of a working relationship between agencies.
Two days after Hurricane Katrina struck (Wednesday, August 31st) Jefferson Parish
Emergency Director states that food and water supplies are gone, "Director Walter
Maestri: FEMA and national agencies not delivering the help nearly as fast as it is
needed"
(Think Progress).
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On Thursday, September 1st, there was still no command or control established in
New Orleans. Terry Ebbert, New Orleans Homeland Security Director stated, "This is a
national emergency. This is a national disgrace. FEMA has been here three days, yet
there is no command and control. We can send massive amounts of aid to tsunami
victims, but we can't bail out the city of New
Orleans"
(Think Progress). On Sunday,
August 28th, Louisiana National Guard requests 700 buses from FEMA for evacuations.
FEMA sends only 100 buses (Think Progress).
3. How will internal and external information sharing impact communication
and performance?
Communication was a constant problem with FEMA and any other agency
collaborating with FEMA. Logistically, FEMA was not able to deploy adequate
communications equipment to the areas most in need, repair them when they were not
functioning properly and FEMA's equipment was not typically compatible with the
equipment used by other agencies. Therefore, both
intra- and inter-organizational
communication was unreliable and typically nonexistent.
Although FEMA experienced several technological failures and employees lacked the
skill to operate functional communications equipment, FEMA had recently simplified its
equipment needs. Before 2001, it was commonplace for FEMA to require approximately
four days to set up equipment before its main disaster field office would be operational
with technical services. Now FEMA employees are able to set up wireless
communications for a field office in one day (Dean, 2001). There is no longer a need for
several trailers worth of equipment. Instead, FEMA employees only need one pick-up
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truck to transport their communications kit. Each employee that is deployed to the field
office receives a wireless phone and laptop. In addition, FEMA inspectors are, "equipped
with a handheld tablet computer that is loaded with a list of homes to inspect on a given
day. At the end of the day, the inspector's work is uploaded to FEMA's National
EmergencyManagement Information System
(NEMIS)"
(Dean, 2001).
FEMA claims that it has been using GIS mapping technology since before Hurricane
Andrew in 1992 (FEMA, 2004). In fact, "in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, GIS
began to take a more cohesive shape within FEMA. FEMA began to use GIS based
hurricane wind and earthquake damage estimation models and disaster
maps"
(FEMA,
2004). Moreover, FEMA states (FEMA.gov, 2005):
In 1994, FEMA formed the GIS Applications Branch in the Information
Technology Services Directorate (ITSD). Under the management of the
ITSD GIS Applications Branch, the Mapping and Analysis Center (MAC)
was designed and developed as a state-of-the-art GIS laboratory to support
the EST and the Response and Recovery Directorate. In addition, MAC
staff also developed complete sets of deployable GIS suites and put in
place on-call GIS contract support to provide on-site GIS field support.
This GIS technology is still used by FEMA during disasters. Johnny Bradberry,
Secretary of the LA. Department of Transportation and
Development testified before the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on January 31, 2006 that, "It was several
days [from Tuesday, August 30th] before FEMA was able to produce maps
for its crews
that are attempting to go into
neighborhoods and rescue stranded
citizens."
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Within the federal government, FEMA did not consistently or effectively pass
information down to its employees, or up through the HSOC to the White House (A
Failure of Initiative, 2004). The HSOC is charged with providing a clear situational
picture for the White House of the current events (A Failure of Initiative, 2004).
According to the NRP, FEMA is a primary agency which belongs to the HSOC and
provides staff to run it (2004). The HSOC operated poorly due to its lack of knowledge
regarding what its duties and responsibilities. Subsequently, the White House did not
consistently or clearly receive information on the status of the situation throughout the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 139).
R. David Paulison testified on May 24, 2006 before the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Senate Committee regarding FEMA communications and
situational awareness:
With what is predicted to be another active hurricane season just days
away, much has already been accomplished towards strengthening and
retooling FEMA. Since September of last year, I have led FEMA through
a period ofmuch-needed
re-
tooling to gear up for the next major hurricane
or disaster. Our top three areas of improvement are in: 1) situational
awareness and communications, 2) logistics and commodity management
and 3) victim management and assistance.
Having real-time, on-the-ground information in the 24 hours immediately
before and after a disaster, especially a hurricane, is the best method for us
to support first responders and help save lives. One of the ways we are
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improving our situational awareness is by enhancing our technology to
include satellite phones, high-frequency and land mobile radios and other
mobile and disaster communications equipment to better equip our
response teams. Our teams also will liaison with state and local emergency
operations centers to establish unified incident command with state and
local officials and report information from the local level.
Bennie Thompson testified before the Senate Committee on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship on November 8, 2005:
Given the inability of the Department and FEMA to prepare and respond
to Hurricane Katrina, I was concerned that they would continue their sub-
par performance with regard to contracts that were awarded as a part of
the response and recovery process. As such, it became obvious to me that
oversight and accountability were critical and should be an integral part of
the contracting process.
William Woods of the Government Accountability Office testified before the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Senate Committee on April 10, 2006:
Our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and poor
communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. For example: The
process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on effective
communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, according to
Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the contracting approach
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used by the Corps and ordered at least double the amount of ice required,
resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites available
to handle the volume ordered. Additionally, the local Corps personnel
were not always aware ofwhere ice might be delivered and did not have
the authority to redirect ice as shipments arrived, resulting in inefficient
distribution and receipt at the state level.
It was evident that no clear or unified communications were in place. Conflicting
pieces of information were consistently reported to the public. For example, FEMA
Director Brown had indicated that he was unaware for days that evacuees had flocked to
the Convention Center (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004). Also, early in the Week ofCrisis,
FEMA officials incorrectly indicated that the levee breaches may be able to be repaired in
a matter of days (A Failure of Initiative, 2004). FEMA employees were not able to
consistently remain in contact with coworkers and subsequently did not know where they
were or what they were doing. The lack of reliable communication led to omission of
necessary activities, duplication of effort, confusion, miscommunication and an overall
poor disaster response. This also furthered the lack of a unified command and response
to Katrina since communications were virtually nonexistent due to incompatible
communications systems and weather which affected the ability for communications
equipment to operate properly.
A lack of communications internally between FEMA officials also externally created
a lot of confusion, delayed relief response and lot of criticism. Repeatedly, during the
daily video teleconferences, state and federal officials expressed their frustrations with
the level of communications. The Select Bipartisan Committee found that the HSOC
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failed to provide valuable situational information to the White House and key operational
officials during the disaster. During Katrina, the roles and responsibilities of the HSOC
were unclear (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 139). One of the primary roles is to
maintain an accurate picture of events as an incident unfolds by fathering and integrating
information from multiple sources. Edward Buikema, Regional Director for FEMA
Region 5, stated that while situational reports were continually flowing up the ladder
from FEMA headquarters to the HSOC, no information was flowing back down from the
HSOC to the NRCC (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 140).
Michael Brown told the Senate Bipartisan Select Committee one of his biggest
failures was failing to properly utilize the media as first informer. Brown testified on a
September 27, 2005 hearing, "We should have been feeding that information to the
press. . . in the manner and time that we wanted to, instead of letting the press drive
us."
Without sufficient working communications capability to get better situational
awareness, the local, state and federal officials directing the response inNew Orleans had
too little factual information to address, and if needed, rebut what the media was
reporting to the public. The lack of situational awareness allowed inhumane situations to
continue longer than they should have and, as noted, delayed response efforts, as well as
perpetuated the
evacuees'
fear and anxiety of not being rescued from the Superdome and
Convention Center. On September 1st, during a FEMA videoconference call, FEMA
Baton Rouge Federal Coordinating Officer, William Lokey stated that, "media reports
and what we are getting from on-scene were contradictory and we [did not] have a clear
picture ofwhat exactlywent
on."
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.248).
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FEMA officials claimed they did not know for days about thousands of people at the
New Orleans Convention Center, or that first responders in helicopters could not talk to
crews patrolling in boats (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 173-1 74). Brown was widely
criticized in the media for saying on Thursday night, September that he only found out
that afternoon about the people at the Convention Center. When asked by the media
about conditions at the Convention Center, Brown said, "We learned about that
[Thursday], so I have directed that we have all available resources to get that convention
center to make sure that they have food and water and medical care that they
need"
(A
Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.280). Convention Center General Manager Warren Reuther
says no such medical provision was ever made. He estimates that between 18,000 and
25,000 eventually gathered there (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p.280). To bolster the
fact that FEMA had poor situational awareness, the FEMA Acting Director for Response
during Katrina, Ed Buikema, also said that on Tuesday and Wednesday, August
30th
and
31st, there was still some hope that the breaches in the levees could be repaired quickly (A
Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 121).
Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, during the
immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near panic and
problems with process (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p.203). FEMA
officials'
perceptions of a slow response from DOD reflected that they were unaware of the
planning already under way before final decisions
were resolved and possibly an
unrealistic expectation that acceptance of such a massive mission would result in
immediate action (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p.214). In addition, the Red Cross
experienced substantial communication issues with FEMA. The Red Cross relied on
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FEMA to provide primary necessities to operate its shelters. The Red Cross noted that
there were frequent miscommunications regarding evacuees arriving without warning,
and warning followed by no evacuees arriving (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.347).
The flow of intra- and inter-flow of communication throughout the response effort
was often criticized by local, state and federal agencies as slow or nonexistent (NRP,
2004). This may have been due to the hierarchal chain that information was required to
pass through before it could ultimately arrive at its final destination. This
T
communications journey allowed for various opportunities in which communications
were misunderstood or not delivered all together. The Select Bipartisan Committee
report found that, "Information passed through the maze of departmental operations
centers and ironically-named
'coordinating'
committees, losing timeliness and relevance
as it was massaged and interpreted for internal
audiences"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004,
p.360).
FEMA official Marty Bahamonde was in New Orleans during and immediately after
landfall. Lokey and his staff in the EOC were not aware of this until they were informed
by FEMA headquarters on late Monday, August 29th. Before that time, they did not even
know he was there or what his function was (A Failure of Initiative, 2004, p. 190).
Bahamonde testified on October 20, 2005 before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee:
I am Marty Bahamonde. I work for the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) as a Public Affairs Officer for FEMA's Boston office
and worked in FEMA's Headquarters in Washington, D.C. I worked in
New Orleans prior to and immediately following Hurricane Katrina and
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have spent that past 6 weeks working at the Joint Field Office in Baton
Rouge. I was the only FEMA employee deployed to New Orleans prior to
the storm.
Regarding the
17th
Street Canal levee breach, Bahamonde also testified that:
At approximately 11am, the worst possible news came into the EOC. I
stood there and listened to the first report of the levee break at the 17th
Street Canal. I do not know who made the report but they were very
specific about the location of the break and the size. And then they added
it was "very bad". I continued to provide regular updates to FEMA
Headquarters throughout the day as the situation unfolded.
At approximately 5pm, I rushed over to the Superdome because I had been
notified that a Coast Guard helicopter was able to take me for a short
flyover so that I could assess the situation in the city and plan for Under
Secretary Brown's visit the next day. My initial flyover lasted about 10
minutes and even in that short time I was able to see that approximately 80
percent of the city was under water,
and I confirmed the
171
Street Canal
levee break. I was struck by how accurate the 11am call was about the
levee. About 15 minutes later, I went back up on a second Coast Guard
helicopter for approximately 45 minutes, and during this flight, I was able
to get a real understanding of the
impact ofKatrina on New Orleans and
the surrounding area. Upon landing, I immediately
made three telephone
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calls. The first was to Under SecretaryMike Brown at approximately 7pm.
The second was to FEMA's front office, and the third was to FEMA
Public Affairs.
When Bahamonde called Brown at 7pm to advise him of what he had seen, Brown
did not ask any questions and merely stated, "Thank you. I am now going to call
the
White
House."
White House didn't consider the rumors confirmed until 6:30am the next
morning after they received an updated report from DHS (A Failure of Initiative, 2004,
p.142).
On Tuesday, August 30th, FEMA official Parr and others were in the Superdome.
They were unaware of any other evacuation plan being made, so they devised their
own
and sent the plan to FEMA Regional Command Center in Denton, Texas, where they
received initial approval (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 121). That FEMA office
began
looking for the needed resources to complete the plan. The next day,
Parr learned that the
Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, General Honore, cancelled the plan when he
came to Louisiana. Parr and his coworkers estimate that their plan would have used nine
helicopters to completely evacuate the
Superdome in about thirty hours (A Failure of
Initiative, 2004,p.l21).
Flood water prevented hospitals from receiving supplies
or personnel, and some
private hospitals, such as Methodist, say medical
supplies and fuel tanks being airlifted to
them by their corporate headquarters
were being intercepted by FEMA. Army officers
and FEMA officials arrived on Tuesday and Larry
Graham (CEO for Pendleton
Memorial Methodist Hospital) informed them he
needed assistance with evacuations.
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The officials assured him they would return but never did (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004,
p.286).
OnWednesdaymorning, August 31st, FEMA staffwarned Brown that there had been
fatalities in the Superdome. Three hours later, Brown's press secretary wrote to
colleagues complaining that Brown needed more time scheduled to eat at a restaurant:
"He needs much more that (sic) 20 or 30 minutes. We now have traffic to encounter to go
to and from a location of his choise (sic), followed by wait service from the restaurant
staff, eating, etc. Thank
you"
(Think Progress).
On Thursday, September 1st, around 8:00pm, Brown learns of evacuees in
Convention Center. "We learned about that (Thursday), so I have directed that we have
all available resources to get that convention center to make sure that they have the food
and water and medical care that they
need."
Speaking from Baton Rouge in a live
interview with CNN's Paula Zahn, he stated, "And so, this this catastrophic disaster
continues to grow. I will tell you this, though. Every person in that Convention Center,
we just learned about that today. And so, I have directed that we have all available
resources to get to that Convention Center to make certain that they have the food and
water, the medical care that they
need."
Zahn began to ask, "Sir, you aren't telling
me..."
Brown interrupted and said, "... and that we take care of those bodies that are
there."
Zahn then asked, "Sir, you aren't just telling me you just learned that the folks at the
Convention Center didn't have food and water until today, are you? You had no idea they
were completely cut off? Brown replied, "Paula, the federal government did not even
know about the Convention Center people until
today."
(Brookings, Think Progress and
Fact Check)
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On Thursday afternoon, September 1st, Brown claims that he has not previously heard
of reports ofviolence. "I've had no reports ofunrest, if the connotation of the word unrest
means that people are beginning to riot, or you know, they're banging on walls and
screaming and hollering or burning tires or whatever. I've had no reports of
that"
(Think
Progress).
4. To what extent will a business continuity plan effect an organization's ability
to timely recover from initial failures?
FEMA did not have an adequate recovery plan in place in the event that part of the
emergency response plan failed. As mentioned in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, FEMA did
experience such failure and did not have a recovery plan in place to assist the agency in
recovering and continuing providing relief to New Orleans. There was no back-up for
obtaining supplies or resources, sending in additional FEMA personnel to effected areas,
establishing and maintaining communications systems or any other facet of disaster
mitigation. In fact, due to poor planning, FEMA struggled greatly just to bring the basic
relief aid to evacuees in an adhoc basis. This primitive response still took four full days
to reach Katrina victims in New Orleans. Supplies were not sufficiently stocked and
pre-
deployed before Katrina hit, despite having a directive from President Bush on Saturday,
August 27th, to coordinate all federal disaster relief to do what is necessary to prepare and
mitigate the disaster by freeing up federal funds. Specifically, "FEMA is authorized to
identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to
alleviate the impacts of the
emergency"
(The White House, 2005).
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In particular, there was no back-up plan for evacuating citizens from New Orleans,
bringing FEMA's outdated communications systems back online after they failed to
work
properly, bringing desperately needed medical supplies and relief (water, ice, MREs)
to
the area, accounting for procurement shipping and tracking, or accounting
for personnel
locations and duties, to name a few aspects.
Congressman Bennie Thompson, ranking member of the Committee on
Homelands
Security U.S. House of Representatives, testified before the Senate
Committee on Small
Business and Entrepreneurship onNovember 8, 2005 in which he said:
Based on FEMA's failings in its response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma of which we had notice, I do not believe that it is capable
of
responding to an event that
brings no notice-such as a terrorist attack.
Simply stated, we have not reached the level of
preparedness or response
that this nation needs and deserves.
Senator Susan Collins testified on December 8, 2005 before the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee that:
FEMA has mobile communications vehicles,
but by the time anyone
thought to bring one to the Superdome,
the building was already
surrounded by water, and FEMA was apparently
unable to figure out a
way to get
its equipment into the building.
FEMA also has
communications equipment that could have been
airlifted in. But despite
Mr. Parr's urgent requests for such equipment,
none arrived. Mr. Parr
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estimates that the unfortunate lack of communications equipment reduced
his team's effectiveness by an astounding 90 percent.
Senator Joseph Lieberman stated on December 8, 2005 before the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee:
Yet FEMA somehow miscalculated the gravity of the storm coming and
failed to realize that doing business as usual would compound the disaster.
Katrina simplywas not a typical hurricane that allowed FEMA to work off
of its typical playbook - but one that required a more aggressive and
urgent federal response. But FEMA seemed to expect this severely
damaged state and local response network - itself the victim of the
catastrophe - to operate as if it was at full and normal capacity.
We've learned from other witnesses that the Coast Guard was performing
rescue missions as soon as hurricane-force winds abated on Monday
afternoon. The State sent its rescue boats out late Monday afternoon. But
FEMA's search and rescue teams didn't arrive in New Orleans until
Tuesdaymorning.
Again, given the catastrophic nature of Katrina's damage
-
something
well understood by these other agencies
- I find it impossible to
understand why FEMA wasn't prepared
to move sooner.
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Steve Ellis, Vice President ofPrograms at Taxpayers for Common Sense (a national,
non-partisan budget watchdog organization) testified before the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee onMay 19, 2006:
Murphy's law tells us that whatever can go wrong, will go wrong.
Pre-
disaster planning was superficial or poor at best. Contracts exceeding $100
million quicklywent to the so-called big four: Shaw Group, Bechtel Corp.,
CH2M Hill, Inc. and Flour Corp. From at least as early October 2005,
FEMA has been promising to re-bid contracts.
Essentially, FEMA did not have a back-up plan in place to recover from failure in one
part of FEMA. In order for an organization to be able to successfully recover from a
failing portion of their organization, employees must have a strong knowledge of their
roles, responsibilities and how they may alternatively provide the services needed at that
time. FEMA was unable and unprepared to stop any type of failure from spreading
throughout the agency.
According to Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director for Emergency Management with
the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, "The single
largest failure of the federal response was that it failed to recognize the likely
consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize
federal assets for a post-storm
evacuation of the flooded
city"
(A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.
134- 135). If it had, then
undoubtedly the federal response
and resources would have arrived to the Gulf Region
several days earlier.
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FEMA and HHS needed to plan for the worst. Instead, they scrambled for supplies in
an effort that was often times uncoordinated. With only nominal amounts of medical
supplies pre-positioned by FEMA and HHS, a great deal ofmedical provisions had to be
scrounged and supplied after Katrinamade landfall (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.275).
The establishment of the DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Teams) in the Sports
Arena connected to the Superdome came thirty-six hours after FEMA reported serious
medical problems in the Superdome, including four hundred people with special needs,
forty-five to fifty patients in need of hospitalization, and the rapid depletion ofmedical
supplies (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p.290).
The federal government lost communications and initial efforts to bring in
supplemental capabilities to improve command and control were unsuccessful. For
example, FEMA has a mobile command and control suite, named Red October, which is
housed in an oversized tractor trailer. Red October was pre-deployed to Shreveport, in
northern Louisiana to keep it out of harms way and also for rapid deployment into Baton
Rouge or New Orleans after the hurricane passed. Red October is able to set up thirty
work stations and robust communications. FEMA officials decided to move Red October
to New Orleans to assist with connecting New Orleans and National Guard authorities at
the Superdome. Red October's trailer was too big to fit into the flooded city (A Failure
ofInitiative, 2004, p. 192).
Other FEMA communications vehicles, such as MERS detachments, were not
capable of driving through the floodwaters without damaging their sensitive electronic
equipment. Therefore, FEMA was unable to use these to restore command and control
with its forward teams in New Orleans, led by Parr (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 192).
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FEMA pre-positioned communications assets, but not in New Orleans, where the
need became exceptionally critical. Former FEMA Director Brown testified and said in
hindsight FEMA should have pre-positioned a MERS detachment in New Orleans (A
Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 169). As a result, one of the federal assets that might have
allowed FEMA and local and state governments to work around the damage to the
communications systems and sooner gain situational awareness about conditions in New
Orleans was not present (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 169). Arguably, this instance of
A Failure ofInitiative
-
leaving aMERS detachment outside of the city - exacerbated the
degree to which the massive damage to the local communications infrastructure delayed
the ability of FEMA to learn of or confirm events on the ground in New Orleans and act
accordingly (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 169).
On Monday morning, August 29th, Brown warned Bush about the potential
devastation that Katrina may bring. In a briefing, Brown warned Bush, "This is, to put it
mildly, the big one, I
think."
He also voiced concerns that the government may not have
the capacity to "respond to a catastrophe within a
catastrophe"
and that the Superdome
was ill-equipped to be a refuge of last resort (Think Progress). Interestingly, on
Wednesday night, August 31st, Brown indicates he is surprised by the size of the storm:
"I must say, this storm is much much bigger than anyone
expected"
(Think Progress).
While certain statements had more evidence and examples than others, each of the
statements was proven true. Senator Lieberman summarizing FEMA's performance
when he testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee on December 8, 2005:
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But adequately preparing for and responding to a disaster of this
magnitude required a well-led, well-trained and well-drilled FEMA that
had a plan in place and a sense of mission to guide its actions. All these
things seemed to have been lacking as disaster swept across the GulfCoast
region last August having reviewed your testimony, and other
testimony and documents gathered by the Committee so far, I conclude
that FEMA is a troubled agency that failed in its prime mission
- the
mission it draws its name from - 'EmergencyManagement'.
In several instances, FEMA was not sufficiently prepared to effectively mitigate this
disaster. Various media reports and federal reports indicate that several FEMA staff
members were caught off guard or surprised by Hurricane Katrina's strength and
magnitude of destruction despite frequent and thorough warnings from the National
Weather Service. It is surprising that FEMA claims that no one could have known about
Katrina's potential force and destruction since the National Weather Service is part of
FEMA's Hurricane Liaison Team, along with state and local emergency officials.
5.2. Findings
Clearly, FEMA is a victim of all four of these research questions. This means that
FEMA suffers from organizational failure to such an extent that FEMA's ability to fulfill
its federal duties and responsibilities is greatly inhibited. FEMA is the only federal
agency in the nation that is charged
with the national emergency preparedness and
response. If this agency is not able to fulfill its
essential functions and duties, then it is
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likely during an emergency situation that unnecessary loss of life and property damage
will occur due to FEMA's inability to properly plan and respond for such situations.
1. How will centralization and flexibility affect an organization's ability to
effectively respond and adapt to new and unexpected situations?
FEMA is part of a bureaucratic system in which simple processes may be consumed
with labor intensive and complex procedures. In this type of system, there is no other
way to accomplish a function without first completing all of the necessary bureaucracy
which can also be very time consuming. FEMA is in dire need ofbreaking free from this
bureaucratic red tape and being allowed to adjust its actions, focus, policies and
procedures based on the type of emergency it is facing. Certain procedures may be not
critical and may be completed at a later date once critical functions are satisfied.
2. To what extent will an employee's skill set and situational awareness affect
organizational operations?
Several FEMA and non-FEMA officials have voiced their concern that FEMA
currently does not have adequate funding for training its employees, practicing for
emergency response situations which
results in employees being unskilled and unfamiliar
with FEMA's policies and procedures for emergency preparedness and response. This
issue must be addressed as staff training is essential to the future success ofFEMA.
Dr. Robert Mager, founder of the Mager Institute and expert on training and human
performance improvement, has recognized that training is not always the answer to
correct problems with employee performance and
knowledge. Dr. Mager posed the
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question, 'could employees perform the function correctly if their lives
depended on
it?'
If the answer is 'yes', then training is not needed. Rather, employee performance,
accountability and motivation may need to be addressed. With regards
to FEMA, clearly
the answer to Dr.
Mager'
s question is 'no'. FEMA employees could not correctly
perform assigned tasks if their life depended on it since they were unfamiliar the task
at
hand or the resources available to accomplish it.
3. How will internal and external information sharing impact communication
and
performance?
Due to bureaucracy, information sharing is an issue within FEMA and also among
other federal and state agencies. Inaccurate or partial information is shared which may
lead to confusion, inappropriate action, duplicated efforts,
inaction or other
consequences. As the only federal agency charged
with national emergency preparedness
and response, FEMA must have a seamless
transition of actions to ensure swift and
effective emergencymanagement
which will save lives and reduce property damage.
4. To what extent will a business continuity plan
effect an organization's ability to
timely recover from initial
failures?
FEMA must be flexible and have skilled staff to
plan for recovery when one part of
the agency fails in completing
its actions and responsibilities during an emergency
incident. If FEMA does have contingency planning,
then inevitably the entire agency
will succumb to failure since there is no
"Plan
B"
to pick up the pieces left by the original
plan of action and continue in its efforts.
As seen in Hurricane Katrina, FEMA did not
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have any type ofback-up or recovery plan to get itselfback on its feet when it suffered a
set back or failure. This type of planning is essential to ensure the future of FEMA and
its ability to plan and respond to emergency incidents.
It becomes apparent that these four issues must be resolved so that FEMA can regain
trust from the American people, enhance the capability to reasonably prepare for and
respond to national emergencies, and improve FEMA organizational functionality.
Current FEMA and federal policies foster bureaucracy, slow the transfer of information
within and between agencies, and allow for under-trained employees to assume positions
of critical importance and responsibility which they cannot fulfill. Each of these all
issues has the ability to delay or even halt emergency planning and response. Therefore,
new policies are essential in securing the future ofnot only FEMA, but the nation.
5.3. Discussion
When analyzing media reports, the White House report, and the Select Bipartisan
Committee report for a compilation of FEMA's performance and activities throughout
the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina, it becomes apparent that FEMA
suffered from several types of organizational failures mentioned above. FEMA was not
prepared to face such a dramatic disaster due to lack of funding, training, staffing, and
even disaster focus. These series of failures caused by FEMA have been referred to as a
secondary disaster.
Each of the four research questions below has been supported by various examples
provided from the federal government's reports, congressional testimony, and the
timeline compilation. The evidence presented for each respective research question also
exemplifies the impact each type of organizational inadequacy. For each research
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question, a chart has been developed that comparing examples FEMA's actions versus
what FEMA should have done. This comparison results in a FEMA's actions being
deemed either a success or failure. A success indicates that FEMA's action coincides
with what it should have done as mandated by the NRP. A failure indicates that FEMA's
action is not aligned with what action the NRP outlined.
1. How will centralization and flexibility affect an organization's ability to
effectively respond and adapt to new and unexpected situations?
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Category What Should
Have Happened
FEMA's Actions Success/
Failure
Centralization
and Flexibility
FEMA should have
properly evaluated and
analyzed Hurricane
Katrina's predicted size and
scope to proportionately
prepare and pre-deploy
resources.
FEMA did not pre-deploy or stage
adequate resources to respond to
New Orleans. This resulted in a
shortage of relief and a delay in
obtaining and delivering additional
resources.
FEMA was able to pre-position an
unprecedented amount ofwater, ice
andMREs before Hurricane Katrina
made landfall.
Failure
Success
FEMA's bureaucratic
procedures must be flexible
to adequately prepare assets
and resources to respond
quickly and effectively to
disasters.
FEMA's response structure was
unable to adapt to the size and scope
ofHurricane Katrina's impact to
provide a coordinated and unified
response. FEMA's response became
overwhelmed and paralyzed.
FEMA delayed providing relief
resources to locations that did not
correctly follow FEMA's procedure
for requesting federal assistance.
FEMA was unable to evaluate needs
and assessing situations in a timely
manner due to lengthy procedures
and outdated equipment. The
Department ofDefense (DOD) grew
frustrated and took over the task of
generating its own orders on behalf
ofFEMA.
FEMA was overwhelmed with the
task of coordinating relief supply
distributions in New Orleans. FEMA
requested that DOD take over this
function.
FEMA employees broke away from
agency procedures and policies
and
began pushing resources and services
to New Orleans even though requests
for assistance were not made.
Failure
Failure
Failure
Failure
Success
co
The federal government is a victim of
bureaucratic red tape which typically involves
mplicated and rigid policies and procedures which greatly
extend the amount of time
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needed to complete tasks and requests and are not adaptable to unexpected situations.
Clearly, the federal government is not a one-size-does-fits-all approach. FEMA is no
exception. FEMA's systems were overburdened and ill prepared for Hurricane Katrina.
As a result, many of FEMA's systems became paralyzed from its inability to handle
unexpected situations, large amounts of requests for assistance, and its inflexibility. It's
apparent that FEMA steadily declined to a level of inoperability as the days after Katrina
made landfall marched on. Various media reports depict FEMA arriving to a scene
without anything in hand, promising to return with aid and never doing so. FEMA was
broken down and unable to recover.
As the evidence shows, Hurricane Katrina did not fit the federal government's,
particularly FEMA's, rubric for disaster preparedness and response needs. Hurricane
Katrina has been deemed one of the worst natural disasters in US history (refer to Figure
1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1). This media seemed to repeatedly state the FEMA was
"overwhelmed". FEMA's policies and procedures are not conducive to a swift and
coordinated disaster response. Procurement tracking processes are not automated.
FEMA would not initiate fulfilling requests for services unless the state or local
government (which not all were able to do) made a formal request by following FEMA's
request procedure.
FEMA was incredibly ineffective with regards to requests for assistance. Requests
took time to be processed and approved by FEMA before action took place. Some
requests were claimed to have never been received. In fact, the DOD grew frustrated of
FEMA's inefficiency regarding appraising situations prioritizing need. The DOD
operated under FEMA and therefore could act only when FEMA gave it direction to do
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so. Since the DOD had more advanced equipment and expertise than FEMA, DOD
began drafting their own work plans and would send them to FEMA who in turn sent
them right back to DOD for action.
FEMA was unable to handle the logistics of distributing relief supplies to evacuees in
Louisiana. By Thursday, September 1st, FEMA relinquished this responsibility to the
military (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p213). The need overpowered FEMA's structure
and FEMA was unable to operate.
2. To what extent will an employee's skill set and situational awareness affect
organizational operations?
Category What Should
Have Happened
FEMA's Actions Success/
Failure
Employee
Competency
FEMA employees must train
regularly as an agency as well as with
external agencies to maintain skills,
develop working relationships, and
determine best practices for
emergency preparedness and
response.
A follow-up exercise to
Hurricane Pam was never
conducted as previously
planned.
Failure
FEMA employees did not
know what their disaster
preparation and response roles
were.
Failure
FEMA's special response
teams did not train and
became merely names on a
roster.
Failure
FEMA did not train with other
agencies and subsequently did
not develop a unified response
strategy to effectivelymanage
and respond to emergencies.
Failure
The Homeland Security Act was signed into law by President Bush in November of
2002 (NRP, 2004). In March 2003, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
assumed control of22 federal agencies, including FEMA, in an effort to better coordinate
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national security, emergency preparedness and response and civil defense (FEMA.gov,
2006). The Department of Homeland Security is charged with dismantling virtually all
aspects of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency when it came under DHS in 2003
(A Failure of Initiative, 2004). Reportedly, FEMA's operating budget for fiscal years
2003 and 2004, after FEMA was absorbed by DHS, was cut by $80 million and $90
million respectively (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004, p. 156). Top officials, senior workers
and specialists were victims of "FEMA brain drain"; meaning that these FEMA
employees were moved to other sectors of DHS to fill staffing needs and left FEMA
without the knowledgeable, skilled and seasoned workers it once had (A Failure of
Initiative, 2004, p. 152).
As seen with the Hurricane Pam exercise, funding for training was also cut. In 2004,
FEMA urged a mock Hurricane disaster to bring together multiple agencies for training,
named Hurricane Pam, out of realization that the Gulf Region was a vulnerable location
for a large-scale hurricane (A Failure of Initiative, 2004). A follow-up exercise was
planned for 2005, but it never materialized due to insufficient funding (A Failure of
Initiative, 2004, p.82). With funding cut for training, employees are unsure of their roles
and responsibilities in the face of a disaster, do not know how to collaborate (meaning
communicate with, meet with, or divide responsibilities) with other responding agencies
(i.e. first responders, local/state emergency officials, federal agencies or other sectors
within FEMA) for an effective, managed and coordinated response.
According to Jane Bullock, former FEMA Chief of Staff (Haddow and Bullock,
2005):
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By all accounts, the government's response to this catastrophic event has
been disorganized and dysfunctional. The near exclusive focus on
terrorism since the September 11 attacks and the deconstruction of
FEMA's response capabilities resulted in a breakdown of the entire
disaster response system.
Experienced disaster managers from FEMA have been replaced by
contractors with no previous disaster experience and all recovery decisions
are being made at DHS headquarters and at the Office ofManagement and
Budget. By any measure, the process is moving too slowly and this has
severely compromised the economic and societal recovery in the impacted
region.
Mitigation has gone from being the foundation of our emergency
management system to an after thought. ... No one is in charge.
Several media reports also indicate that since FEMA's inclusion into DHS in 2003,
the focus of FEMA was no longer disaster preparedness and response. Rather, FEMA
was forced to focus on terrorism, which is the main focus ofDHS (A Failure ofInitiative,
2004). According to A Failure ofInitiative, FEMA's trained response teams were merely
names on a roster and by no means coordinated or well trained (2004).
As mentioned in A Failure ofInitiative, FEMA personnel were meeting officials from
other agencies for the first time ever during the response to Hurricane Katrina (2004). An
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effective, swift and coordinated interagency federal response cannot be
expected if
members of the involved organizations do not have any experience training
together.
All of these factors contribute to FEMA's severely lacking response to
Katrina.
There are several apparent examples given by the both of the federal
government's
reports and the timeline which demonstrate a clear lack of training, familiarization,
knowledgeable personnel, situation awareness, and practice.
3. How will internal and external information sharing impact
communication and
performance?
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Category What Should FEMA's Actions Success/
Have Happened Failure
Information FEMA must evaluate the most FEMA did not deploy adequate Failure
Sharing effective locations to pre-deploy communications equipment to
communications equipment so areas in New Orleans or have
communications can quickly be made the ability to repair
operational after Katrina made nonfunctional communication
landfall in New Orleans units.
FEMA should establish FEMA communications Failure
communications with local, state and equipment was not compatible
federal agencies before Katrina made with communications units used
landfall. After experiencing lacking by other state, local and federal
inter-agency communication, an agencies which impeded
alternate means of communication information sharing.
should have been used.
The HSOC is charged with passing FEMA is a primary agency in Failure
information provided by FEMA charge of running the HSOC.
through DHS to theWhite House and Throughout the response, this
consistently deliver a clear situational did not happen consistently.
picture of the response efforts and
actions.
The hierarchical chain of FEMA did not communicate Failure
communication within FEMA as consistently with each other or
well as outside ofFEMA should with outside agencies. This led
have been observed and utilized. to conflicting information
FEMA is charged with coordinating reports and duplicated or
the federal response effort and neglected response efforts.
ensuring information is consistently
and accurately relayed to local, state Beginning on August 25th and
and federal agencies, as per ESF #5. continuing well into the
response effort, FEMA held
video teleconferences daily
with local, state and federal
agencies.
Success
FEMA needs to maintain clear FEMA's overall lack of Failure
situational awareness at all times and communication resulted in a
push information to media outlets. lack of situational awareness.
As a result, FEMA relied on
conflicting media reports for
information and was not able to
provide the media with accurate
information or updates.
As a part of the Hurricane Liaison FEMA's HLT was deployed to Success
Team (HLT), FEMA must assist with the National Hurricane Center
the dissemination of advisories and (NHC) on August 24th in
warnings to local, state and federal anticipation ofKatrina's landfall
agencies to workwith the NHC in
monitoring weather forecasts
and ensuring advisories were
made.
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Communication was a repeated issue with FEMA and any other agency interacting
with FEMA. Logistically, FEMA was not able to deploy adequate communications
equipment to the areas most in need, repair them when they were not functioning
properly and FEMA's equipment was not typically compatible with the equipment used
by other agencies. Therefore, both intra and inter-organizational communication was
unreliable and typically nonexistent.
Within the federal government, FEMA did not consistently or effectively pass
information down to its employees, or up through the HSOC to the White House. The
HSOC is charged with providing a clear situational picture for the White House of the
current events (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004). FEMA is a primary agency which belongs
to the HSOC and provides staff to run it. The HSOC operated poorly due to its lack of
knowledge regarding its duties and responsibilities (A Failure of Initiative, 2004).
Subsequently, the White House did not consistently or clearly receive information on the
status of the situation.
It was evident that no clear or unified communications were in place. Conflicting
pieces of information were consistently reported to the public. FEMA Director Brown
indicated that he was unaware for days that evacuees had flocked to the Convention
Center (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004). Early on, FEMA officials indicated that the levee
breaches may be repaired in a matter of days (A Failure of Initiative, 2004). FEMA
employees were not able to consistently remain in contact with coworkers and
subsequently did not know where they were or what they were doing. This led to
omission of necessary activities,
duplication of effort, confusion, miscommunication and
a poor disaster response. This also furthered the lack of a unified command and response
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to Katrina since communications were virtually nonexistent due to incompatible
communications systems and weather which affected the ability for communications
equipment to operate properly.
4. To what extent will a business continuity plan effect an organization's ability to
timely recover from initial failures?
Category What Should
Have Happened
FEMA's Actions Success/
Failure
Business
Continuity
Planning
FEMA will initiate its business
continuity plan when a segment
ofFEMA's response effort
experiences failure. This will
allow FEMA to continue its
response effort and despite
having failure in a portion of the
response effort.
FEMA struggled to provide a
primitive relief response and
allowed partial organizational
failures to paralyze and severely
delay the response effort.
Failure
The inoperable FEMA
communications equipment was a
major obstacle for FEMA's
response. In the absence of a
continuity plan, FEMA's response
succumbed to ineffective and
disorganized conditions.
Failure
FEMA did not have an alternate
plan to travel through the severely
flooded streets ofNew Orleans to
bring relief supplies, evacuate
citizens or coordinate rescues.
Failure
FEMA did not have an adequate recovery plan in place in case part of the emergency
response plan failed which can be seen from the evidence provided. There was no back
up for obtaining supplies or resources, sending in additional FEMA personnel to effected
areas, establishing and maintaining communications systems or any other facet ofdisaster
mitigation. In fact, due to poor planning, FEMA struggled greatly just to bring the basic
relief aid to evacuees in an adhoc basis. This primitive response still took 5 full days to
reach Katrina victims in New Orleans. Supplies were not sufficiently stocked before
Chapter 5
-154-
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Van Patten
Katrina hit, despite receiving a directive from President Bush on Saturday, August 27th,
to coordinate all federal disaster relief to do what is necessary to prepare and mitigate the
disaster by freeing up federal funds (www.whitehouse.gov, 2005). In particular, there
was no backup plan for evacuating citizens from New Orleans, bringing FEMA's
outdated communication systems back online after they failed to work properly, bringing
desperately needed medical supplies and relief (water, ice, MREs) to the area, accounting
for procurement shipping and tracking, or accounting for personnel locations and duties,
to name a few aspects.
Essentially, there was no business continuity plan since there was no concrete base
plan in place. In order for an organization to be able to successfully recover from a
failing portion of their organization, employees must have a strong knowledge of their
roles, responsibilities and how they may alternatively provide the services needed at that
time. FEMA was unable and unprepared to stop any type of failure from spreading
throughout the agency.
While certain statements had more evidence and examples than others, each of the
statements was proven true from the content analysis completed on the National
Response Plan, timeline, congressional testimony and compared with the organizational
research questions. In several instances, FEMA was not sufficiently prepared to
effectively mitigate this disaster. Various media
reports and federal reports indicate that
several FEMA staff members were caught off guard or surprised by Hurricane Katrina's
strength and magnitude of destruction despite frequent and thorough warnings from the
National Weather Service. It is surprising that FEMA claims that no one could have
known about Katrina's potential force and destruction since the NationalWeather Service
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is part of FEMA's Hurricane Liaison Team, along with state and local emergency
officials. From this analysis, policy recommendations can be
developed in order to
improve FEMA's disaster planning and response.
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6. Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations
The National Response Plan charges FEMA with numerous essential tasks and
responsibilities that must be completed properly and timely in order for the entire federal
relief effort to succeed. Currently, FEMA is not capable of carrying the burden placed on
its shoulders by the NRP. FEMA was not prepared to respond to a disaster ofKatrina's
magnitude as an individual agency, let alone manage several critical Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs) as the federal emergency management coordinating agency. FEMA
must make changes to its organizational functions and operating structure in order to
have the capacity and flexibility to respond to future disasters, either natural or man-
made. Currently, it is difficult to imagine that FEMA would be able to respond to an act
of terrorism in a coordinated, efficient or timely manner. FEMA had adequate advanced
warning ofKatrina's impending strength and damage, particularly because FEMA is part
of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), which is the primary federal center
for situational awareness and operations coordination. All federal agencies must report
information through the HSOC regarding potential or impending disasters. Although
FEMA had ample advanced warning to prepare for Hurricane Katrina, it appears as
though FEMA could not coordinate itself in order to prepare properly and provide a
uniform and effective response.
FEMA's incredibly poor response to Hurricane Katrina opens the door for several
recommendations. As the evidence shows, FEMA is not currently operating at full
capacity or with adequate resources in order
to properly prepare and respond to disaster
situations. FEMA appears to be run in an ad hoc manner in which situations are
addressed as they arise during a disaster, instead of being preplanned and strategically
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managed during the relief effort. Outside federal agencies claim that they met FEMA
officials for the first time when they arrived on scene to respond to an emergency. The
absence of a inter-agency working relationship results in confusion over roles and
responsibilities, miscommunication and either duplicated response efforts or omission of
action entirely. Clearly, FEMA is in need of changes and improvements to its
organization and operations in order for it to successfully function in the future.
For each research question, at least one recommendation has been developed. The
recommendations are based on the findings of the content analysis which included an
evaluation of the research questions against the responsibilities and tasks outlined in the
NRP, first hand accounts and comments of FEMA's response effort provided by
congressional testimony, and the media timeline which depicts the federal response effort
as reported to the media. Each of these data sources was compared against each of the
four research questions. The purpose of the recommendations is to enhance FEMA's
capability to respond to disaster situations with adequate response to meet the needs of
the victims/evacuees in a reasonable amount of time. It must be noted that a "reasonable
amount of
time"
would vary with each disaster and be situationally dependent on such
factors as type ofdisaster, number ofvictims, geographic location, etc.
In order for FEMA to improve its preparation and response capabilities, obtain
confidence from the American people and begin to repair its reputation, policy changes
and corrective action must occur quickly. The policy recommendations described below
are organized to address each of the four research questions. The chart below
summarizes the recommendations.
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Thesis Research Questions Recommendations
1 . How will centralization and flexibility
affect an organization's ability to effectively
respond and adapt to new and unexpected
situations?
1 . FEMAmust establish the capacity to maintain
direct communications with theWhite House
during disaster situations.
2. FEMA must adopt a policy which would
allow response procedures to be abbreviated
during disasters.
3. FEMA must create a contingency plan to
manage unforeseen circumstances.
2. To what extent will employee skill set and
situational awareness affect organizational
operations?
4. FEMA employees must be held personally
liable for their actions
5. FEMA must developminimum
communication equipment standards.
3. How will intra and external information
sharing impact communication and
performance?
6. Organizational communication must be
coordinated to ensure that the same message is
being sent and received by all FEMA employees.
7. Inter-agency federal emergency scenario
trainingmust be conducted.
4. To what extent will a business continuity
plan effect an organization's ability to timely
recover from initial failures?
8. FEMAmust develop a business continuity
plan to manage organizational disaster.
6.1. Centralization and Flexibility
1. FEMA must establish the capacity to maintain direct communications with
theWhite House during disaster situations.
The Director of FEMA should have direct communication with the White House
during federally declared disasters. A direct
communication will eliminate delays in
information passing up the hierarchal chain to
the White House and improve information
flow back down the hierarchy to FEMA from the White House. Currently, information
must pass through the communications hierarchy in FEMA and then in DHS before the
information will reach the President. As the research shows, rapid communication
between the President and FEMA is essential, particularly since FEMA is the only federal
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agency with the authority to carry out federal emergency preparedness and responses
duties on the behalf of the President of the United States. Direct communications will
increase seamless service from FEMA, miscommunications will decrease since the
information will not pass through as many hands, and lack of information being passed
both up and down the hierarchy is reduced by eliminating the number of people and
agencies that critical informationmust pass through.
This is necessary as seen in the communications between FEMA and the White
House in an attempt to confirm the levee breach. When Marty Bahamonde called FEMA
Director Brown at 7pm to advise him of what he had seen, Brown did not ask any
questions and merely stated, "Thank you. I am now going to call the White
House."
White House didn't consider the rumors confirmed until 6:30am the next morning after
they received an updated report from DHS.
2. FEMA must adopt a policy which would allow response procedures to be
abbreviated during disasters.
Current FEMA policies and procedures have been criticized by emergency
management officials and federal agencies as being cumbersome and bureaucratic which
often resulted in delayed relief response during Hurricane Katrina. For example, the
Department ofDefense became frustrated that FEMA was moving too slowly to develop
work plans for DOD to complete under FEMA's authority. As a result, DOD drafted its
own work plans and submitted them to FEMA. FEMA turned around and handed them
right back to DOD for action.
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The procedure for requesting assistance from FEMA has also been criticized as a
bureaucratic burden. FEMA would not honor requests for assistance from state
governments if the request did not exactly follow FEMA's procedure. FEMA's strict
procedural requirements resulted in delays in assistance, as states were forced to resubmit
their requests in the proper format and wait for FEMA to review and decide if the request
would be approved.
Such a streamlined policy would provide a skeletal outline of critical steps in an
emergency response that cannot be bypassed during a disaster response while omitting
procedures that can be completed once the emergency need is met, or eliminated entirely.
This policy would alleviate the bureaucratic ripple effect that state and local governments
experience from FEMA policies and procedures. In addition, increased response times,
reduced miscommunication and less confusionwill result.
3. FEMA must create a contingency plan to manage unforeseen circumstances.
Unforeseen circumstances are inevitable during a disaster. FEMA must develop a
policy that will direct FEMA to respond to such circumstances in addition to the primary
disaster. This policy must allow for operational and emergency response flexibility in
order to accommodate a seemingly endless list of unforeseen circumstances that may
arise during a disaster. Such situations may include a secondary disaster including:
weather related complications, lack of electricity, insufficient transportation and the like.
There is no guarantee that only one disaster will occur at a time.
For example, the events of September 11, 2001 were several separate disasters that
snowballed together to collectively demand a coordinated
federal response, assistance to
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victims, an investigation of events, and recovery. The following actions that occurred on
September 11, 2001 each represent a separate disaster; the first plane crashing into the
north tower, the second plane crashing into the south tower, a plane striking the
Pentagon, Flight 93 crashing in Pennsylvania, intelligence suggesting the White House as
an additional target, individually providing protection for the President and Vice
President, the north tower collapsing, the south tower collapsing, the establishment of a
'no fly zone', and all nationwide air traffic halted (CNN, 2001).
Such contingency plans would allow FEMA to continue its response operations
despite encountering situations that may deviate from the National Response Plan (NRP).
The NRP does not include provisions for managing secondary disasters. Without such, a
secondary disaster situation may have the ability to paralyze FEMA's response efforts
and leave FEMA unable to recover from this failure.
There are several components that must be included in a contingency plan, such an
internal and external communications hierarchy, prioritized list of essential tasks and
functions, primary and secondary FEMA personnel charged with completing the
prioritized list and additional federal agencies who may provide assistance to the list.
6.2. Employee Competency
4. FEMA employees must be held personally liable for their actions.
Based on the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act,
federal employees are not held personally liable for their actions and decisions made
during a disaster situation. More specifically, the act states that, "The Federal
Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance of
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
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Federal agency or an employee of the Federal Government in carrying out the provisions
of this
Act"
(Disastersrus.org, 2006). FEMA officials should reverse this federal law by
enacting a policy that would hold FEMA employees accountable for their actions and
also lack of action. By holding federal workers personally accountable for their actions
and opening up the possibility of lawsuits and liability, FEMA employees would
undoubtedly act in more cautious and personally invested manner with their actions and
decisions. This change in policy has the potential to increase employee performance,
accuracy and accountability. Several professions, most specifically first responders, are
already accountable and personally liable for their actions on a daily basis, such as police
officers and emergencymedical technicians. FEMA employees should be no different.
Typically, in the hierarchal chain of federal emergency management, FEMA is
considered to be a third responder. The local government resources are first responders
to a disaster. Once overwhelmed by the size and scope of the disaster, the local
government relies on the state government to intervene and provide resources. If the
state government also becomes overwhelmed, then the state governor requests federal
assistance. This is the point at which FEMA becomes involved. Generally, most
disasters in the United States are managed and the local and state level without the need
to involve the federal government.
This policy should extend only to
direct hires of FEMA, not contracted vendors,
volunteers, or FEMA reservists. Additionally, FEMA employees should be held
accountable by agency administrators and federal officials for all actions as well as lack
of action that clearly do not adhere to
FEMA policy or directives, or the mandated
missions and actions outlined in the NRP. FEMA employees should be held personally
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liable and vulnerable to lawsuits in instances in which unnecessary suffering, loss of life,
and property damage occurred as a direct result of a FEMA employee's imposed action
or decision-making during disaster planning, mitigation and recovery. The possibility of
FEMA supervisors and direct reports also being held liable would be situational
dependent.
In fact, on February 9, 2007, a U.S. District Court judge ruled that the Army Corps of
Engineers may be sued for negligence with regard to the flood damage that ravaged New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Newslnferno, 2007). "In that ruling, a federal judge
allowed a suit to proceed charging the Corps was liable for the flooding of eastern New
Orleans and suburban St. Bernard Parish by waters from the Mississippi River-Gulf
Outlet"
(Burdeau, 2007). If the Corps is found liable in court, they may be responsible
for billions of dollars in damages (News Inferno, 2007).
Professional development is critical to the operability of FEMA. Accordingly,
FEMA employees must be provided with consistent training to become skilled and
knowledgeable in response efforts and activities. Therefore, there should be no
opportunity for FEMA officials to be excluded from being held accountable and liable for
their actions due to the gravity and serious wrought by disaster situations. Other
professionals, again police officers, are not held to that same standard and are personally
responsible for their actions in each situation they may encounter as a police officer. For
example, according to media reports, Mississippi SheriffBilly McGee of Forest County,
Mississippi, "commandeered two 18-wheelers full of ice from Camp Shelby, a FEMA
staging area, after five days passed with little relief for residents living without electricity
in the wake of the deadly
storm"
(Mohr, 2006).
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AllExpert summarizes the incident regarding SheriffBillyMcGee (AllExperts, 2006):
In the afternoon of September 4, 2005, Sheriff Billy McGee sent three
deputies to the FEMA Distribution Center co-located at Camp Shelby.
They asked the coordinator why the trucks weren't moving out and the
coordinator told them that the eleven ice drop-off points had not been
completely set up yet. The deputies immediately commandeered two
semi-trucks and their drivers and started to move out. U.S. Army Captain
Michael Bryant climbed on the step of one of the trucks and tried to talk to
the driver. The deputies removed him from the truck, handcuffed him,
and arrested him for disorderly conduct and interference with a police
officer. CPT Bryant claimed he sustained injuries to his hands, arms, face,
and shoulder as well as nerve damage to his hands from the handcuffs
being too tight.
The ice was delivered to Mississippi Katrina victims and many needed the ice to keep
their medications cold (Mohr, 2006). Sheriff Billy McGee is being charged with
interfering with, intimidating and impeding a federal officer. The three deputies involved
are all facing federal felony charges (AllExperts, 2006).
As the evidence in Chapter 4 has shown, there are several instances in which FEMA
employees were untrained and not familiar with processes. Gary LaGrange, President
and CEO of Port ofNew Orleans, testified before the Senate Committee on Finance on
September 28, 2005 in which he stated, "However, it is difficult to keep the FEMA
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person focused on one crisis. FEMA employees are often moved around to address the
newest crisis and that often delays recovery ofolder
problems."
5. FEMA must develop minimum communication equipment standards.
Minimum communication procurement standards should be developed and
recommended by FEMA for all federal, state and local emergency officials which would
provide procurement guidance for governments and emergency management officials. It
is expected that future communication equipment procurement by states and federal
agencies would follow FEMA's recommended standards. Over time, increased
equipment compatibility and communication flow can be expected. Such standards
would also create a shift with communications manufacturing to develop products that
meet FEMA standards in order to compete in the marketplace.
It is important that support agencies for NRP Emergency Support Functions in which
FEMA is a coordinating or primary agency be able to communication quickly, efficiency
and consistently. The ability for equipment to be used interchangeably by federal and
state governments will decrease confusion related to operating various models of
equipment. It will increase the ability of agencies/governments to work together to
supplement deficient equipment needs as well as ensure a timely, steady and unified
response.
6.3. Information Sharing
6. Organizational communication must be coordinated to ensure that the same
message is being sent and received by all FEMA employees.
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Regular agency-wide debriefs must be conducted by an agency designee to ensure all
employees are receiving informational updates at the same time and from the same
source. Such debriefs may be conducted electronically as to be able to reach
organizational employees who may be in staged in different parts of the nation.
Employees will increasingly become more organized with the status of critical tasks,
reduce redundancy of responsibilities and efforts, and provide a more unified response as
everyone has access to the same knowledge, updates and agency directives.
There are several instances in which communication was lacking as well as all
employees receiving the same message. Michael Brown told the Senate Bipartisan Select
Committee one ofhis biggest failures was, ". . .failing to properly utilize the media as first
informer."
Brown testified on a September 27, 2005 hearing before the House Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, "We should have been feeding that information to the press. . . in the manner and
time that we wanted to, instead of letting the press drive
us."
7. Inter-agency federal emergency scenario training must be conducted.
To increase inter-organizational communications, emergency scenario simulation
training (similar to the Hurricane Pam exercise) among various federal agencies must be
conducted on an annual basis, at minimum.
This type of training will allow federal agencies to work together on simulated crises
in order to increase a seamless provision of emergency response services, enhance
communication between agencies and allow agencies to build working relationships
among each other. The
federal agencies that should be involved in such scenario training
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would be based on the National Response Plan's Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).
The agencies that are part of the ESFs in which FEMA is either a coordinating or primary
agency should participate in the annual interagency training to ensure a unified and
efficient response to emergencies.
Based on this structure, training would be conducted annually on 5 out of the 15
ESFs. While many federal agencies seem to be involved in each ESF as support
agencies, many of these are involved in multiple ESFs which therefore increases the
necessity for each agency to send representatives to participate in the training. Funding
for the training should be set up as nondiscretionary to demonstrate the nation's
dedication to national preparedness and to guarantee future training sustainability.
6.4. Business Continuity Planning
8. FEMA must develop a business continuity plan to manage organizational
disaster.
Internally, FEMA must design a business continuity plan to manage an organizational
disaster. Disaster may occur with any ofFEMA's responsibilities as outlined by the five
NRP's EFSs in which FEMA is a primary or coordinating agency.
FEMA is the sole federal agency charged with coordinating the federal response to
disasters and emergencies. Essentially, FEMA is the nerve center of the federal response.
When the hub of information and coordination falls apart, so will the supporting agencies
as their direction, guidance and support for action is lost. FEMA must be able to plan for
organizational disasters and appropriately halt them from spreading through the agency.
For example, ifFEMA's mobile communication vehicles are not functional, the response
effort cannot cease. FEMA must be able to move on and work around a failure that may
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be experienced in one part of the organization and not allow it to paralyze the entire
organizational effort.
In each department, a back-up individual or team (based on departmental structure)
should be identified. This person or team should also be included in all training
opportunities as the "first
string"
FEMA responders. In addition, a metric must be
developed to determine when this back-up should be activated and define what
constitutes a failed response, such as having a time limit for certain services or functions
to be delivered or completed.
6.5. Summary
The recommendations listed above will assist FEMA in providing a streamlined,
timely, and organized response effort. With such policy changes, FEMA will be able to
operate with less federal red tape, increase internal and external communications, provide
procedures to recover from agency failure and increase interagency cohesiveness.
In the past, FEMA has been repeatedly criticized for not implementing
recommendations that have made by various government entities and officials after
numerous other disaster situations, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that FEMA was lacking in the
following areas: assessing damage and the needs of victims; providing food, shelter and
other essential services to disaster victims when the need for resources overburdens state
and local faculties and adequately preparing for such a disaster even with advanced
warnings (GAO, 1993, p.l). The same inadequacies have been cited again 13 years later
with FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina. It appears that FEMA has not made
concerted efforts to correct its emergency response inadequacies. The recommendations
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listed above will address and correct several of the chronic deficiencies that FEMA has
experienced repeatedly in the past.
The public and other agencies have since lost confidence that FEMA is competent to
properly plan for and successfully manage emergency situations after witnessing
recurring disastrous and pathetic emergency response. FEMA must make
changes to its
organization in order to demonstrate its commitment to emergency management
including national preparedness and response. The recommendations outlined above are
key strategies that would bring FEMA to the road of recovery and allow for FEMA to
begin making noticeable and sustained improvements in its
disaster planning and
response.
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7. Chapter 7: Limitations of Study
No research is without its limitations and this research project is no exception. There
are various limitations and weaknesses associated with the content analysis research
method and data sources included in this research, which must be acknowledged. This
research project also provides various future research opportunities regarding FEMA's
organizational structure and functionality, FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina, and
implementing changes that are essential for the survival and future successes ofFEMA.
7.1. Limitations ofMethodological Choice
There are alternative research methods that could have been utilized to conduct this
analysis, such as interviews or surveys. However, there are several reasons why content
analysis was selected over the other possible methodologies. Due to the scope of the
topic, a content analysis seemed to be the most compatible research method. This topic
included several layers of complexity, such as: Hurricane Katrina itself, the federal action
taken by the federal government and FEMA (conversations held, closed door decision
making, and classified information being withheld from the public by the federal
government). Other types of research would have required an analysis of federal
government officials as well as state and local leaders, citizens and other persons that
should be interviewed or surveyed. Given the size and scope of Hurricane Katrina's
destruction, such analysis is complicated and time consuming.
Data collection, by any other means, would have been difficult to obtain. Making
contact with all of the necessary federal, state and local officials in order to obtain
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interviews would have been nearly impossible. Most likely, these officials would decline
to participate in due to confidentiality and protecting political careers.
In addition, it would be difficult to determine which officials and victims should be
contacted for an interview or surveyed. Victims of Hurricane Katrina have relocated
throughout the nation. Determining the identities of victims and obtaining their current
contact information would be costly, time consuming and nearly impossible. Also,
mailing surveys to all involved officials and victims or traveling around the United States
conducting interviews with persons who were victims of Hurricane Katrina or
participated in the relief effort would be too costly.
Also, content analysis is a relatively easy and straightforward method, out of all the
research methods with regards to ease of replication (Sommer, 2000). Typically, the
materials used in a content analysis research can be made available for others to use
(Sommer, 2000).
Finally, the quality and quantity of information that interviews or surveys could
provide must be considered. Due to the traumatic and chaotic situation of Hurricane
Katrina, victims as well as emergency officials may not be able to recall specific details
or information that would be specific or useful as the federal reports. Victims were also
not in a position to provide an accurate or specific account of the federal government's
preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina since victims were struggling to survive
without essential supplies, let alone access to news and communications equipment
where victims could closelymonitors the actions of
the federal government.
Without using the federal reports,
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina and A
Failure of Initiative, which are a thorough
compilation of federal information, it would
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not be time or cost effective to attempt to obtain the same documents providing they are
available through the Freedom of Information Act. The federal government has the
authority, unlike individual citizens, to demand private correspondence, documents
and
require federal officials to provide testimony. Therefore, content analysis is the most
practical methodology for this type of analysis and topic since
there are federal
documents available that contain the information necessary for this research.
Content analysis itself has various weaknesses. This methodology allows subjective
information to be included in the research design which may be based on research
limitations including finances, time and expertise. Also, content analysis is only
able to
analyze information that is recorded or documented. Therefore, information that was not
documented, such as verbal communications, personal thoughts
or actions, cannot be
included in a content analysis. The analysis is limited by availability of material.
Observed trends in media may not be an accurate
reflection of reality (Sommer, 2000).
In other words, an event that receives more
media coverage than other may skew the
reality and importance
of either event.
Content analysis also is a descriptive means of analysis and is thus
able to explain the
information included in the research, but is not able to
draw conclusions regarding
underlying causes or
motives behind such observations (Sommer, 2000). Thus, if a
researcher desires to explore the underlying motive,
an additional research design must
be implored, otherwise the researcher is
left to make their own subjective speculations.
7.2. Limitations oftheData
Sources
The reports developed by the federal government,
A Failure of Initiative and The
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,
included information that may be difficult for
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the public to obtain, specificity, and clear examples to support the Select Bipartisan
Committee's arguments, recommendations, and criticisms. These reports were authored
by the federal government who has the power and ability to omit and suppress any
information it does not wish to be made public. The federal government also decided
what additional information would be made available to the public through media reports.
Therefore, in places, it seems as though the federal reports are vague. Access to
additional information from the federal government may have been available through the
Freedom of Information Act, however, request and processing is time and cost
prohibitive. There is a strong probability that there is further information being withheld
from public consumption.
The federal government's reports were also influenced by politics. The content of the
federal government's report may have been influenced by several aspects of politics
including: political agendas, reputations, strategies, promises or compromises with
regards to what information the reports would include and what would be left out. As
such, one can assume that there is further information regarding the federal government's
preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina that were suppressed and never made
public. Furthermore, the information included in the reports may have been tweaked or
falsified to show certain political leaders in a more favorable light while highlighting the
weaknesses and mistakes of political adversaries in hopes of swaying public opinion of
certain political leaders.
Congressional testimony provides a first hand account related to FEMA's
preparations and response actions regarding Hurricane Katrina. Congressional testimony
provides primary sources that support points
and arguments made by the federal reports
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and the media timeline. Congressional testimony provides a definitive expression and
explanation ofwhat actually occurred during the time period being examined. However,
congressional testimony does not provide the researcher an opportunity for additional
questions or specific details.
The ability for the National Response Plan to be examined against the timeline and
federal reports was restricted by the federal government's limitation of information
sharing. It is difficult to discern ifFEMA fulfilled every action outlined andmandated by
the National Response Plan. The media did not focus on reporting the progress ofFEMA
in relation to completing NRP tasks and responsibilities. The federal government also
has not released that type ofdetailed information to the public. Therefore, it is difficult to
discern what tasks were completed and what were forgotten. The federal reports and
timeline provide the closest assessment of FEMA's adherence and completion of NRP
tasks and duties.
Politics will also impact how media outlets report news. Media sources are not
politically impartial. Media outlets each have their own political biases and political
agendas. Therefore, the media is notorious for reporting based on their political leanings
and agendas. Media sources may report in a certain way as to attract political and/or
financial support.
Secondary sources are also not without limitations. The sources used for this analysis
include the federal reports A Failure ofInitiative and The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina, media reports of federal activity and communication, are secondary sources.
This research is dependent on secondary information since primary information, such as
federal correspondence/transcripts, federal meeting minutes, interviews, field reports,
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undisclosed federal agency internal policies/procedures, FEMA training curriculum, and
other similar information was not accessible to the researcher. The use of secondary
sources comes with the risk of information from the primary source may have been
skewed, misinterpreted, described poorly, or inaccurately relayed by the secondary
source either which may be done either due to lack of skill and accuracy, or intentionally
for some sort of alternate gain (political, financial, etc).
While there are several alternate research methods that could be selected for a
research design, content analysis was an appropriate research method for the restrictions
of this study and the type of data used in this analysis. Given the restrictions on time,
finances, and access to federal information, content analysis was the best choice for this
particular research design. Content analysis allowed for flexibility when analyzing
multiple data sources at once in terms of comparing secondary sources to primary.
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8. Chapter 8: Conclusions
This thesis has shown that the organizational structure of FEMA contributed to its
inability to successfully provide relief and assistance to the New Orleans victims of
Hurricane Katrina in a reasonable, sufficient and timely manner. FEMA failed in
preparing for and responding to Hurricane Katrina. Katrina survivors were left stranded
for four full days. FEMA provided an uncoordinated and delayed response in providing
relief and medical attention to survivors. Research has shown that to date, FEMA has not
made significant policy or organizational changes to improve its response efficiency
and
effectiveness.
Each of the research questions below examined an area of FEMA's deficient and
delayed response including, organization centralization and inflexibility, lack of
employee training/knowledge, lack of information sharing and lack ofpre-planning.
5. How will centralization and flexibility affect an organization's ability to
effectively respond and adapt to
new and unexpected situations?
6. To what extent will an employee's skill set and situational awareness affect
organizational operations?
7. How will internal and external information sharing impact communication and
performance?
8. To what extent will a business continuity plan effect an
organization's ability to
timely recover from initial
failures?
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8.1. FEMA Failures
It is understood that FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina was a failure on multiple
levels. FEMA made several crucial mistakes that led to its failure to achieve its mission.
FEMA lacked several necessary components in order to provide an effective, timely and
adequate response to Hurricane Katrina. FEMA's insufficient and delayed actions can be
understood through organizational theory, the theoretical framework of this research.
This analysis includes fundamental organizational theory regarding organizational failure
as related to FEMA's structure, employee competence, information sharing and pre
planning capability.
While mistakes certainly did occur throughout FEMA's inadequate response effort to
Hurricane Katrina, misconduct did not occur. Misconduct may have been considered if
FEMA intentionally and purposely did not adequately respond to Hurricane Katrina and
willfully contributed to delays and obstacles in the relief effort that furthered human
suffering and loss of life. However, this thesis has shown that FEMA's response failed
due to its organizational structure, not employee misconduct.
8.1.1. Centralization and Inflexibility
FEMA's highly centralized and inflexible federal organizational structure does not
allow FEMA to be adaptable to new or unforeseen circumstances. FEMA's federal
organizational structure is rooted in bureaucracy, which means FEMA has lengthy, and
often time consuming, procedures it must follow when a decision needs to made or action
needs to be taken. FEMA is consistently wrapped up in bureaucratic red tape so it is
unable to act or provide assistance until all necessary procedures have been appropriately
completed. FEMA is not structured or authorized by the federal government to adjust
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policies and procedures based on the type of emergency or disaster that FEMA is
planning for, or responding to in order to provide such assistance in a more timely
manner. FEMA, as the only federal agency that coordinates planning and relief of
national emergencies and disasters, must be able to function and fulfill its primary
objective of saving human life without being tied up with bureaucratic red tape.
8.1.2. Lack ofEmployee Competence
When analyzing media reports, the White House report, and the Select Bipartisan
Committee report for a compilation of FEMA's performance and activities throughout
the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina, it becomes apparent that FEMA
suffered from several types of organizational failures. FEMA was not prepared to face
such a dramatic disaster due to lack of funding, training, staffing, and even disaster focus.
When Hurricane Katrina was itself a disaster, these series of FEMA's failures have been
criticized as a second disaster.
After FEMA's absorption into the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) in 2003,
FEMA lost a number of essential tools for carrying out its functions and mission. Senior
FEMA staffmembers with expertise in the field either left the agency or were reassigned
to other parts of DHS (A Failure of Initiative, 2004). FEMA suffered budget cuts. A
large number of positions remained vacant. FEMA's focus was shifted from disaster
management to terrorism. FEMA no longer had the ability to properly train staff or train
with other federal agencies. Lack of available funds severely restricted procurement for
equipment upgrades as well as employee training funding (A Failure ofInitiative, 2004).
The lack of financial resources and loss of seasoned personnel as well as expertise in
2003 left a huge gap and loss of direction for the remaining FEMA employees to fill.
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FEMA was not able to adequately train its remaining and new employees, or focus on
emergency and disaster management. The federal report, A Failure ofInitiative describes
the lack of FEMA training and employee knowledge in a 2004 FEMA memo, which
illustrated the dismal preparations that FEMA response teams had. The memo explained
that due to lack of funding for training and equipment upgrades, FEMA response teams
had been reduced to merely names on a roster.
8.1.3. Lack of Information Sharing
Non-filtered communication is the key to the successful management of any
emergency or disaster situation. FEMA was not able to easily or consistently share
information with its employees or with other agencies. Throughout the relief effort of
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA experienced a lack of both intra-communication and inter
communication. FEMA did not pre-deploy adequate communications units to the Gulf
Region in preparation for Hurricane Katrina. The equipment that was positioned was
outdated, could not communicate with the equipment other agencies used, and was not
placed in practical locations to quickly establish communications after the hurricane.
Frequently, communications equipment was not functioning or had to be located and
moved out of flood waters to more optimal locations. Throughout the relief efforts of
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA found itself unable to communicate within its agency or with
other federal, state and local government agencies. This lack of communication hindered
coordination among agencies and within
FEMA caused delays in the arrival of relief and
caused the unnecessary duplication ofvarious
relief efforts bymultiple agencies.
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8.1.4. Lack ofBusiness Continuity Planning
FEMA did not have a recovery plan in place to assist the agency in continuing its
relief effort should a portion of its response plan fail. Without such a plan, the failure
experience in one area of FEMA was able to spread to the rest of the agency. For
example, FEMA did not have a back-up plan to manage the nonfunctioning
communications systems, accurately locate or track supply shipments, coordinate with
other federal agencies, or navigate through flooded areas to bring relief supplies to
residents ofNew Orleans. FEMA was not able to recover from these and other failures
experienced during its relief effort in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. A business
continuity plan should include also include technology. If one technology fails, an
alternate technology should be available for us. For example, FEMA relied on outdated
technology to conduct situation assessments and prioritize relief needs
which created
delays in developing mission orders for the military. Instead of bringing in alternate
technology and equipment to properly complete the
task and correct this failure, FEMA
gave up and turned this duty over to the military. In early September,
FEMA requested
that the Department ofDefense (DOD) take over the logistics of coordinating the military
response effort.
8.2. Data Sources
The timeline by The Brookings Institute, Fact Check
and Think Progress provided
accounts of what happened during FEMA's preparation and response to New
Orleans.
Conflicting reports can be found
within this timeline. It is important to note such
conflicts as it depicts the type of confusion and
miscommunication that took place in the
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aftermath ofHurricane Katrina. This confusion and misunderstanding was subsequently
conveyed to the media and general public.
The National Response Plan (NRP) provides the standard or checklist that FEMA's
actions should be compared against. The NRP is an outline for what should have
happened during the federal response. The NRP is a relatively new document and was
implemented in 2004 by President Bush. The NRP was used for the first time during the
response to Hurricane Katrina. There has been consistent criticism by disaster
management officials and federal officials who feel that FEMA was not familiar with the
NRP and therefore was not able to fulfill the duties and responsibilities it had.
The federal reports also provided additional information regarding what actually
happened during the response to Katrina that were not previously included in media
reports. The federal reports, A Failure of Initiative and The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina are the result of investigations initiated by the White House and
Congress to evaluate the federal response to Katrina. Therefore, the federal investigating
body of each report had the authority to demand federal documents that were classified
and not available to the public.
Congressional testimony is another important data source in this analysis.
Congressional testimony is the main primary data used for this evaluation. Testimony
was gathered from both the US Senate and US House from federal officials, Senators,
Congressmen, state and local disaster management employees and the like. Testimony
also provides first hand accounts of the overall federal response effort, as well as
criticisms and identification of poor performance. Congressional testimony is beneficial
for further supporting the timeline, as well.
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The timeline, NRP and congressional testimony were collectively compared against
the research statements derived from the organizational theoretical framework in order to
assess what should have happened versus what actually happened regarding FEMA's
response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans between August 26, 2005 and September
5, 2005. Recommendations were made based on the findings of this content analysis.
Each theoretical statement has its own recommendation(s).
8.3. Recommendations
FEMA's inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina has reaffirmed the lost credibility
and trust for FEMA felt within the emergency management field as well as from
American citizens. FEMA has been criticized that it is no longer able to adequately
prepare for and provide a timely, coordinated and effective response to emergency and
disasters. In order for FEMA to regain its credibility in the field, build internal
confidence, empower its employees, successfully prepare response efforts and provide
adequate relief assistance to victims and survivors, several critical changes to FEMA's
organizational structure must be implemented.
8.3.1. Centralization and Flexibility
FEMA must have more flexibility in its policies to accommodate unforeseen
circumstances. During an emergency situation, bureaucracy needs to be curtailed in
order to alleviate time intensive procedures that could delay relief efforts. This would
include the ability to streamline bureaucratic
processes while completing critical disaster
response activities. Such streamlined procedures may be completed at a later date after
the disaster has passed the response stage.
Chapter 8
-183-
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Van Patten
Also, a catch-all policy and procedure should be created to manage unplanned
outcomes within FEMA. This policymust allow for operational and emergency response
flexibility in order to accommodate a seemingly endless list of unforeseen circumstances
that may arise during a disaster. Currently, the National Response Plan does not have
any provisions for managing secondary disasters or other unforeseen circumstances.
FEMA was not prepared for Hurricane Katrina, even though there were ample warnings
announcing Katrina's arrival. One can only wonder how well FEMA would handle a
terrorist attack, especially since such attacks are likely to come without any warning at
all.
Direct communication should also be developed between FEMA and the White
House to ensure more accurate flow of information to and from the White House. This
would eliminate the need for passing information up the federal hierarchy through the
Department ofHomeland Security and then onto the White House. Passing information
up the hierarchy delays the delivery of information and also allows the opportunity for
information to be miscommunicated as the information is passed through additional
hands.
8.3.2. Employee Competence
In order to allow FEMA officials to respond to disasters with more accuracy, capacity
and enhanced skill-sets, FEMA employees should be held personally liable for their
actions, as is the common practice in many other professions. This would push FEMA
employees to perform at a higher level, eliminate careless errors and grow more
dedicated to the mission of FEMA due to the looming threat of personal liability should
FEMA fail to respond adequately to the needs of the victims/evacuees. Also, an
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incredibly poor response by FEMA to an emergency situation has the potential to create a
secondary disaster. For example, FEMA's delayed rescue of victims and evacuees
stranded in attics, on roofs and in the blistering sun resulted in a rather large number of
cases of sun poisoning, dehydration, sun burn and other associated illnesses.
FEMA must also properly train its staff members. Training needs to occur with all
federal agencies in an attempt to encourage a seamless federal response in which each
agency is familiarwith the operations and functions of the other.
Also, minimum communication procurement standards should be developed and
recommended by FEMA for all federal, state and local emergency officials. This would
provide procurement guidance for governments and emergency management officials.
Such standards would also create a shift with communications manufacturers to develop
products that meet FEMA standards in order to remain competitive.
8.3.3. Information Sharing
Regular agency-wide debriefs must be conducted by an agency designee to ensure all
employees are receiving informational updates at the same time and from the same
source. Employees will become increasingly more organized with the status of critical
tasks, reduce redundancy of responsibilities and efforts, and provide a more unified
response as everyone has access to the same knowledge, updates and agency directives.
To increase inter-organizational communications, emergency scenario simulation
training (similar to the Hurricane Pam exercise) among
various federal agencies must be
conducted on an annual basis, at minimum. This type of training will allow federal
agencies to work together on simulated crises in order to increase a seamless provision of
emergency response services,
build internal confidence, foster trust, enhance
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communication between agencies and allow agencies to build working relationships
among each other.
8.3.4. Business Continuity Planning
FEMA must develop a business continuity plan for itself in order to carry out its
duties and responsibilities despite experiencing a failure in one part of its response.
FEMA must be able to carry on and provide an effective and timely disaster response.
FEMA is the only federal agency with the authority and responsibility to coordinate the
entire federal response to disasters and emergencies. Essentially, FEMA is the nerve
center of the federal response. When the hub of information and coordination falls apart,
so do the supporting agencies as they lose their direction, guide and support for action.
FEMA must be able to plan for organizational disasters and appropriately halt them from
spreading through the agency.
8.4. Next Steps
FEMA's preparations and response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is still a relatively
new topic of interest for researchers. While there have been a number of studies already
conducted, there are plenty of opportunities for future research on FEMA, its
organizational structure and its responses to emergencies and disasters.
This analysis provides several opportunities for additional research. Research
focusing on primary data sources involved in Hurricane Katrina would provide for a
more in depth examination and first hand account of FEMA's response efforts, failures
and successes. Such research may be accomplished through interviews or surveys of key
federal officials and state/local disaster management leaders who were affected by
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Hunicane Katrina. Interviews and surveys would allow the research to develop new
questions that may not have been asked through congressional testimony and would
provide an opportunity for new information to be brought to the research spotlight.
Other areas for future research include a more in depth study of organizational
mistake and failure theory as related to how FEMA is structured and its operating
abilities. There may be additional factors that are involved in FEMA's emergency
response limitations that are not immediately apparent or known to the public. This type
of research may require access to documents and information that is not readily
accessible to the public, particularly on the organization and functionality of FEMA and
the federal government.
Another research opportunity includes a study of the severity and effects of federal
bureaucracy on FEMA's ability to provide timely and adequate disaster preparations and
response to disaster situations. It is established that bureaucratic red tape delayed and at
times paralyzed the federal response due to the overburdening need for approvals,
specific paperwork being required before action could be taken, lack of information flow
and situational awareness, as well as the unwillingness for FEMA to bypass
overcomplicated procedures in order push relief resources into New Orleans. This red
tape resulted in inexcusable additional loss of life and property damage as relief efforts
were delayed or never fulfilled due to multiple instances ofbureaucratic red tape.
Also, the focus of this thesis was related to FEMA's initial response to Hurricane
Katrina in New Orleans. Future research opportunities could examine FEMA's response
to Hurricane Katrina in other affected areas in the GulfRegion and create a comparison.
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It is possible that the federal response documented in this thesis may be unique to New
Orleans and not uniform throughout the GulfRegion.
Providing FEMA implements the recommendations outlined in Chapter 6, future
research may include an evaluation of the recommendations after a specific
time period
to determine if the recommendations are impacting FEMA and its functional abilities
negatively, positively or neither. The impact of training and related changes may
also be
researched. From this research, additional recommendations for improving FEMA's
training and capabilities may be developed, or the recommendations
in Chapter 6 may be
adjusted and then reevaluated.
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I. Appendix 1 - Timeline Extension
This timeline is an extension of the timeline presented in Chapter 4. The information
in this section is not directly related to FEMA and its activities in New Orleans between
August
26th
and September
5th
2005 and thus was not included in the timeline in Chapter
4. The information in this section describes additional activities that occurred during
Hurricane Katrina, including actions of other federal agencies, and descriptive
information about Hurricane Katrina. The most pertinent information, which is
underlined, demonstrates other inadequacies and poor decision-making within the federal
government. The data below demonstrates several areas of inadequacy, naivety, lack of
situational awareness, and advancing ofpolitical agendas.
Most shockingly, President Bush and other federal officials frequently staged photo
opportunities for press releases and political prestige as well as attended to personal
events and errands instead of focusing their attention and efforts on the relief response.
The staged photo opportunities incorporated the use of relief workers who were diverted
from providing rescue and relief assistance, to posing with President Bush. A lack of
situational awareness was illustrated several times as President Bush and other federal
officials addressed the media rather ambiguously and briefly regarding the Katrina relief
effort and indicate the relief effort was proceeding well when in reality efforts were
delayed and insufficient. There are also instances throughout the federal response where
President Bush and federal officials blatantly lied to the public and maintained they did
not have knowledge of certain pieces of information.
Appendix I -189-
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Van Patten
Friday August 26th, 2005
Gulf Coast States request troop assistance from the Pentagon. At a 9/1 press
conference, Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina, said
that the Gulf States began the process of requesting additional forces on Friday,
8/26. (Think Progress)
Sunday August
28th
1 L31am - President Bush, from his Crawford ranch, delivers statement vowing to
help those affected. His statement contains 203 words about Katrina and 819
congratulating Iraqis on their new constitution. "We will do everything in our
power to help the people in the communities affected by this
storm."
he says of
the approaching hurricane. (Brookings and Fact Checks
6pm Nagin orders a curfew of 6 PM. (Brookings)
Gov. Blanco requests disaster relief funds (some evidence of this request was on
8/27/05) (Brookings)
President Bush declares State ofEmergency inMississippi, Florida, and Alabama.
(Brookings)
Monday August
29th
8am - Mayor Nagin reports that water is flowing over the levees. "I've gotten
reports this morning that there is already water coming over some of the levee
systems. In the lower ninth ward, we've had one of our pumping stations stop
operating, so we will have significant flooding, it is just a matter of how
much."
(Think Progress)
Morning
- Mayfield warns Bush about the toppling of the levees. In the same
briefing, Max Mayfield, National Hurricane Center Director, warns, "This is a
category 5 hurricane, very similar to Hurricane Andrew in the maximum
intensity, but there's a big big difference. This hurricane is much larger than
Andrew ever was. I also want to make absolutely clear to everyone that the
greatest potential for large loss of lives is still in the coastal areas from the storm
surge. ... I don't think anyone can tell you with any confidence right now whether
the levees will be topped or not, but there's obviously a very very grave
concern."
(Think Progress)
Morning
- Bush calls Chertoff to discuss immigration. "I spoke to Mike Chertoff
today he's the head of the Department of Homeland Security. I knew people
would want me to discuss this issue [immigration], so we got us an airplane on
a telephone on Air Force One, so I called him. I said, are you working with the
governor? He said, you bet we
are."
(Think Progress)
Morning
- Bush shares a birthday cake photo opportunity with Senator John
McCain (Think Progress)
1 1 :06 am - Bush visits a resort in El Mirage, Arizona to promote Medicare drug
benefit during a 44-minute event. He devotes 156 words to the hurricane, among
them: "I want the folks there on the Gulf Coast to know that the federal
government is prepared to help you when the storm passes. I want to thank the
governors of the affected regions for mobilizing assets prior to the arrival of the
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storm to help citizens avoid this devastating
storm."
(Think Progress and Fact
Check)
11:13am - The White House circulates an internal memo regarding the levee
breach. "Flooding is significant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans
has reportedly been breached sending 6-8 feet of water throughout the 9th ward
area of the
city."
(Think Progress)
4:40pm - Bush appears in Rancho Cucamonga, California for another Medicare
event. He again devotes a few words to Katrina: "It's a storm now that is moving
through, and now it's the time for governments to help people get their feet on the
ground. .. For those of you who are concerned about whether or not we're prepared
to help, don't be. We are. We're in place. We've got equipment in place, supplies
in place. And once the once we're able to assess the damage, we'll be able to
move in and help those good folks in the affected
areas."
(Think Progress and
Fact Check!
8pm - Rumsfeld attends San Diego Padres baseball game. Rumsfeld "joined
Padres President John Moores in the owner's box...at Petco
Park."
(Think
Progress)
Tuesday August 30
11:04am - In San Diego, California, Bush delivers a 31-minute speech marking
the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. Of Katrina, he says, "we're
beginning to move in the help that people
need."
(Fact Check and Think Progress)
Immediately after the speech. White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan tells
reporters that Bush will return to Crawford, then cut short his Texas stay and go to
Washington. McClellan says, "This is one of the most devastating storms in our
nation's history. I think that's becoming clear to everyone. The devastation is
enormous."
(Think Progress)
Pentagon claims there are adequate National Guard troops in the region
"Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita said the states have adequate National
Guard units to handle the hurricane
needs."
(Think Progress)
2pm - Bush plays guitar with country singerMarkWillis (Think Progress)
Bush returns to Crawford for the final night ofhis vacation (Think Progress)
At a Baton Rouge briefing, Sen. Mary Landrieu reports that "most of the roads
and highways are impassable, and water is still coming into the city of New
Orleans. The water is up to the rooftops in St. Bernard and Plaquemine. We think
there may be only one major way into the city right now and it has to be used for
emergency personnel to get food and water and rescue equipment to people who
are in desperate
need."
o US Sen. David Vitter said of the still-risingwater:
Sen. Vitter: In the metropolitan area in general, in the huge
majority of areas, it's not rising at all. It's the same or it may be
lowering slightly. In some parts of New Orleans, because of the
17th Street breach, it may be rising and that seemed to be the case
in parts of downtown. I don't want to alarm everybody that, you
know. New Orleans is filling up like a bowl. That's just not
happening.
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o None of the officials present at the press conference correct the mistaken
remark. And Blanco seems puzzled when a reporter asks the governor
about the water pollution that will later emerge as a major public health
risk:
Q: Does the water that's downtown ~ does this represent what
everyone feared before the hurricane would come, that you would
have this toxic soup that has overrun the city?
Blanco: It didn't - I wouldn't think it would be toxic soup right
now. I think it's just water from the lake, water from the canals.
It's, you know, water.
Q: Well, something could be underneath that water.
Blanco: Pardon?
(Fact Check)
3:00pm - Officials report that the Army Corps of Engineers has surveyed the
levee damage and will soon attempt repairs (Fact Check)
5:50pm - President Bush announces that he will cut vacation short. (Brookings)
8:55pm - Army Corps ofEngineers begin work on 17th St levee. (Brookings)
The convention center was discussed as a possible option for refugees by New
Orleans officials, but it was never officially chosen as a place of refuge. It was not
a shelter listed in the New Orleans Comprehensive EmergencyManagement Plan.
Unclear as to why it became a shelter. (Brookings)
WednesdayAugust
31st
Early morning
- Gov. Blanco again request assistance from Bush. "She was
transferred around the White House for a while until she ended up on the phone
with Fran Townsend, the president's Homeland Security adviser, who tried to
reassure her but did not have many specifics. Hours later, Blanco called back and
insisted on speaking to the president. When he came on the line, the governor
recalled, "I just asked him for help, 'whatever you
have' "
She asked for 40,000
troops."
(Think Progress and Brookings)
Early
- Bush passes over New Orleans in Air Force One on his way back to
Washington. His press secretary tells reporters: "The President, when we were
passing over that part ofNew Orleans, said, 'It's devastating, it's got to be doubly
devastating on the
ground.' "
(Fact Check)
10am - Texas Governor spokesperson says that Superdome refugees will be put
in Astrodome. (Brookings)
National Guard troops arrive in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida.
Troops arrive two days after they are requested. (Think Progress)
Pentagon sends four Navy ships with emergency supplies. Launches
search-and-
rescue mission. (Brookings)
Bush organizes task force to coordinate federal response. Bush says on Tuesday
he will "fly to Washington to begin work...with a task force that will coordinate
the work of 14 federal agencies involved in the relief
effort."
(Think Progress)
Public health emergency is declared for the entire Gulf Coast. "After a natural
disaster, short and long-term medical problems can occur. Diseases like cholera,
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typhoid, hepatitis and mosquito-borne illnesses tend to break out under these
conditions."
(Think Progress)
Chertoff is "extremely pleased with the
response"
of the government. "We are
extremely pleasedwith the response that every element of the federal government,
all of our federal partners, have made to this terrible
tragedy."
(Think Progress)
4pm - Bush gives first major address on Katrina. "Nothing about the president's
demeanor. . . which seemed casual to the point of carelessness suggested
that he understood the depth of the current
crisis."
(Think Progress)
Late Afternoon Bush, back at the White House, holds a cabinet meeting on
Katrina and speaks for nine minutes in the Rose Garden to outline federal relief
efforts. He says FEMA has moved 25 search and rescue teams into the area. As
for those stranded at the Superdome, "Buses are on the way to take those people
from New Orleans to
Houston,"
the President says. (Fact Check)
7pm - Condoleezza Rice attends a Broadway show. "On Wednesday night.
Secretary Rice was booed by some audience members at 'Spamalot!, the Monty
Python musical at the Shubert, when the lights went up after the
performance."
(Think Progress)
Thursday September
1st
7am - Bush claims that no one expected the levees to break. "I don't think
anybody anticipated the breach of the
levees."
His remark comes in a live
interview on ABC's GoodMorningAmerica
o Bush: I want people to know there's a lot of help coming. I don't think
anybody anticipated the breach of the levees. They did anticipate a serious
storm. These levees got breached and as a result, much ofNew Orleans is
flooded and now we're having to deal with it and will. (Think Progress and
Fact Check)
Rice visits the U.S. Open. "Rice, [in New York] on three
days'
vacation to shop
and see the U.S. Open, hitting some balls with retired champ Monica Seles at the
Indoor Tennis Club at Grand
Central."
(Think Progress)
Rice goes shoe shopping. "Just moments ago at the Ferragamo on 5th Avenue,
Condoleeza Rice was seen spending several thousands of dollars on some nice.
new shoes. A fellow shopper, unable to fathom the absurdity of Rice's timing,
went up to the Secretary and reportedly shouted, 'How dare you shop for shoes
while thousands are dying and
homeless!' "
(Think Progress)
Sandbags arrive for levees. (Brookings)
Red Cross President Marsha Evans asks permission to enter the city with relief
supplies, but Louisiana state officials deny permission. (Fact Check)
Senators return from recess to begin work on emergency aid bill. (Brookings)
DHS Secretary Chertoff states in an interview that he was not aware of the people
at the convention center until recently. (Brookings)
Friday September
2nd
Rove-led campaign to blame local officials begins. "Under the command of
President Bush's two senior political advisers, the White House rolled out a
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plan... to contain the political damage from the administration's response to
Hurricane
Katrina."
President Bush's comments from the Rose Garden Friday
morning formed "the start of this
campaign."
(Think Progress)
The Red Cross renews its request to enter the city with relief supplies. Louisiana
officials say they needed 24 hours to provide an escort and prepare for the Red
Cross's arrival. However, 24 hours later, a large-scale evacuation is underway and
the Red Cross relief effort never reaches New Orleans. (Fact Check)
Early morning - Bush watches DVD of the week's newscasts created by his staff
who thought he "needed to see the horrific reports". "The reality, say several
aides who did not wish to be quoted because it might displease the president, did
not really sink in until Thursday night. Some White House staffers were watching
the evening news and thought the president needed to see the horrific reports
coming out ofNew Orleans. Counselor Bartlett made up a DVD of the newscasts
so Bush could see them in their entirety as he flew down to the Gulf Coast the
next morning on Air Force
One."
(Think Progress)
10am - Bush stages photo-op "briefing". Coast Guard helicopters and crew
diverted to act as backdrop for President Bush's photo-op. (Think Progress)
Noon A convoy ofmilitary trucks drives through floodwaters to the convention
center, the first supplies of water and food to reach victims who have waited for
days. Thousands of armed National Guardsmen carrying weapons stream into the
city to help restore order. (Fact Check)
Bush visits ground food aid. "Three tons of food ready for delivery by air to
refugees in St. Bernard Parish and on Algiers Point sat on the Crescent City
Connection Bridge Friday afternoon as air traffic was halted because ofPresident
Bush's visit to New Orleans, officials
said."
(Think Progress)
Levee repair work orchestrated for Bush's visit. Sen. Mary Landrieu, 9/3:
"Touring this critical site yesterday with the President, I saw what I believed to be
a real and significant effort to get a handle on a major cause of this catastrophe-
Flying over this critical spot again this morning, less than 24 hours later, it
became apparent that yesterday we witnessed a hastily prepared stage set for a
Presidential photo opportunity; and the desperately needed resources we saw were
this morning reduced to a single, lonely piece of
equipment."
(Think Progress)
Bush uses 50 firefighters as props in disaster area photo-op. A group of 1,000
firefighters convened in Atlanta to volunteer with the Katrina relief efforts. Of
those, "a team of 50 Monday morning quickly was ushered onto a flight headed
for Louisiana. The crew's first assignment: to stand beside President Bush as he
tours devastated
areas."
(Think Progress)
12pm - Bush tours the Gulf area and indicates he is "satisfied with the response".
"I am satisfied with the response. I am not satisfied with all the
results."
(Think
Progress and Brookings)
More National Guardsmen arrive; 6500 arrive New Orleans, 20,000 by day's end
in LA andMS. (Brookings)
Congress approves $10.5 billion for immediate rescue and relief efforts.
(Brookings)
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Fifteen airlines begin flying refugees out of New Orleans to San Antonio.
(Brookings)
5:01pm Bush speaks at New Orleans airport, saying, "I know the people of this
part of the world are suffering, and I want them to know that there's a
flow of
progress. We're making
progress."
(Fact Check)
Saturday September 3rd
Senior Bush Administration official lies to the Washington Post bv claiming that
Gov. Blanco never declared a state of emergency. The Post reported in their
Sunday edition "As of Saturday, Blanco still had not declared a state of
emergency, the senior Bush official
said."
They were forced to issue a correction
hours later. (Think Progress)
9am - Bush blames state and local officials. "fTIhe magnitude of responding to a
crisis over a disaster area that is larger than the size of Great Britain has created
tremendous problems that have strained state and local capabilities. The result is
that many of our citizens simply are not getting the help they
need."
(Think
Progress)
10:06am - Bush announces he is ordering additional active duty forces to the Gulf
coast. "The enormity of the task requires more
resources,"
he says in his Saturday
radio address. "In America we do not abandon our fellow citizens in their hour of
need."
He says 4,000 active-duty troops are already in the area and 7,000 more
will arrive in the next 72 hours. Those will add to some 21,000 National Guard
troops already in the region. (Brookings and Fact Check)
40,000 National Guardsmen now on GulfCoast. (Brookings)
New Orleans police report 200 officers have walked off the job, 2 committed
suicide. (Brookings)
Sunday September
4th
Gov. Blanco declares State ofPublic Health Emergency. (Brookings)
The President issues a proclamation ordering the US Flag to be flown at half-staff
at all federal building until Sept. 20 "as a mark of respect for the victims of
Hurricane
Katrina."
(Fact Check)
Monday September
5th
Gap in
17th
Street Canal levee closed by Army Corps ofEngineers. Still repairing
another gap. Army CoE begin to pump water from the city.
(Brookings and Fact
Check)
Bush returns to the region. 4,700 more active duty troops dispatched. (Brookings)
500 New Orleans officers unaccounted for. (Brookings)
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